ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
Also, when we talked about the bomber rule, you suggested that B-17s were there as "anti-shipping" not strategic bombing. I don't think that's correct. I was re-reading Arnold's biography "Global reach" and a couple of books of military thought of the period. B-17's were sold to a pasifist public as a plane that "could defend our shores", but Arnold and other accolytes of Billy Mitchell knew that bombing cities was what it was all about. (Sure , if you could steal some money from the Navy , that would be a good thing too!). The 1st, bases for B-29's were China, in Mid 1944. To bomb Japan. And the Bombers sent to China in 1943 were bombing Chineese and Vietnamese cities. So we might want to re-think this. I know what you really want is no bombing Palemburg and DEI oil centers. But in essence , your calling no strategic bombing worldwide.
So what is your counter proposal then, Steve?
I'm not sure that your examples are in violation of this proposed HR, with the exception of SB in China, circa 1943. Bomb anything you want anywhere in 1944 *or* bomb anything outside of China (even FROM China if you desire) in 1943.
Trust me, eliminating SB in China, circa 1943, is a boon to the Allies moreso than the Japanese. But, if you want all Chinese national RESOURCE, LIGHT INDUSTRY, HEAVY INDUSTRY to be put to the torch effective January 1, 1943, I guess I'm game.
I would propose that it's not worth it to you-the Allied player-to get in a few desultory shots at damaging Palembang, Balikpapan or Soerbaja before being kicked out of the DEI (and range) in exchange for an open IJAA hand in China strategic bombing from day one. Ask Canoerebel about that for more thoughts...
As far as your access to SB Japanese-held resource centers, you won't have any in range (except Magwe) in 1943 if we're doing our job.