ORIGINAL: treespider
What I will find interesting is how many lower tier AQ members can now be eliminated now that OBL is gone. I imagine a fair number of AQ members were being monitored and simply allowed to continue to operate in the continuing effort to gather intel on the whereabouts of OBL. Now that OBL is gone I imagine their utility for that Intel is no longer needed.[;)]
What I also find interesting is what is being said/not said about Pakistani Govt involvement. IMO the local police chief was likely bought and paid for by OBL. However at a National level the Pakistani Government was likely notified of an op in progress so as to minimize the chance of an unneeded intercept/confrontation. Publicly however to provide cover for the Pakistani Government due to its internal politics the US Admin denies any such notification.
More than elimination in the physical sense, the biggest blow was to morale. There will be a short surge in recruitment due to his 'martyrdom' but if America can land another such blow in the near future, it may as well fatally injure AQ. In a way, it was the system used when battling terrorism in Europe (look at how the Italians dealt with the Brigate Rosse or to take an extreme case, how many areas in Europe failed to produce resistance movements during WWII). Essentially it becomes a question of maintaining momentum taking out the important heads, depriving the rest of leadership or that 'organisational glue' that such organisations need. Another bigger blow could be dealt if they can unravel the money trails that feed into the organisation.
As to the Pakistanis, the government has long played an ambivalent role. It is well known that it has used the Taliban for their own uses like when they were hired as mercenaries to provoke trouble in Kashmir. They are also fearful of the fact that the west has more in common and more sympathy with India, its greatest rival, while it is the west that buys Pakistani wares. Besides the army and security apparatus is deeply divided on their role in society and what Pakistan should look like. Which is why they constantly woo the Chinese who in the end use them for their own purposes (but still are their major competitors). Pakistan is walking a tightrope internally and internationally but frankly I would interpret the US stand on not informing Pakistan of the operation as a snub - ie indirectly pointing out that Pakistani secret services are riddled with informers and supporters of extreme islam and couldn't be trusted not to alert the intended victim of the raid. Despite all the diplomatic niceties, that would be my interpretation (after all carrying out an armed attack in another country is the most flagrant breach of soverignity immaginable), but sufficiently hazy as not to ruffle international feathers.