How does the experience differ for each side?

Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: The German-Soviet War 1941-1945 is a turn-based World War II strategy game stretching across the entire Eastern Front. Gamers can engage in an epic campaign, including division-sized battles with realistic and historical terrain, weather, orders of battle, logistics and combat results.

The critically and fan-acclaimed Eastern Front mega-game Gary Grigsby’s War in the East just got bigger and better with Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: Don to the Danube! This expansion to the award-winning War in the East comes with a wide array of later war scenarios ranging from short but intense 6 turn bouts like the Battle for Kharkov (1942) to immense 37-turn engagements taking place across multiple nations like Drama on the Danube (Summer 1944 – Spring 1945).

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Grisha
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How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by Grisha »

My question has to do with the strengths and weaknesses of the Axis and the Soviet sides. Things like German tactical to operational combat finesse countered by logistical shoddiness. Or the lack of Soviet initiative in combat, as well as Stalin's impatience, countered over time by the meticulousness and thoroughness of Soviet operational planning. The Germans started with a well trained force, versed in an excellent combined arms tactical theory. The Soviets developed over time a methodology called operational art that incorporated a combination of detailed intelligence/reconnaissance with tactical and operational (and eventually strategic) deception. Will partisans be incorporated into improving Soviet operations through intelligence as well?

My concern is that the game will anchor itself on a calculation of numbers and not simulate the systems that made this titanic struggle so unique.
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by ComradeP »

The Axis "logistical shoddiness" you mention was more a result of the lack of vehicles, the huge area to cover and the lack of standardization resulting in a lack of spare parts for some types of vehicles, rather than a failure of the way Axis logistics were planned or carried out. Also keep in mind that the late war Soviet offensives were basically only possible due to the Lend Lease vehicles, as the Soviets would otherwise have faced similar problems to what the Axis faced.

German operation and tactical expertise mostly seems to translate into better leaders, better starting experience and more powerful units on a 1-1 comparison with Soviet counterparts. It's certainly there.

The Soviet operational planning you praise was one of the direct results of the lack of initiative you also mentioned: Soviet units needed a very clear battle plan aimed at certain objectives otherwise their attack would simply stop at some point as units waited for orders. The Soviets were like trains on one way tracks compared to German figure skaters when it came to operational flexibility.

The Soviets piled huge amounts of men and equipment into an area, broke through a frontline and had to start all over again because units required constant management from higher command levels to keep them moving. Soviet logistics also tended to break down rather quickly and suddenly when their offensive got more momentum than they had expected, as the logistics were also finetuned for the plan, not for greater or lesser success than was predicted. You basically have to do all that planning yourself in this game, it would be impossible to simply abstract it as you're the supreme commander.

Soviet Rifle units seem to be balanced for slow and methodical assaults after which they have to rest for a while, like their historical counterparts. As has been noted several times in other threads, Soviet mobile units are more for exploiting than attacking, with regular infantry acting like a sponge to soak up losses. The Germans need to achieve their objectives with a minimal amount of violence as they advance on a fairly broad front, the Soviets will try to aim a maximum amount of violence at a limited area. As such, you can't play like a German commander when you're the Soviets because your mobile units are not good enough, and you can't play like a Soviet commander when you're the Germans because you have nowhere near enough units and can't afford the losses.
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by Flaviusx »

Oh, I dunno. That bang up job they did planning for the first winter qualifies as shoddiness.

The Axis plan in 1941 logistically speaking amounted to: beating up the Red Army west of the Dnepr and then doing a victory march across the rest of the Soviet Union...and finish it up before the snows. It was all supposed to be a piece of cake and a lighthearted romp.

They simply did not take the Soviets very seriously and made no real arrangements to fight a long war.







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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by jaw »

ORIGINAL: Grisha

My question has to do with the strengths and weaknesses of the Axis and the Soviet sides. Things like German tactical to operational combat finesse countered by logistical shoddiness. Or the lack of Soviet initiative in combat, as well as Stalin's impatience, countered over time by the meticulousness and thoroughness of Soviet operational planning. The Germans started with a well trained force, versed in an excellent combined arms tactical theory. The Soviets developed over time a methodology called operational art that incorporated a combination of detailed intelligence/reconnaissance with tactical and operational (and eventually strategic) deception. Will partisans be incorporated into improving Soviet operations through intelligence as well?

My concern is that the game will anchor itself on a calculation of numbers and not simulate the systems that made this titanic struggle so unique.

I don't know if you can satisfy your concerns without actually playing the game but I'll try to go through the points you make above and explain how they are addressed in the game.

1. German combat finesse - If by this you mean can the Axis player replicate German blitzkrieg tactics in the opening months of Barbarossa, the answer is yes. The Germans possess an enormous edge in experience/training, better command & control, and generally superior leadership.

2. German logistical shoddiness - If by this you mean do the Axis armies face the same supply difficulties as their historical counterparts, the answer is yes. You can very easily overstretch your supply lines and reduce your panzers to a crawl. Air supply, while vital to maintaining momentum, is inadequate to supply your advance alone. The Axis player must resist the temptation to lunge eastward into the vastness of the Soviet Union faster than his supplies can keep up.

3. Soviet Initiative - Overall, Soviet leadership is inferior to German leadership and this is particularly true in the area of initiative. This gap between the two armies declines the higher up the chain of command you go but never completely disappears. If however you were to sack the same leaders Hitler did (or were playing a latter war scenario) you would find the two armies much closer in leadership quality.

4. Stalin vs STAVKA - To the chargin of some people, the game possesses no rules to force you to repeat the actions of the historical supreme leadership on either side. My own experience playing both sides is that the player will make more than enough mistakes of his own that such "mad dictator" rules are unnecessary.

5. Soviet deception tactics - Players gather information on the enemy in the game three ways: 1) physical contact with enemy units (most accurate), 2) aerial recon, & 3) partisans (Soviet only). Since the Axis player only has access to the first two methods, Soviet deception success needs only take them into account. By keeping as much of your assault force behind the lines as possible until you are ready to commit them you can at least partially conceal your intentions from the Axis player. If you are fortunate enough to gain air superiority (very hard to do until late in the game) you can reduce the effectiveness of Axis air recon further muddling the picture for the Axis player. So the answer to your question is yes; if he is willing to work at it the Soviet player can replicate deception tactics.
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by Grisha »

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

The Axis "logistical shoddiness" you mention was more a result of the lack of vehicles, the huge area to cover and the lack of standardization resulting in a lack of spare parts for some types of vehicles, rather than a failure of the way Axis logistics were planned or carried out. Also keep in mind that the late war Soviet offensives were basically only possible due to the Lend Lease vehicles, as the Soviets would otherwise have faced similar problems to what the Axis faced.

The logistical shoddiness I speak of was more a result of poor German strategy, which was largely at the mercy of Hitler. One could also say strategy had long been a sore point for the Germans going as far back as the elder von Moltke, and that would have influenced the sentiments and decisions of the General Staff as a whole. There was a tendency by the Prussians (and Germans afterward) to prioritize from the tactical when viewing higher up through operational to strategic. In other words, German tactics 'pulled' German operations, which in turn 'pulled' their strategy. This would sometimes lead to them not seeing the forest for the trees.
The Soviet operational planning you praise was one of the direct results of the lack of initiative you also mentioned: Soviet units needed a very clear battle plan aimed at certain objectives otherwise their attack would simply stop at some point as units waited for orders. The Soviets were like trains on one way tracks compared to German figure skaters when it came to operational flexibility.

The Soviets piled huge amounts of men and equipment into an area, broke through a frontline and had to start all over again because units required constant management from higher command levels to keep them moving. Soviet logistics also tended to break down rather quickly and suddenly when their offensive got more momentum than they had expected, as the logistics were also finetuned for the plan, not for greater or lesser success than was predicted. You basically have to do all that planning yourself in this game, it would be impossible to simply abstract it as you're the supreme commander.

ComradeP, you seem to see this as a disadvantage, and that may be due to an assumption that intiative is the only way to fight a war. Consider a special forces raid, which is meticulously planned with comprehensive intelligence and reconnaissance, then rehearsed through training and simulation. The result can be overwhelming so long as intelligence is accurate and preparatory wargaming thorough. While I'm not saying the Red Army was one big spetsnaz formation (far from it), the similar methodologies should be noted.

Planning when done with effective deception and intelligence can result in great success, as the Soviets proved on many occasions in WWII. The Soviets understood their limitations only too well, and made the most of their advantages. Manipulating German military perceptions was one aspect of Soviet operations that came to the fore as the war progressed. This played well with the Germans' natural preference for intelligence derived from combat.

I'm not saying the Red Army should do this things automatically, merely that the tools are available in the game to make this happen as a Soviet player.
Soviet Rifle units seem to be balanced for slow and methodical assaults after which they have to rest for a while, like their historical counterparts. As has been noted several times in other threads, Soviet mobile units are more for exploiting than attacking, with regular infantry acting like a sponge to soak up losses. The Germans need to achieve their objectives with a minimal amount of violence as they advance on a fairly broad front, the Soviets will try to aim a maximum amount of violence at a limited area. As such, you can't play like a German commander when you're the Soviets because your mobile units are not good enough, and you can't play like a Soviet commander when you're the Germans because you have nowhere near enough units and can't afford the losses.

That sounds good.
Best regards,
Greg Guerrero
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by Grisha »

To jaw:

Thanks for the input. Regarding the Soviets, a lot of their success such as in Bagration and the Vistula-Oder operation were due to intense planning, veiled by deception and hinged on accurate intelligence. Odds at the operational level could reach as high as 7:1 in the Soviets' favor, and that would often result in as high as 16:1 odds tactically in the main assault sector. I should point out that these odds are probably the highest you saw in WWII wrt the Red Army, so don't assume it was the norm. It was rarely done and only late in the war (1944, on). Still, it was done.

It's too bad there isn't some planning mechanism in place for the Soviet player that improves over time. They really did fight in a manner that differed from the German model, relying a lot more on planning. While many are quick to point out how it differed from an initiative-based model, the fact is it worked well with the Soviets against the Germans and provided them with a lot of operational flexibility.

Still, from what you have stated about intelligence rules it looks like a minimum of tools necessary are available for the Soviet player to simulate a planning operational model.
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by ComradeP »

Oh, I dunno. That bang up job they did planning for the first winter qualifies as shoddiness.

The Axis plan in 1941 logistically speaking amounted to: beating up the Red Army west of the Dnepr and then doing a victory march across the rest of the Soviet Union...and finish it up before the snows. It was all supposed to be a piece of cake and a lighthearted romp.

They simply did not take the Soviets very seriously and made no real arrangements to fight a long war.

There's a difference between the plan and the reality/the actual system. Naturally, the Germans suffered from the rather silly optimistic idea that no winter clothing would be needed outside of AGN, and they planned for that by not moving the winter clothing from the depots. However, the actual logistics system kept functioning. Units were still supplied even in the middle of the winter. Had the entire system broken down, AGC would've been combat ineffective in 1942 as its mobile units would've been destroyed. The first winter can be considered a failure of the plan, that's the well known standpoint, but it also showed the strength of the system, as the Germans kept their units in the field with minimal means. The "shoddiness" was thus mostly to be found in the plan and the results of the plan on the system, not on the system in general.
ComradeP, you seem to see this as a disadvantage, and that may be due to an assumption that intiative is the only way to fight a war.

Don't get me wrong, the Soviet planning helped a lot, but my problem with it is that it was not the needed "antidote" to the lack of initiative, so that breakthroughs could not always be exploited because there was often nothing "beyond the plan" until a new plan had been created. Mobile formations had some freedom to move around, but the infantry required a strict plan, because they would not function as an effective force without it and because Soviet logistics could be rather simplistic. Basically I'm saying that the planning was a strength, but could not be fully exploited because of the initiative and leadership problems with the Soviet army.
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RE: How does the experience differ for each side?

Post by Grisha »

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

Don't get me wrong, the Soviet planning helped a lot, but my problem with it is that it was not the needed "antidote" to the lack of initiative, so that breakthroughs could not always be exploited because there was often nothing "beyond the plan" until a new plan had been created. Mobile formations had some freedom to move around, but the infantry required a strict plan, because they would not function as an effective force without it and because Soviet logistics could be rather simplistic. Basically I'm saying that the planning was a strength, but could not be fully exploited because of the initiative and leadership problems with the Soviet army.

I hear ya, ComradeP. Good leadership and well trained troops are always a boon, I've no argument there. Soviet planning certainly could have been better as you say, but to say that you have to assume the political system was malleable, which it was not. The same goes for the Germans. Both sides had distinct ways of fighting at whatever echelon of the military hierarchy you want to focus on. Neither side was perfect. That's what makes it all so interesting.

Regarding operational planning, one creed of operational art is that an operation is won with its last battle. A plan is only as good as its result. War was too big to just take one bite and call it a win. Operations were a way of taking a strategy and seeing it through in manageable bits. This is how the Soviets fought. They planned within their logistical and combat limits as a principle. They didn't always follow it (Kharkov '43), but they tried to adhere by it. A Soviet operation always had a final objective that they deemed was obtainable within a given time frame. If criticism is to be placed on this, I think it would be more in terms of operational turnover, or how fast the Soviet could launch an operation from the last one. And, yes, lend lease did allow for the Soviets to plan for deeper objectives. Without it, Soviet operations might have had to limit their operational exploitation to half the usual length.
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Greg Guerrero
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