Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
Sorry, one more possible correction.ORIGINAL: el cid again
Rename location 623 Balinta pass - the trail system is also correct here - for a communications route from the Northern Ilagan Valley into the central plain of Luzon. It needs to be defined as mountains as well.
ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
As I recall, MacArthur's plan was to concentrate for the defense of Luzon and Mindanao. Del Monte, on Mindanao, was to be a major airbase.
If shipping and the Japanese had allowed, I believe the entire 71st and 91st Divisions would have moved to Luzon. The actual movement started after hostilities, and I do not know the planned schedule pre-war. Or, indeed, if they would have moved at all. Additional CD defenses were being planned for the Visayas.
The 61st and 81st were to move to Mindanao, a movement that also began after war broke out.
In all cases, only portions of the Visayas divisions completed the move.
Another problem is the long-term goal of a full corps for each military district. Not to be completed until 1946, but at some time (soon?) the mobilization of the second divsion in each district would have begun. Note that Panay was able to raise two more (under equiped) regiments before being overrun. The first division might have moved while the units of the second defended the Visayas??
Hi Don
From what I read even MacArthur didnt think Mindanao was defensible and because it was outside his defense perimeter he told Washington that Del Monte would not due for the planned bomber base. Del Monte would serve as an auxillary base and for expediancy temporarliy serve as the 7th BG base until the Cebu base could be developed. USAFFE maintained that with the completion of the Inland Seas Defence project and in-shore patrol that the Visayas could be defended. It was thought that Cebu also had the advantage of being far enough away as to be imune to Japanese attack but close enough to allow B-17 and B-24 to strike enemy targets. It was only after the early start of the war made the Cebu base in Inland Seas Defence project moot that the decision was made to concentrate on Mindanao to protect the now only practical base Del Monte. Both Sharp and Chenweyth were posted to there commands prior to out break of the war so it doesnt appear that the Panay and Cebu Divisions were going anywhere.
Yeah. Lots of problems crop up. About the only solution I can think of is to go with Ltr Orders, CG USAFFE to CG NLF, SLF, V-MF, 3 Dec 4l, AG 381 (12-3-41), which details the force composition of the three main commands (NLF, SLF, V-MF). Put units where they are supposed to be, given a completed training cycle. I think, according to USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, 4 Nov 41, that Mindanao was indeed part of Mac's planning. It was definitely part of his perimiter; it was called the Visayan-'Mindanao' Force, after all [;)]. Perhaps Cebu figured more prominently as a potential future air base, but Del Monte was nevertheless in the box.ORIGINAL: TIMJOTHi DonORIGINAL: Don Bowen
As I recall, MacArthur's plan was to concentrate for the defense of Luzon and Mindanao. Del Monte, on Mindanao, was to be a major airbase.
If shipping and the Japanese had allowed, I believe the entire 71st and 91st Divisions would have moved to Luzon. The actual movement started after hostilities, and I do not know the planned schedule pre-war. Or, indeed, if they would have moved at all. Additional CD defenses were being planned for the Visayas.
The 61st and 81st were to move to Mindanao, a movement that also began after war broke out. In all cases, only portions of the Visayas divisions completed the move.
Another problem is the long-term goal of a full corps for each military district. Not to be completed until 1946, but at some time (soon?) the mobilization of the second divsion in each district would have begun. Note that Panay was able to raise two more (under equiped) regiments before being overrun. The first division might have moved while the units of the second defended the Visayas??
From what I read even MacArthur didnt think Mindanao was defensible and because it was outside his defense perimeter he told Washington that Del Monte would not due for the planned bomber base. Del Monte would serve as an auxillary base and for expediancy temporarliy serve as the 7th BG base until the Cebu base could be developed. USAFFE maintained that with the completion of the Inland Seas Defence project and in-shore patrol that the Visayas could be defended. It was thought that Cebu also had the advantage of being far enough away as to be imune to Japanese attack but close enough to allow B-17 and B-24 to strike enemy targets. It was only after the early start of the war made the Cebu base in Inland Seas Defence project moot that the decision was made to concentrate on Mindanao to protect the now only practical base Del Monte. Both Sharp and Chenweyth were posted to there commands prior to out break of the war so it doesnt appear that the Panay and Cebu Divisions were going anywhere.
ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
What you say makes sense. I do know that an air base unit was already in route from the US for Del Monte, but that could be because it was a staging base of the sourhern air transport route.
I have no resources for anything else. Do you have any additional book references? Love to read more on this.
ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
What you say makes sense. I do know that an air base unit was already in route from the US for Del Monte, but that could be because it was a staging base of the sourhern air transport route.
I have no resources for anything else. Do you have any additional book references? Love to read more on this.
My most recent source is the excellent and highly recomended "Racing the Sunrise" Glen Williford Ch.14 pg 215
http://www.amazon.com/Racing-Sunrise-Re ... 399&sr=1-1
A more detailed reference can be found in William Bartch's "December 8th 1941 MacArthurs Peral Harbor" Ch.7 pg 211-212.
http://www.amazon.com/December-1941-Mac ... 184&sr=1-1
Well, it's not that big a deal to put some engineers there to get the ball rolling. Am seriously backing away from an April/May start. There's just too much speculation and assumptions with Mac's plans to provide a reasonable basis for a scenario. And then there's the Japanese; although South Army had limited resources, would the PI get the major proportion of 14, 15, 16 Armies, along with all Group holdings?ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
No problem, as I said Bartch sites Mac directly, but whether or not the Visayas base could have been completed prior to May 1942 is another matter, but since this is a "what if" on Macs plan IMO it should be included.
ORIGINAL: JWE
Well, it's not that big a deal to put some engineers there to get the ball rolling. Am seriously backing away from an April/May start. There's just too much speculation and assumptions with Mac's plans to provide a reasonable basis for a scenario. And then there's the Japanese; although South Army had limited resources, would the PI get the major proportion of 14, 15, 16 Armies, along with all Group holdings?
Think it best to go with 'what you see is what you get', but reinforced to the limits of what was in the actual pipeline. That would avoid the potential "what-if" questions and still give Japan a much harder nut to crack.
Going whole-hog is something somebody else is gonna have to do.
[ed] Mescaline is worth a try. Michoacan buds would work, too.[;)]
ORIGINAL: berto
Didn't Yamashita in fact surrender at Kiangan, Ifugao?ORIGINAL: el cid again
The key to an interesting game that MIGHT permit Allied victory is Baguio City ... A house there is still US territory - it is where Yamashita surrendered.
REPLY: Nope. I have been to the house. You need permission from the US Embassy in Manila - in writing - to get past the security guards. It is preserved as a historical site for that reason. It is on Fort John Hay at the edge of the perade ground.
Look here.
I have relatives (by affinity) from Kiangan, and I've visited the Shrine on a couple of occasions. I believe that Kiangan was, in fact, Yamashita's last holdout.
REPLY: Probably. But when talked to, he said he would make them fight - he could surrender only if written orders were obtained from the Emperor - for legal reasons We agreed. The formal ceremony was set for Fort John Hay.
Also, it's the Cagayan Valley, named after the Cagayan River, the Philippine's longest and largest, that runs through the valley, south to north. Ilagan is the capital of Isabela Province, just one of several provinces in the Cagayan Valley Region. (I should know. I lived in Ilagan for a year, back in 1978. Indeed, I've visited every one of the places you mentioned. Ah, the memories.)Rename location 623 Balinta pass - the trail system is also correct here - for a communications route from the Northern Ilagan Valley into the central plain of Luzon.
ORIGINAL: berto
Sorry, one more possible correction.ORIGINAL: el cid again
Rename location 623 Balinta pass - the trail system is also correct here - for a communications route from the Northern Ilagan Valley into the central plain of Luzon. It needs to be defined as mountains as well.
Are you referring to Balete Pass (aka Dalton Pass)?
I've been through the Pass many times, and visited the Dalton Shrine there, too. [;)]
Look here.
BTW, the Yamashita Shrine in Ifugao is in the shape of a stylized Japanese pillbox, and one can enter inside. The Dalton Shrine is more like a spike, kind of a mini Washington Monument.
ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
As I recall, MacArthur's plan was to concentrate for the defense of Luzon and Mindanao. Del Monte, on Mindanao, was to be a major airbase.
If shipping and the Japanese had allowed, I believe the entire 71st and 91st Divisions would have moved to Luzon. The actual movement started after hostilities, and I do not know the planned schedule pre-war. Or, indeed, if they would have moved at all. Additional CD defenses were being planned for the Visayas.
The 61st and 81st were to move to Mindanao, a movement that also began after war broke out.
In all cases, only portions of the Visayas divisions completed the move.
Another problem is the long-term goal of a full corps for each military district. Not to be completed until 1946, but at some time (soon?) the mobilization of the second divsion in each district would have begun. Note that Panay was able to raise two more (under equiped) regiments before being overrun. The first division might have moved while the units of the second defended the Visayas??
Hi Don
From what I read even MacArthur didnt think Mindanao was defensible and because it was outside his defense perimeter he told Washington that Del Monte would not due for the planned bomber base. Del Monte would serve as an auxillary base and for expediancy temporarliy serve as the 7th BG base until the Cebu base could be developed. USAFFE maintained that with the completion of the Inland Seas Defence project and in-shore patrol that the Visayas could be defended. It was thought that Cebu also had the advantage of being far enough away as to be imune to Japanese attack but close enough to allow B-17 and B-24 to strike enemy targets. It was only after the early start of the war made the Cebu base in Inland Seas Defence project moot that the decision was made to concentrate on Mindanao to protect the now only practical base Del Monte. Both Sharp and Chenweyth were posted to there commands prior to out break of the war so it doesnt appear that the Panay and Cebu Divisions were going anywhere.
What you say makes sense. I do know that an air base unit was already in route from the US for Del Monte, but that could be because it was a staging base of the sourhern air transport route.
I have no resources for anything else. Do you have any additional book references? Love to read more on this.
ORIGINAL: JWE
Yeah. Lots of problems crop up. About the only solution I can think of is to go with Ltr Orders, CG USAFFE to CG NLF, SLF, V-MF, 3 Dec 4l, AG 381 (12-3-41), which details the force composition of the three main commands (NLF, SLF, V-MF). Put units where they are supposed to be, given a completed training cycle. I think, according to USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, 4 Nov 41, that Mindanao was indeed part of Mac's planning. It was definitely part of his perimiter; it was called the Visayan-'Mindanao' Force, after all [;)]. Perhaps Cebu figured more prominently as a potential future air base, but Del Monte was nevertheless in the box.ORIGINAL: TIMJOTHi DonORIGINAL: Don Bowen
As I recall, MacArthur's plan was to concentrate for the defense of Luzon and Mindanao. Del Monte, on Mindanao, was to be a major airbase.
If shipping and the Japanese had allowed, I believe the entire 71st and 91st Divisions would have moved to Luzon. The actual movement started after hostilities, and I do not know the planned schedule pre-war. Or, indeed, if they would have moved at all. Additional CD defenses were being planned for the Visayas.
The 61st and 81st were to move to Mindanao, a movement that also began after war broke out. In all cases, only portions of the Visayas divisions completed the move.
Another problem is the long-term goal of a full corps for each military district. Not to be completed until 1946, but at some time (soon?) the mobilization of the second divsion in each district would have begun. Note that Panay was able to raise two more (under equiped) regiments before being overrun. The first division might have moved while the units of the second defended the Visayas??
From what I read even MacArthur didnt think Mindanao was defensible and because it was outside his defense perimeter he told Washington that Del Monte would not due for the planned bomber base. Del Monte would serve as an auxillary base and for expediancy temporarliy serve as the 7th BG base until the Cebu base could be developed. USAFFE maintained that with the completion of the Inland Seas Defence project and in-shore patrol that the Visayas could be defended. It was thought that Cebu also had the advantage of being far enough away as to be imune to Japanese attack but close enough to allow B-17 and B-24 to strike enemy targets. It was only after the early start of the war made the Cebu base in Inland Seas Defence project moot that the decision was made to concentrate on Mindanao to protect the now only practical base Del Monte. Both Sharp and Chenweyth were posted to there commands prior to out break of the war so it doesnt appear that the Panay and Cebu Divisions were going anywhere.
Perhaps the best way to work this is to move the start date to Jan 7, 42 and assume that the Pensacola convoy arrived, and all the troops, planes, and goodies sitting at SFO got there too. Ending up with a nicely reinforced and better equipped US Army contingent, up to strength and better equipped PA units, a fleshed out PC, some more CA and CA(AA). i.e., not presume Mac's defense project was completed; think that would open too many cans of worms, especially of the Japanese variety.
Facing a full boogie defense, doubt they would have assigned just 2 divs and a brigade for the op. Would have barfed the whole PI/Malaya/Burma/DEI deployment schedule. Also doubt that Japan would schedule anything in the Southern area after January. Hydrology and met conditions would obviate against it. Given that Japan doesn't get anything beyond what was actually available, perhaps a "reinforced" PI, rather than a "fortress" PI will be a hard enough nut to crack.
ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
ORIGINAL: JWE
Well, it's not that big a deal to put some engineers there to get the ball rolling. Am seriously backing away from an April/May start. There's just too much speculation and assumptions with Mac's plans to provide a reasonable basis for a scenario. And then there's the Japanese; although South Army had limited resources, would the PI get the major proportion of 14, 15, 16 Armies, along with all Group holdings?
Think it best to go with 'what you see is what you get', but reinforced to the limits of what was in the actual pipeline. That would avoid the potential "what-if" questions and still give Japan a much harder nut to crack.
Going whole-hog is something somebody else is gonna have to do.
[ed] Mescaline is worth a try. Michoacan buds would work, too.[;)]
Of course its your perogative but I thought the whole point of this mod was to see what if Mac got to implement his plan. I think between Morton, Bartch Williford and other sources we have a pretty good idea on what was going to be sent. You may need to make some educated assumptions on what specific units. As far as Japan IMO we can also make some educated assumptions. The 4th IJA and 56 IJA were both historically available to bolster the 14th Army. without weakening 15th and 16th armies. The monsoon does pose a problem but maybe at least a March start would allow enough margin for IJA operations and also allow Mac to get most of his stuff. Again your decision but dont really see the point to a what amounts to a Pencecola mode.
It's a lot more than just Pensacola. Everything stacked up at SFO comes in as well. So Mac gets the 34th and 161st IRs, all the arty units, the engineers, the planes, the base and material Bns, as well as 380 odd ATGs, 500 odd MGs, real-live Brandt 81s, at least 50 105mm, more 3in AAA, some CD tubes, two dancing bears ... there was 1,100,000 tons of stuff at SFO FoB Manila in November 41, quite a bit of it actually scheduled for departure mid December. And Mac gets his Q-boats, too.ORIGINAL: TIMJOT
Of course its your perogative but I thought the whole point of this mod was to see what if Mac got to implement his plan. I think between Morton, Bartch Williford and other sources we have a pretty good idea on what was going to be sent. You may need to make some educated assumptions on what specific units. As far as Japan IMO we can also make some educated assumptions. The 4th IJA and 56 IJA were both historically available to bolster the 14th Army. without weakening 15th and 16th armies. The monsoon does pose a problem but maybe at least a March start would allow enough margin for IJA operations and also allow Mac to get most of his stuff. Again your decision but dont really see the point to a what amounts to a Pencecola mode.
ORIGINAL: JWE
Been nattering with Uncle Don on some PI things and he suggested a short map scenario with a May 1, '42 opening day might be interesting. It would give Dougie a lot of the things he asked for and make the PI into a real live, honest to gosh, campaign. It will be based on the detailed OOB and delivery schedule research done by Don Bowen.
This will be a CPX-style scenario. It will exist in a vacuum and is not subject to 'what if' constraints. It will be detailed in a manner similar to the Babes-style DEI scenario.
Any interest from the community?
