Attack on Pearl Harbor, new book

[msieving1]

ORIGINAL: Disco Duck

I have always wondered why the Battleships weren't used more during the early stages of the war. The answer seems to be that Nimitz was afraid to.

There's never been any great mystery as to why Nimitz didn't use the battleships more early in the war.

1) They were too slow to keep up with the carriers.
2) They used too much fuel, and the Pacific Fleet didn't have enough oilers to support them.

[Mynok]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

ORIGINAL: hbrsvl

spence-Re "landing on carriers." There was good reason for this.

Shokaku and Zuikaku (CarDiv 5) were brand new ships, commissioned in 9/41, etc., with very green air crew.

These crews were so green they were allocated to strike air and ground installations, not the fleet.

Hugh Browne

This begs the question as to why the pilots of these units are so highly rated in WitP AE.

They aren't nearly as good as CarDiv 1 and 2 pilots.

[vettim89]

I have not yet bought this book and am now disinclined to do so. I have noticed that many modern authors (not all) have a nasty tendency to let personal bias influence their writings. While I enjoyed Castles of Steel, I must say that Massie obviously disliked both Churchill and Beatty and chose to paint them in as negative a light as possible. I found the same type of writing in Evans' Sea of Thunder - especially his criticism of LCmdr Evans.

My copy of Sixteen Hundred Men shipped today. Will give a review when it arrives and I finish it

[John 3rd]

We reduced the skill level of CarDiv5 pilots in RA to reflect reality as shown here.

Just ordered the book. Why NOT!??

[hbrsvl]

vettim89-What is subject of "1600 Men"? Where does one order it?

Thanks, Hugh Browne

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: hbrsvl

vettim89-What is subject of "1600 Men"? Where does one order it?

Thanks, Hugh Browne

I got it from Amazon.com. It follows the USNA class of 1936 through their time at Annapolis. BTW, its Sixteen Hundred Men written out. You search for 1600 and its no joy

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: msieving1

ORIGINAL: Disco Duck

I have always wondered why the Battleships weren't used more during the early stages of the war. The answer seems to be that Nimitz was afraid to.

There's never been any great mystery as to why Nimitz didn't use the battleships more early in the war.

1) They were too slow to keep up with the carriers.
2) They used too much fuel, and the Pacific Fleet didn't have enough oilers to support them.

Caputo adds a third:

3) They were a reserve force in case the Japanese moved on the West Coast or Oahu.

(similar in concept to the Japanese employment of their primary battleline during the first stages of the war.....a reserve to protect Japan and their SRA op flank in case the US reinforced it's battle line and still sought early engagement.)

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mynok

ORIGINAL: Pascal

ORIGINAL: hbrsvl

spence-Re "landing on carriers." There was good reason for this.

Shokaku and Zuikaku (CarDiv 5) were brand new ships, commissioned in 9/41, etc., with very green air crew.

These crews were so green they were allocated to strike air and ground installations, not the fleet.

Hugh Browne

This begs the question as to why the pilots of these units are so highly rated in WitP AE.

They aren't nearly as good as CarDiv 1 and 2 pilots.

Yup....but i question the level of greeness. Less than Div1 and 2 yes.....so green they could barely fly formation? no. Zimm appears to mainly rely on Ron Werneth's "Beyond Pearl Harbor: untold stories of Japan's naval aviators" for these conclusions which is a book of interviews by surviving pilots of the IJNAF. The interviews echo the theme of almost "snobish" contempt CarDiv 1 and 2 pilots had of CarDiv5 mentioned at least once in just about every air book that touches on the JNAF. Zimm is however forced to admit at one point in his book that the Div5 pilots quote "would turn in a sterling performance, greatly exceeding all expectations and outshining the dive-bombers from the more experienced carriers." There is no direct evidence to support that Div5 pilots could not drop torps, particularily since Zimm himself points out that the TB pilots had to be pre-chosen, and then intensly trained for the specific conditions of PH. (this is why even while documenting that KB had plenty of torps for further ops, it was not simply a matter of altering the loadouts for KB....the same trained TB pilots would have to conduct the shallow harbor runs again with reloaded torps)

This didn't suprise me as CarDiv5 put in an equally sterling performance at Coral Sea as well. As with other sources, Lundstrom documented how CarDiv1/2 still looked down on them even by may of 42.

AE/WitP wise.....CarDiv5 is less rated than the older carriers.

[vettim89]

While the CarDiv 5 pilots may not have been quie as experienced as the CarDiv 1/2 pilots, they were still a product of the pre-war IJN pilot traniing program which was by every account I have read extremely intense to a point bodering on brutality. To put it into modern terms: a newly minted SEAL or Green Beret may not be the equivalent of a veteran of those organizations but they would still be better than almost any other soldier in the world

[Nikademus]

the author later expands his theme of green pilots to include all of KB while building up the PH AAC pilots so its all good [:'(]. He was incorrect in saying that no veterans were in Div5. Lundstrom introduced a few in his book from the same Div.

BTW.....I have to admit.....i really like Masse and thought his Castles book was excellent. Honestly i didn't see his portrayal of Beatty as outwardly negative as it seems to only expand on what other sources have said. But i like to give benefit of doubt.....is there a more Beatty friendly book you'd recommend?

[vettim89]

BTW.....I have to admit.....i really like Masse and thought his Castles book was excellent. Honestly i didn't see his portrayal of Beatty as outwardly negative as it seems to only expand on what other sources have said. But i like to give benefit of doubt.....is there a more Beatty friendly book you'd recommend?

This is just my perspective but Massie seemed to be very pro-Jellico. I guess my impression of his view on Beatty had as much to do with the sections dealing with his personal life, his wife, and non-military matters.

Let me be clear: I loved Castles of Steel. I thought that Massie did an excellant job conveying the problems of command at that time. The Beatty thing was a minor issue for me and I was just using it as an example of the type of writing that seems to be so common of late. Perhaps you are correct in saying that Massie really doesn't merit being placed in that category.

Evans on the other hand is a completely different story. His efforts to portray Kurita as a hero and LCmdr Evans as the goat comfounds reason. I suppose if you look at Leyte through post-modern eyes it makes some sort of sense. Problem is that the mind set of all those involved in the battle were framed by the societal, cultural, and national views of the time.

[Captain]

I don't have Zimm's new book, but as to the skill level of carrier air groups at PH, S.E. Morison in vol. 3 of "History of U.S. Naval operations in WW2" states that the IJN air groups at PH were the most highly skilled of the war. (I just happened to be reading it last night on another topic). This is based on interviews of surviving IJN personnel and review of available records after the war.

Before coming to a conclusion that some of the crews were "green", I would like to see what sources are used.

Incidentally, I spent a day at PH some years back. It looks much the same now as it did in 1941. The south channel opposite "Battleship row" is surprisingly narrow. It would take real skill for a pilot to dip down, launch torpedoes and pull back in time.

[Mynok]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Mynok

They aren't nearly as good as CarDiv 1 and 2 pilots.

Yup....but i question the level of greeness. Less than Div1 and 2 yes.....so green they could barely fly formation? no. Zimm appears to mainly rely on Ron Werneth's "Beyond Pearl Harbor: untold stories of Japan's naval aviators" for these conclusions which is a book of interviews by surviving pilots of the IJNAF. The interviews echo the theme of almost "snobish" contempt CarDiv 1 and 2 pilots had of CarDiv5 mentioned at least once in just about every air book that touches on the JNAF. Zimm is however forced to admit at one point in his book that the Div5 pilots quote "would turn in a sterling performance, greatly exceeding all expectations and outshining the dive-bombers from the more experienced carriers." There is no direct evidence to support that Div5 pilots could not drop torps, particularily since Zimm himself points out that the TB pilots had to be pre-chosen, and then intensly trained for the specific conditions of PH. (this is why even while documenting that KB had plenty of torps for further ops, it was not simply a matter of altering the loadouts for KB....the same trained TB pilots would have to conduct the shallow harbor runs again with reloaded torps)

This didn't suprise me as CarDiv5 put in an equally sterling performance at Coral Sea as well. As with other sources, Lundstrom documented how CarDiv1/2 still looked down on them even by may of 42.

AE/WitP wise.....CarDiv5 is less rated than the older carriers.

I agree. I was just responding to Pascal's claim that they are 'highly rated' in Witp. Well, they are good, but they aren't elite like divs 1 & 2 are.

My suspicion is that the author is conflating 'lack of training in the specialized torpedo bombing for Pearl' with 'inability to launch a standard naval torpedo attack'. I can see Cardiv 5 not receiving the former, sure. The latter, no freaking way.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mynok

I agree. I was just responding to Pascal's claim that they are 'highly rated' in Witp. Well, they are good, but they aren't elite like divs 1 & 2 are.

My suspicion is that the author is conflating 'lack of training in the specialized torpedo bombing for Pearl' with 'inability to launch a standard naval torpedo attack'. I can see Cardiv 5 not receiving the former, sure. The latter, no freaking way.

Zimm has a real bug up his bum re: KB's pilots. He justifies his tear as being a myth dispelling exercise that the KB pilots were "superpilots" which in 2011 is rather silly to claim. No serious historian, amatuer or otherwise considers Japan's pilots "supermen" anymore than one does the Luftwaffe's. He makes no less than 6 references to Div5's pilots being "really green" and cites interviews talking about formation flying and such and runs away with it implying that this indicates how green they were. Not true. Evans and Peattie had pointed out years back that carrier flying required continual refreshing to maintain the most basic but vital skills. Combat missions over China they cited actually erroded in part their naval skills, including basic landing/takeoff requiring refresher training afterwards. As mentioned, the author is forced to admit at one point that the Div5's pilots "actual" performance was stellar despite all the bad press.

By the end of the book Zimm expands his green pilots to include Div's 1 and 2 as well, tearing down their total flight hours and claiming most were in fact "Nuggets" (rookies) to use a modern US term. However he fails to be as cutting and critical of the same flight hours for the AAC at Pearl, and even throws in a quote about the prewar USN carrier pilots (from a war vet) suggesting that they were in fact the "elite" I was stunned at Zimm trying to further justify the awesome experience of the AAC by citing a brief visit to Oahu by Chennault who "talked" to the men there telling them about his Zero experiences as if this would be enough to turn the Army pilots into Zero killers. He then makes the error of quoting the Flying Tiger's bloated kill ratio claim and fails to mention that the FT org never fought a Zero. One last tidbit he throws in made me laugh the most. He suggests directly, that one can trust the FT kill claims more than usual because they were mercenaries and thus being paid for each kill the verification system naturally would be more stringent. WTF??!! Shores didn't agree with that. Neither do I. As for the SRA preformances and the Philippines....he dismisses the poor performance there as a one off....inadequate trained pilots. He might as well have suggested they were all "in a landing pattern" too.

His enduring criticism of the Zero pilots is laced with cutting derogatory language that i found offensive for a 2011 book. In comparing him to David Glantz...a fellow US military officer and extremely gifted analytical historian, Glantz's writing style is truely objective and just presents his analysis in dry unobtrusive format, whether it be criticism or compliment. Zimm also contradicts himself. He states in the beginning that first off...the Zero escort was inadequate in size, exaserbated by the dispersed nature of the raid making it that much harder to deal with enemy fighter defenses. He also refers to the need for proper SEAD (Supression of enemy defences) and later cites this failure by the success the AAC pilots had in shooting down bombers. Yet he had earlier explained that the Japanese greatly feared US Land based airpower...so much so that they expected to lose half their force. Its easy to see how the specifics of the raid could incur unique factors that would lead to the escorts, not seeing ANY enemy fighters in the air when they arrived, would then expend their efforts to keep enemy air suppressed. Zimm however takes the opportunity to blast them, forgetting the earlier factors he himself cited. His critiques of the distribution of the escorts is valid.....for example he fairly criticises the lack of Zero escorts for the critical torpedo planes. In his criticisms of the Zeros close escort tactics, Zimm fails to mention that the Luftwaffe found such tactics counter-productive to protecting the bombers during the BoB in 1940...and this with far larger #'s of escorting fighters. The Jagdwaffe preferred to be in more loose hunting formations to intercept enemy fighters before they could get near the bombers. There was merit to this. Zimm then naturally follows the angle that more fighters in the air defending would automatically and exponentially increase KB's losses....maybe, but as mentioned, the exponential increase in escort size for the Luftwaffe example did not produce the same math results.

In the end, having achieved suprise, the Zeros immediately went into ground attack mode shooting up enemy air defenses and available targets. Zimm sneers at this claiming that the pilots lacked discipline, did not understand SEAD for this raid (but did at sea however!), and only grudgingly acknowledges that their efforts could have accounted for a good number of planes on the ground. The few planes that did get airborne in extremely small #'s got most if not all of their kills by approaching undetected and even joining enemy formations of bombers and then shooting down unsuspecting crews from behind and then pats them on the back by adding up all the bomber kills and grading them with a positive kill raito.....then further hand slapping the Zeros for failing to protect the bombers and making continual references to them wanting to be "Samauri" who did not understand proper escort tactics as this was not part of their doctrine (because they were busy shooting up ground targets!)......an opinion I strongly disagree with based on study and example. Of the couple fighters the Zeros did shoot down.....Zimm is again uncomplimentary, citing that they had just taken off. Luftwaffe pilots made an art of ambushing enemy fighters at points of vulnerability. All's fair in love and war if it achieves the objective. Yet Zimm discounts this, but feels that ambushing enemy bombers from behind is totally fair and proves the fighter's skills. ???!!!! As for the rest of KB's "skill", he suggests that somehow they aquired it in the period between PH and mid 42, which on the face is ridiculous, more so for the very oft maligned Div5. Combat experience is an important part of making crews elite but to suggest that a majority bunch of "nuggets" became experts within weeks of PH (if one includes earlier raids such as Darwin which was very professionally handled) by combat alone with no time for dedicated training just tells me that the author has little actual understanding of air ops and was relying too much on Werneth's book of interviews.

In the end its the bias and contradictions that get me. In terms of bias....as mentioned, nowhere is he as cutting and derogatory of US personell in the book. The continual cultural references to "wanting to be warriors"..."samauri" etc etc takes away from the professionalism of the crews, pilots and officers as would references of US pilots/crews being "wanna be warrior-civilians....."accountants turned aircrew" etc. The contradictions occur in his continual change of angles in his arguments that neatly box up the Japanese in no win scenarios.....such as citing the lack of numbers for escort, the prevalient fear of enemy airpower getting off the ground yet turning around after that later in the book and chiding the fighter pilots for not being everywhere they were needed when the extremely few AAC fighters came buzzing around and quietly scored their kills and blaming it on their training and "warrior spirit"

While Zimm makes some good points here and there, just like Clay Blair (who's books i like and own), but even more so than Blair a heavy dose of salt is required in viewing the book. His commentary on why the Japanese did things the way they did in re: wargaming was excellent and ironically, was without bias, actually supporting Yamamotto and his fellow officers in a positive way vs. the traditional negative manner in which they are treated, including in Parshalls/Tully. It was also extremely interesting to learn about the huge dud rate of the Type 80 AP bombs.....do not recall this being cited in Friedman and helps explain why Maryland and Tennessee and WeVee wern't more badly damaged by their hits. In fairness to Zimm, he does congratulate the B5N AP bombers for achieving an extraordinary hit rate that exceeded expectations...but they were let down by their ordinance except in the spectacular case of Arizona. Rather than discount it though, Zimm IMO correctly contexts it for what it was, justifying the effort though he still cavets it with some justificaiton that less AP bombers and more torpedo planes might have been better (in theory)

[Mynok]

Type 80 is the 800kg bomb? Is that different from the converted BB shells?

[Skyros]

I was having the same reaction to this book. Unfortunately his style and extraneous comments overshadow some of the interesting information that he does reveal.

Good synopsis Nik.

[Disco Duck]

ORIGINAL: Mynok


Type 80 is the 800kg bomb? Is that different from the converted BB shells?

The way I read it the type 80 was the converted BB shell. It had been thinned out to reduce weight and this reduced it's structural integrity. Hence the high failure rate.

I like the technical details in the book but I will agree that there seems to be too many personal and cultural attacks in the book. It is almost like he was told by his publisher to bulk it up to a bigger page count to justify it's price and he just threw things in at the last minute.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mynok


Type 80 is the 800kg bomb? Is that different from the converted BB shells?

Yes....actually official designation is Type 99 Number 80 Mark 5 Bomb. This is the 40cm shell converted into an AP bomb of 800kg weight.

[spence]

This didn't suprise me as CarDiv5 put in an equally sterling performance at Coral Sea as well. As with other sources, Lundstrom documented how CarDiv1/2 still looked down on them even by may of 42.

Sterling performance? The entire strike force was launched at the wrong target after it was misidentified: USS Neosho and USS Sims. The most experienced B5N pilots missed the US TFs (at least while they still had torpedoes) and then some of these highly skilled torpedo bomber pilots tried to land on a US CV. Once everybody got sorted out with the range at 100 miles +/- (not saying the US was any better) the full attack potential of Cardiv 5 was applied to the US CVTFs and scored 2 torpedo and 3 bomb hits. This fails to match the typical result achieved in AE (or WitP) in 1942 by an IJN Cardiv at even odds which will not only sink the US CVs but will very likely sink or seriously damage a significant number of the escorts. US damage control was not what it might have been later otherwise the USS Lexington might well have sailed away from Coral Sea. The secondary detonation suffered quite some time after the last Japanese strike plane departed the scene was not a foregone conclusion...Lexington was recovering aircraft and making 20 kts with a burden of 2 torpedo and 2 bomb hits when that happened. Meanwhile Shokaku (due to damage) and Zuikaku (due to aircrew losses) were OOC (If one assumes the catastrophic explosion does not occur on Lexington and thereafter matches 2 US CVs with reduced airgroups against Zuikaku with whatever she could muster Lundstrom certainly does nothing to support the contention it would have been an even fight).

And now turning to the Type 99 Number 80 Mark 5 bomb the dud rate appears to be significantly in excess of what is typical for a weapons system. Is it really so unbelievable that the unproven jury-rigged system did not function up to expectations? And since the IJN chose to employ only 40 torpedoes in the attack 3 months before the attack should not they be limited as to how many torpedoes they get to launch in the "Historical Scenario"?

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: spence

... This fails to match the typical result achieved in AE (or WitP) in 1942 by an IJN Cardiv at even odds ...

ROFL.

Seriously, you rely upon AE praxis to support real world arguments. Maybe at the real Coral Sea they were the victims of a bad die roll. and the commanding officer had been negligent by not spending PPs to change leaders.

Alfred