Test Question

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RE: Test Question

Post by Flaviusx »

Americans are kinda weird on the whole POW business in general. Not just a WW2 thing, btw.
 
Once again, the casualties in Hammelburg are the result of a poorly conceived and executed raid; but if it had been done right and the camp liberated, nobody would be very much concerned about Waters having been rescued along with the rest of the camp. The problem was that Patton did it half assed. 
 
Oh, and, MacArthur's entire Philippine liberation strategy rather trumps Hammelburg in terms of sheer egotism, if you want to get het up about that kind of thing. (Although I'm personally sympathetic to it on political grounds if not military ones.)
 
I'm not quite sure what you think Patton should've done in Sicily. My own view is that he made lemonade out of lemons.
 
Once again, Falaise failed not because of Patton. I'd primarily blame Bradley on this, and for the Brittany sideshow. Patton always wanted to complete the encirclement and was restrained from doing so out of Bradley's exaggerated respect for the Germans. Rightly or wrongly Bradley felt it was better to drive the Germans out of the salient and rake them with artillery and airpower, and more or less wreck the Germans in the process. I don't agree with the strategy -- the Germans showed a remarkable ability to reconstitute divisions that weren't completely encircled and destroyed -- but I note this "golden corridor" concept looms large in Asian conceptions of the art of war. It's not totally crazy if you follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Rasputitsa »

We seemed to have just replayed all the tensions that hit the allies in the '44 European campaign, so if we haven't resolved it after more than 60 years, there's not much hope now. More importantly, what is the answer to the 'Test Question' ? [:)]
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RE: Test Question

Post by ComradeP »

Why? In 1944, the German manpower barrel was in real trouble. They had largely static forces to act as a tripwire and mobile formations to act as the Fire Brigade. Committing the Fire Brigades with offensive action and then attriting them would never hurt the Americans as it would the Germans. American formations improve after D-Day whereas the quality of German forces steadily declined. The americans could afford the losses, the Germans couldn't.

In 1944, the Americans could afford the losses. The problem is that the 90 division army and their doctrine were finalized a year before that. A doctrine that works mostly because the Germans lost most of their strength on the Eastern Front (a fact which could never have been correctly estimated when the doctrine and the army were "designed") isn't really a good doctrine.
But it didn't need to be. The American replacement system provided a steady stream of replacements.

Replacements that had to be shipped across the Atlantic, with in many cases little means of slowly getting accustomed to combat (few chances for field training). The combat in Italy already showed that the US replacement system had its limitations, and that was against a handful of German divisions in difficult terrain. Marshall had all the time in the world to change it between the first landings in Italy and the landings in Normandy, but he didn't.
I'm getting a little lost here. The point of the German advance was not to cross the Ardennes, but strike the Meuse. Therefore, the French 2nd Army and a lot more besides would have to dealt with before very long. They also planned to force the Meuse by assault crossing, whereas the British planned to drive across the bridges, which they did in many cases on the way to Arnhem.

There were 4 French quality divisions, about a division worth of quality non-assigned troops and 4 poorly equipped or poorly trained divisions within an area dozens of kilometres wide between Dinant and Montmedy. Those poorly equipped or poorly trained troops were mostly static forces supposed to defend certain sectors of the Maginot Line or seperate (not attached to the rest of the line) fortifications west of Montmedy. The Germans basically had air superiority on day 1 and could see what was happening on the French side of the front. With 24 divisions in the first wave, there was a lot less risk involved than what XXX Corps faced on their drive to Arnhem, where commanders chose to ignore warnings of quality troops being in the area, which was especially risky for 1st Airbourne. Had there been any further delays in capturing Nijmegen and the bridges over the Waal, 1st Airbourne would've been done for, the same goes for the Poles.
German traffic was backed up halfway across Germany. The roads were so good that the various Divisions got in each other's way attempting to get off some of the roads assigned to them and several "good roads" is hardly the point if you want to move an Army Group over them.

Ultimately, Monty attempted the most audacious Allied operation of the war. It was arguably the most audacious operation of the war. My point was that those that give Monty a hard time for being cautious, reflect on MG's failure, not on the fact it was the most incautious Allied effort of the 20th century. You can't have it both ways.

The difference is that the Germans did not move over a single contested road, whilst Monty planned to do so. Traffic jams are a natural feature of large scale military operations in a limited area. The Germans did not have to clean up the logistical mess under fire in most cases, whilst the Allied transport units supplying the forces involved in Market Garden were in many cases at least halted for a short while by enemy fire.
In which case we can characterise Patton;s breakout as cautious since the only forces captured were generally those penned up in coastal fortresses who did their utmost to become entrapped.

Patton shattered a front without reserves, the achievement is Patton's for making that happen, the achievement is the German defence which made it possible to hold the Allies without any substantial reserves at first and basically no reserves afterwards. Patton basically advanced into a void after the breakout, with mostly token German resistance as the non-static forces were relocating.
Before that, the Allies slugged their way through Notmandy, fought a broad front advance to the borders of the Reich then everything collapsed. Arguably, the Ruhr was an operational encirclement, but then everything was over bar the shouting at that point. At Falaise, the Allies demonstrated that real manouver warfare was simply not in their makeup.

You mean manoeuvre warfare against a foe that would actually have a chance to resist was not really their kind of warfare. The advance across Germany was certainly swift, but the Germans had barely any mobile units left at that point and those that were left had little fuel and could not really operate in the open due to Allied air supremacy.

There's also the point of how "broad front" the advance was. The front was indeed fairly broad, but the Allies had the forces to do it, with the 60-70 divisions they had in France and Belgium in late 1944. The Germans didn't really intend to fight for most of france after Falaise and there were mostly scattered units in Belgium, trying to keep a retreat route open for forces that had either been already destroyed or were withdrawing in a different direction.
They were. We dropped thousands of them during the Rhine crossing.

If you're referring to Varsity: They were dropped almost directly behind German lines, that's not a deep insertion or a good use for paratroopers, as it takes away most of their advantages and placed them at a disadvantage against organised resistance due to lacking heavy weapons. Of course, German resistance was already breaking apart by then.
It was significant because it convinced Hitler paratroopers were not a strategic, or perhaps even operational weapon.

Limited Luftwaffe transport production and requirements on other fronts for transport aircraft meant paratrooper operations involving one or more divisions would not be possible, Hitler just saw the situation as it is. A lot has been said about how Hitler changed his mind about paratrooper operations after Crete, but it was one of the few cases where he understood the reality check he had just received.
By 1943/44, Britain had a lot of bad experiences and lessons to draw upon. They may well have sounded high handed to proud American warriors, but it was Brits who developed specialised armour for Normandy, added bigger guns to the Shermans and successfully argued for a later rather than earlier D-Day.

Yet until late 1944 the British had failed to develop and produce in any significant numbers a tank that could use the 17 pounder, failing British tank production of newer designs being one of the main reasons the Shermans were converted to begin with. The majority of the British tanks were still using a gun type that was close to being obsolete 2 years earlier (6 pounders and short barreled ~75mm guns). I've also always been amazed at how the British failed to develop a truly modern scout vehicle, especially as they had seen captured German equipment so they would know how it should be done. The British equipment list had some serious shortcomings that were never ironed out, in some cases not until after Korea.
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RE: Test Question

Post by wodin »

Manstein could and should have forced the issue with Paulus to breakout...Paulus never had the backbone but Manstein did...he could have stood his ground and ordered the breakout and dealt with Hitler later....

He comes in for a good critque by a German soldier in http://www.amazon.com/Stalingrad-Memori ... 290&sr=1-1

A good read.

Manstein was a great general. I also like Patton and I'm english...Monty is lower down in my opinion...Brian Horrocks is a British General I really rate.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Rasputitsa »

1st Airborne would have dropped at Arnhem, even if it had been in Hell. These were highly trained and motivated troops, and in September 1944 almost everyone thought that the war was nearly over and didn't want to miss it. Several airborne operations were planned, but then cancelled as the Normandy breakout went faster than expected and the planned drops were overtaken by events. These divisions had been in training forever, they just wanted to go, at any cost.

XXX Corps made it up the road and, had the airborne division landed on the Arnhem bridge in divisional strength, holding it at both ends, XXX Corps could have passed over. They would possibily have been able to hold the railway bridge as well. As it was, fragments of only one airborne battalion made it to the bridge, but they were able to hold one end for several days. The 1st Airborne expended its strenghth trying to hold on to its landing and supply DZs. If these had been around the bridges, everyone would have known where to make the follow-up and supply drops, even with poor radios.

The plan failed not because of the road, but because an airborne division, with almost not transport, was dropped 8 miles from the target.

I have always been puzzled that the allies did not produce better armoured vehicles, until the war was nearly over. I can understand that all equipment had to be sea transportable (imagine taking Tigers in a LCT, or liberty ship) and there was a decision to go for quantity production. However, reading the story of Percy Hobart, it was mentioned that one month before the war started, the UK Ministry of Supply was formed to provide equipment for the armed forces. The Navy and RAF managed to stay out, but the War office lost control of the Directorate of Mechanisation. Anyone who knows how British ministries work will understand what that means, the rest is history.

The other mystery is why, when German 88s were tearing our tanke to pieces, British 3.7 in. AA guns were kept pointing skywards. These guns had equally good ballistic capabilities as the 88 and could have done as much damage. [:)]
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RE: Test Question

Post by ComradeP »

The plan failed not because of the road, but because an airborne division, with almost not transport, was dropped 8 miles from the target.

Well, I live in Arnhem and I'm not convinced even an entire division could've held the bridge.

In order to capture the bridge quickly, they would've had to land on the Southern end of the bridge (where there's no natural cover to speak of, aside from a few clusters of trees). A landing in the middle of the city wasn't really a good idea and the city center of Arnhem is located just to the North of the bridge, which also meant that was one of the most densely packed areas of the city in terms of buildings. A landing near the bridge would've made it perfectly clear to the Germans what the objective was, whilst the historical landing confused the Germans as much as 1st Airbourne itself.

Assuming the Germans didn't blow the bridge, and could not reinforce the Northern side in time, the Germans would still be able to concentrate all forces in the area on the bridge, instead of on dozens of kilometres of frontage, facing platoons and companies of 1st Airbourne each fighting their own small scale battle for survival. If 1st Airbourne had been partially dropped South of the bridge and partially North of Nijmegen, the operation might've been possible, especially if the Polish brigade would also be dropped in the area within a day or so.

If 1st Airbourne would've concentrated on the bridge at Arnhem, it would probably have been blown (the same goes for the narrow railway bridge) and it's doubtful whether 1st Airbourne could've held out against concentrated German attacks, especially as it was historically badly mauled by mostly piecemeal attacks. If concentrated at Arnhem, it would also have been easier for the Germans to move along the Rhine to the West, to the next available bridge.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Capt Cliff »

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

1st Airborne would have dropped at Arnhem, even if it had been in Hell. These were highly trained and motivated troops, and in September 1944 almost everyone thought that the war was nearly over and didn't want to miss it. Several airborne operations were planned, but then cancelled as the Normandy breakout went faster than expected and the planned drops were overtaken by events. These divisions had been in training forever, they just wanted to go, at any cost.

XXX Corps made it up the road and, had the airborne division landed on the Arnhem bridge in divisional strength, holding it at both ends, XXX Corps could have passed over. They would possibily have been able to hold the railway bridge as well. As it was, fragments of only one airborne battalion made it to the bridge, but they were able to hold one end for several days. The 1st Airborne expended its strenghth trying to hold on to its landing and supply DZs. If these had been around the bridges, everyone would have known where to make the follow-up and supply drops, even with poor radios.

The plan failed not because of the road, but because an airborne division, with almost not transport, was dropped 8 miles from the target.

I have always been puzzled that the allies did not produce better armoured vehicles, until the war was nearly over. I can understand that all equipment had to be sea transportable (imagine taking Tigers in a LCT, or liberty ship) and there was a decision to go for quantity production. However, reading the story of Percy Hobart, it was mentioned that one month before the war started, the UK Ministry of Supply was formed to provide equipment for the armed forces. The Navy and RAF managed to stay out, but the War office lost control of the Directorate of Mechanisation. Anyone who knows how British ministries work will understand what that means, the rest is history.

The other mystery is why, when German 88s were tearing our tanke to pieces, British 3.7 in. AA guns were kept pointing skywards. These guns had equally good ballistic capabilities as the 88 and could have done as much damage. [:)]

If the Brit's had not pi$$ed away John Howards Elite glider strike force by putting it into the line it could have been used at Arnhem bridge. An "IF" the ferry's from the south had been properly interdicted by the RAF then the gamble would have worked.

Oh, why wasn't the 3.7" AA gun used by the Brits? Kind of hard to attack with AA guns ... but dam easy to defend with an 88mm.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Rasputitsa »

I would not question your local knowledge, as the closest I have come to the site is Google earth. However, it is a requirement of airborne operations to have surprise and land as close as possible to the objective. The Germans realised quickly what the ojective was, which is why Frost's men were the only ones to reach the bridge. The Germans had quickly moved to block access to the bridge by th rest of the division.

Imagine not 600 paratroops at one end of the Arnhem bridge, but a significant part of the division, even with the scattering common in airborne operations, it would be thousands of men in a much larger bridgehead. The gliderborne 6pdr antitank guns caused problems for the Germans, how much more effective would they have been over the open country to the South of Arnhem. The whole of Arnhem would have been turned into a battleground, which the Germans would have had to advance through, losing some of the power of their AFVs. The street fighting would have been more extensive on the Northern approaches to the bridges. It was not an attack up just one road, but a three Corps advance with 12th and 8th Corps on the flanks, even though the 'dash' for the bridge depended on XXX Corps.

There would have been no doubt where the airborne enclave was for follow-up drops, accepting that the losses to AAA would have been higher. It was protection of the aircraft fleet which had a high prority and probabily doomed the operation. There were good reasons for this, as Bomber Command's losses were 50% over the war time period. The Stirling bomber glider tug crews had been through enough.

Comments have been made about the intensity of operations, as compared with today, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without denigrating the courage of our forces today, we would not be there, if we were anywhere near 50% casualties.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Flaviusx »

Honestly, as long as Monty kept ignoring Antwerp, it really almost didn't matter what happened at Arnhem. Market Garden lacked the logistical underpinnings to do very much even if they had taken the bridge. He would have been in hold of a nice bridgehead which couldn't meaningfully exploit. Nor have I ever been convinced that the single thrust idea was the right one in any case, too easy to stop.
 
It was an unsound plan. Visionary and highly impractical. The tragedy of the 1st Airborne tends to obscure this. If Monty hadn't been so blinded by his own glory and the enormous political pressure he was getting from Brooke, he wouldn't ever have done it. For all his flaws, Monty was a professional who prided himself on his grip, and the whole operation really was uncharacteristically sloppy for him. I'm not sure his heart was really in it.
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RE: Test Question

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I think all the allied commanders fell into the same trap of thinking that the Germans were finished and it was really just a short drive into Germany. They underestimated the energising effect of fighting for your homeland. Just as Union forces were energised when Lee crossed into Union territory. Also like a charging guard dog, the allies were yanked back as they came to the end of their supply leash [:)]
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RE: Test Question

Post by IronDuke_slith »

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Americans are kinda weird on the whole POW business in general. Not just a WW2 thing, btw.

Americans are just kinda weird...[;)]
Once again, the casualties in Hammelburg are the result of a poorly conceived and executed raid; but if it had been done right and the camp liberated, nobody would be very much concerned about Waters having been rescued along with the rest of the camp. The problem was that Patton did it half assed.


But done right meant committing a Combat command or more. Given the camp was liberated within a couple of weeks anyway, and the end of the war was clearly in sight, provoking a major battle with no operational aim was criminal. It was not possible to get this one man out without killing Americans, Americans who might well have survived and gone home in a few short weeks/months. Why was GI Joe worth killing in order to save one man's son-in-law?

If America is about anything, it is advancement by merit and everybody equal under the constiutution. Which "American" merit did Patton's son-in-law have that the man who died trying to get him out didn't have?

Or put another way. What would everyone's response (including americans) have been historically if Mark Clark had attempted this? Crap is crap, even when an American icon is shovelling it.
Oh, and, MacArthur's entire Philippine liberation strategy rather trumps Hammelburg in terms of sheer egotism, if you want to get het up about that kind of thing. (Although I'm personally sympathetic to it on political grounds if not military ones.)

Not my theatre, but pointing out you had more than one "Leader" pulling this sort of stuff in no way excuses Patton.
I'm not quite sure what you think Patton should've done in Sicily. My own view is that he made lemonade out of lemons.


No issue here. My issue tends to be with people who point at this and the breakout and go "Genius..."
Once again, Falaise failed not because of Patton. I'd primarily blame Bradley on this, and for the Brittany sideshow.

I'd blame doctrine. American warfare depended on logistics and logistics needed deep water ports. Brittany was always a given then. British doctrine advocated not sticking your head too far behind German lines, so no one was in a hurry to complete the encirclement. Bradley was certainly cautious, but then the mass of Germans (if surrounded) would most likely have burst across his lines and there were instances of Americans getting bloody noses from isolated and ad-hoc German Kampfgruppe as it was.
Patton always wanted to complete the encirclement and was restrained from doing so out of Bradley's exaggerated respect for the Germans. Rightly or wrongly Bradley felt it was better to drive the Germans out of the salient and rake them with artillery and airpower, and more or less wreck the Germans in the process. I don't agree with the strategy -- the Germans showed a remarkable ability to reconstitute divisions that weren't completely encircled and destroyed -- but I note this "golden corridor" concept looms large in Asian conceptions of the art of war. It's not totally crazy if you follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz.

I think Patton wanted to go long and complete the encirclement by the Seine, but it's correct to say he would have been more aggressive if given the green light.

If memory serves, Sun Tzu talks about the golden corridor as a means of unsettling enemy will to resist. Cornered animals fight more desparately. True up to a point, but then he wrote all this before copious artillery was invented. I'd have encircled then gone hard at it. Allied forces could cope with the losses from an encirclement battle, the Germans couldn't.

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RE: Test Question

Post by IronDuke_slith »

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

Why? In 1944, the German manpower barrel was in real trouble. They had largely static forces to act as a tripwire and mobile formations to act as the Fire Brigade. Committing the Fire Brigades with offensive action and then attriting them would never hurt the Americans as it would the Germans. American formations improve after D-Day whereas the quality of German forces steadily declined. The americans could afford the losses, the Germans couldn't.
ORIGINAL: ComradeP
In 1944, the Americans could afford the losses. The problem is that the 90 division army and their doctrine were finalized a year before that. A doctrine that works mostly because the Germans lost most of their strength on the Eastern Front (a fact which could never have been correctly estimated when the doctrine and the army were "designed") isn't really a good doctrine.

It was American doctrine. It had been during WWI and it remained so until the Russians turned up with more Tanks and nukes in the 60s and 70s and you started sexing doctrine up with AirLand Battle. It was a winning doctrine in the end. Besides, a year before 1944, it was clear the Germans were bleeding to death in the east and that 90 Divisions would be plenty.
But it didn't need to be. The American replacement system provided a steady stream of replacements.
Replacements that had to be shipped across the Atlantic, with in many cases little means of slowly getting accustomed to combat (few chances for field training). The combat in Italy already showed that the US replacement system had its limitations, and that was against a handful of German divisions in difficult terrain. Marshall had all the time in the world to change it between the first landings in Italy and the landings in Normandy, but he didn't.

Change it inside a year? How? German and British replacement systems differed, but only because they had existing regimental/medium unit establishments and traditions to build on. The only other way the americans could have done it was to have devolved replacements and training into the homeland structure of the existing divisions. This would have required a complete re-organisation and wasn't practical in the middle of a war.
I'm getting a little lost here. The point of the German advance was not to cross the Ardennes, but strike the Meuse. Therefore, the French 2nd Army and a lot more besides would have to dealt with before very long. They also planned to force the Meuse by assault crossing, whereas the British planned to drive across the bridges, which they did in many cases on the way to Arnhem.
There were 4 French quality divisions, about a division worth of quality non-assigned troops and 4 poorly equipped or poorly trained divisions within an area dozens of kilometres wide between Dinant and Montmedy. Those poorly equipped or poorly trained troops were mostly static forces supposed to defend certain sectors of the Maginot Line or seperate (not attached to the rest of the line) fortifications west of Montmedy. The Germans basically had air superiority on day 1 and could see what was happening on the French side of the front. With 24 divisions in the first wave, there was a lot less risk involved than what XXX Corps faced on their drive to Arnhem, where commanders chose to ignore warnings of quality troops being in the area, which was especially risky for 1st Airbourne. Had there been any further delays in capturing Nijmegen and the bridges over the Waal, 1st Airbourne would've been done for, the same goes for the Poles.

Sorry, but this looks way out to me.

Firstly, how are the 24 divisions being counted? If forces like 14th Motorised Corps are being included, then the French reserves get to the scene before this formation did, and you have to include for the French a couple of Armoured divisions and a motorised division that turned up around the 14th May.

The German's did not assault with 24 Divisions out of the Ardennes in the first wave. Secondly, most of Guderian's assault crossings with elite Pzgr and men of the crack GD Regiment failed at Sedan, so to suggest it was somehow less risky is simply not true. Thirdly, 1st Airborne units that did reach Arnhem held out for days longer than planned, so elite troops or no, it was a difficult fight for the Germans to contain this. Finally, as the Germans moved for the coast in 1940, they opened up flanks ripe for counterattack. They took a tremendous operational risk. By comparison, Monty had much more limited objectives.

Monty lost at Arnhem but still won the campaign. a loss in the Ardennes for the Germans would most likely have cost them the war. The risks just don't compare.

There were errors in planning and execution, but for something thrown together in 7 days, Market Garden was remarkable.
German traffic was backed up halfway across Germany. The roads were so good that the various Divisions got in each other's way attempting to get off some of the roads assigned to them and several "good roads" is hardly the point if you want to move an Army Group over them.

Ultimately, Monty attempted the most audacious Allied operation of the war. It was arguably the most audacious operation of the war. My point was that those that give Monty a hard time for being cautious, reflect on MG's failure, not on the fact it was the most incautious Allied effort of the 20th century. You can't have it both ways.
The difference is that the Germans did not move over a single contested road, whilst Monty planned to do so.


But they were moving far more over their larger (but still very limited) road net. It all evens out.
Traffic jams are a natural feature of large scale military operations in a limited area. The Germans did not have to clean up the logistical mess under fire in most cases, whilst the Allied transport units supplying the forces involved in Market Garden were in many cases at least halted for a short while by enemy fire.

The Germans had real issues supplying the forward units during the invasion of France. Given the roads available couldn't support the combt units, exactly how easy was it ever going to be? German tanks units carried extra fuel with them, sometimes strapped to the tank. You underestimate German logistical difficulties.

In which case we can characterise Patton;s breakout as cautious since the only forces captured were generally those penned up in coastal fortresses who did their utmost to become entrapped.
Patton shattered a front without reserves,

Hmmm....Hodges shattered the front.
the achievement is Patton's for making that happen,

No, it is Hodges and Collin's.
the achievement is the German defence which made it possible to hold the Allies without any substantial reserves at first and basically no reserves afterwards. Patton basically advanced into a void after the breakout, with mostly token German resistance as the non-static forces were relocating.

And advancing in the face of no resistance is how difficult exactly....?
Before that, the Allies slugged their way through Notmandy, fought a broad front advance to the borders of the Reich then everything collapsed. Arguably, the Ruhr was an operational encirclement, but then everything was over bar the shouting at that point. At Falaise, the Allies demonstrated that real manouver warfare was simply not in their makeup.
You mean manoeuvre warfare against a foe that would actually have a chance to resist was not really their kind of warfare.

There is no other type. Manouver warfare against a foe incapable of resisting is known as "pursuit".
There's also the point of how "broad front" the advance was. The front was indeed fairly broad, but the Allies had the forces to do it, with the 60-70 divisions they had in France and Belgium in late 1944.


The front stretched from the northern coast down to Switzerland. the Allies advanced the length of it. It was a broad front advance. How long or broad the front was is not the point. It was whay type of advance was being made that formed the heart of the point.
They were. We dropped thousands of them during the Rhine crossing.
If you're referring to Varsity: They were dropped almost directly behind German lines, that's not a deep insertion or a good use for paratroopers, as it takes away most of their advantages and placed them at a disadvantage against organised resistance due to lacking heavy weapons. Of course, German resistance was already breaking apart by then.

The Normandy landings were not deep insertions, what difference does it make. the point was the Allies tried hard at Arnhem, and when that failed, still had the specialist para resource to go again six months later.
It was significant because it convinced Hitler paratroopers were not a strategic, or perhaps even operational weapon.
Limited Luftwaffe transport production and requirements on other fronts for transport aircraft meant paratrooper operations involving one or more divisions would not be possible,


Why? The Germans massed enough transports at Stalingrad to airdrop a Division. Successfully lifted an Army into Tunisia. It was nothing to do with transport aircraft. It was will. The casualties persuaded Hitler these operations wouldn't work.
By 1943/44, Britain had a lot of bad experiences and lessons to draw upon. They may well have sounded high handed to proud American warriors, but it was Brits who developed specialised armour for Normandy, added bigger guns to the Shermans and successfully argued for a later rather than earlier D-Day.
Yet until late 1944 the British had failed to develop and produce in any significant numbers a tank that could use the 17 pounder,

Which western Allied Nation fielded a 17pdr or 90mm weapon before that? British doctrine called for infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The cruisers were designed for manouvre so didn't need thick armour and the infantry tanks were consistently the best in class. British tank design was also stunted because production in the early years concentrated on pumping out proven existing designs to maximise production to replace the losses of the French campaign. There was no doctrinal pressure within either the US or British Armies to build anything bigger until the first Tigers appeared in 1942.

As they cottoned on to the fact that they needed a weapons system capable of dueling with the German cats, the Brits improvised.
failing British tank production of newer designs being one of the main reasons the Shermans were converted to begin with. The majority of the British tanks were still using a gun type that was close to being obsolete 2 years earlier (6 pounders and short barreled ~75mm guns).

Weapons ideally suited to infantry support, which is what the tanks were designed for.
I've also always been amazed at how the British failed to develop a truly modern scout vehicle, especially as they had seen captured German equipment so they would know how it should be done. The British equipment list had some serious shortcomings that were never ironed out, in some cases not until after Korea.

Which nation didn't have shortcomings? A "truly" modern scout vehicle was hardly as desparately needed as heavy armour etc. We developed a range of specialised armoured vehicles that gave us real advantages in Normandy; developed the war's most successful heavy bomber; produced good fighter designs and fight bomber platforms etc. All nations had pluses and minuses.
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RE: Test Question

Post by ComradeP »

Imagine not 600 paratroops at one end of the Arnhem bridge, but a significant part of the division, even with the scattering common in airborne operations, it would be thousands of men in a much larger bridgehead. The gliderborne 6pdr antitank guns caused problems for the Germans, how much more effective would they have been over the open country to the South of Arnhem. The whole of Arnhem would have been turned into a battleground, which the Germans would have had to advance through, losing some of the power of their AFVs.

The SS would've mostly had to ferry troops across the Rhine to get to them, so they would be safer south of Arnhem, with water on three sides. However, in that case the SS or other German forces could also try and relocate (through Germany) to Nijmegen in order to engage American forces and drive North across the bridges at Nijmegen, which is why it think that success would've been only possible if both the bridges at and around Nijmegen and the bridge at Arnhem could've been held until the arrival of XXX Corps.
It was a winning doctrine in the end.

I'll repeat it again: whether a doctrine was successful or not is not the sole issue that matters, as it does not necessarily have a relation to the merits of the actual doctrine.
Change it inside a year? How?

Mobilise more men, create a number of divisional sized training units as a pool for frontline units and move some of them to Europe with the rest of the army, so the replacements would be trained and on site. That would've given them enough time for at least 6 months of training, with the rest spend on preparing to move to Europe and moving to Europe.
The German's did not assault with 24 Divisions out of the Ardennes in the first wave.

No, but they could have, as those forces were available.

Comparing the forces that could have been used in the Ardennes and the area around it (from troops South of Liege to Montmedy):

German:

Infantry divisions: 3,5,8,12,15,16,17,21,23,24,28,32,34,36,62,68,73,76.
1st Gebirgs Division.
Motorised: 2nd Motorised Infantry, with 13th Motorised Infantry and 29th Motorised infantry arriving in a few days.
Panzer: 1,5,6,7,8,10.

A few of the infantry divisions would be needed to keep the French units in the Maginot Line honest and in place.

Belgian: 1st Cavalry, 1st and 2nd Ardense Jagers division as mobile formations, with the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Infantry divisions protecting Liege and Namur.

French:

Initially (in the area described earlier or within a few kilometres West, or South of the Meuse): 1st, 2nd, 3rd (would have to move from Maginot Line reserve duty) and 5th Light Cavalry, as well as about a division worth of non-divisional mobile units, with the 55th and 61st Infantry division and the 102nd Fortress/static division assembled in defences/defensive positions behind the Meuse.

Possible Reserves (including some reserves of the Maginot line): South of the Meuse: 1st Colonial Infantry division, 6th Infantry division and another division worth of mobile troops, in several days: 3rd Armour and after that 2nd Armour. West of the Meuse: 4th North African Division, 22nd Infantry division and the 4th Light Cavalry. 1st Armour could possibly act as a reserve should it decide to move South.

The French had enough men in the area to stall the Germans, they just didn't have a sensible defensive strategy so they could not stop them.
The Germans had real issues supplying the forward units during the invasion of France. Given the roads available couldn't support the combt units, exactly how easy was it ever going to be? German tanks units carried extra fuel with them, sometimes strapped to the tank. You underestimate German logistical difficulties.

I'm not underestimating anything, I'm saying that the Germans were not under fire when they had their supply difficulties, whilst the Allies were during Market Garden.
Hmmm....Hodges shattered the front.

&

No, it is Hodges and Collin's.

The front was still there, it was shaken, but still there, Patton finished what others had started but did not finish. That's what we can credit him for, for delivering the final blow that dislodged the German line in the area. I don't give him any credit for the wearing out the defenders.
And advancing in the face of no resistance is how difficult exactly....?

It isn't, that's why I don't credit him for it.
There is no other type. Manouver warfare against a foe incapable of resisting is known as "pursuit".

I meant: a chance to resist their mobile forces. The Germans were still resisting, but they were virtually immobile. The Allied mobile divisions bypassed tens of thousands of German forces that couldn't stop them because they had no mobility. That was not "pursuit".
The Normandy landings were not deep insertions, what difference does it make. the point was the Allies tried hard at Arnhem, and when that failed, still had the specialist para resource to go again six months later.

It makes a substantial difference. The Normandy landings, as well as the German landings in Holland and in Crete, were made with the knowledge that if no friendly follow-up forces would arrive, the paratroopers would be screwed. The same goes for the landing around Arnhem. In the case of the landing at Arnhem and the German landing in Rotterdam, the paratroopers were nearly defeated by the defenders before they could withdraw/be rescued. The paratrooper operations in Germany made little to no use of the advantages of paratroopers by dropping them almost directly behind German lines. Allied paratroopers did not quite "go again" on an operation comparable to the landings of Normandy, Market Garden or the German paratrooper operations.
Why? The Germans massed enough transports at Stalingrad to airdrop a Division. Successfully lifted an Army into Tunisia. It was nothing to do with transport aircraft. It was will. The casualties persuaded Hitler these operations wouldn't work.

First: the Germans did not airlift an army into Tunisia, they lifted about a division in. Most forces were shipped in.

Second: the Germans could not air drop a division because that would mean the forces in the pocket would not be supplied by the transports being used to deliver and supply the paratroopers.

The point is that the German transports always had other tasks and could in most cases simply not be used to drop large quantities of troops. That's the result of the early war losses and lacking production, not "will".
Which western Allied Nation fielded a 17pdr or 90mm weapon before that?

By the time 17 pounder equipped tanks became more common in late 1944, the Americans had the M36.

Of course, the 17 pounder had been developed and produced prior to the US conversion of the 90mm AA gun to an AT weapon, but it effects had not really been felt because British tank design did not keep up with the improvement in armament.
British doctrine called for infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The cruisers were designed for manouvre so didn't need thick armour and the infantry tanks were consistently the best in class.

&

British tank design was also stunted because production in the early years concent
rated on pumping out proven existing designs to maximise production to replace the losses of the French campaign.

And here we have the primary flaws of British tank designs: tanks designed for the wrong kind of war/enemy and good tanks not being produced because early and mid war designs were kept in production.
Weapons ideally suited to infantry support, which is what the tanks were designed for.

A concept of which the bankruptcy had become painfully apparent during the battle for France in 1940, but which was still kept in place.
A "truly" modern scout vehicle was hardly as desparately needed as heavy armour etc.

We have already established that the British did not have good "heavy armour" for most of the war either, at least no heavy armour that packed a punch that matched its protection.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Rasputitsa »

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

The SS would've mostly had to ferry troops across the Rhine to get to them, so they would be safer south of Arnhem, with water on three sides. However, in that case the SS or other German forces could also try and relocate (through Germany) to Nijmegen in order to engage American forces and drive North across the bridges at Nijmegen, which is why it think that success would've been only possible if both the bridges at and around Nijmegen and the bridge at Arnhem could've been held until the arrival of XXX Corps.

Which is more or less what I am saying, if the Germans had been forced into large scale movements they would not have been able to bring their full force to bear quickly and would have faced allied air power. The the plan was flawed because it did not ensure that the Arnhem bridges were taken quickly (within minutes of landing, as on the Orne on D-day) and with sufficient force to hold them. The problem was not so much the road, but the choice of landing grounds that 1st Airborne was required to use. That choice may have reduced aircrfaft losses, but it doomed the operation. However, that failing did save the town of Arnhem from complete distruction.

We will never know if the attack could have pushed beyond Arnhem, after XXX Corps arrived, but that is why we play these games, to find out. [:)]

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RE: Test Question

Post by ComradeP »

Well, as it was, out of around 25.000 houses, only 200 were undamaged after the war, so it's not like the city was spared. Similarly, parts of Nijmegen were destroyed by a not on purpose but also not accidental bombing raid by US bombers (they were supposed to bomb cities in Germany, but turned back due to the weather, decided to attack the railyard at Nijmegen but ended up bombing the city center after the lead bomber dropped its load too early), by operations during Market Garden, and by prolonged German shelling. Eindhoven was damaged during the fighting and in a Luftwaffe bombing raid. The cities had barely been scratched before Market Garden.

The question of whether XXX Corps could've pushed on beyond Arnhem is interesting. I'd say: not by itself and certainly not with one armoured division.
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RE: Test Question

Post by Flaviusx »

It seems to me altogether unlikely that XXX corps, unsupported and lacking secure logistics to supply any kind of larger force could've gone much beyond Arnhem. No Antwerp, no Germany. This isn't even a close call. Taking the bridgehead itself would have been nice for future operations once we got the rear straightened out, granted.
 
If the British were serious about making this the area of a single thrust they should have gotten Antwerp settled out -- it might have forced Ike's hand and completely altered the broad front strategy. As things stood, they had no case.
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RE: Test Question

Post by punkjock »

With all due respect the best general in any military anywhere without question was Hoth!! He unlike any Russian commander always lead with dash flare and on a regular basis he was the Germans go to man for impossible missions. He was critical in the 41 army group center victories. he whipped ass in the south with his 42 victories and in 43 at kursk he out fought, out smarted, and out maneuvered even the great russian war master zukov by smashing through the Russian defenses south of kursk. he single handedly forced the Russians to comite the steppe front to stop him alone 400,000 men to stop one army.
With regard to is defensive skills he held up time and time again the Russian attacks east of Kiev after kursk and he single handedly save nearly a 100k men at uman that were encircled by a massive Russian army in late 43 . he was also in charge of the relief offensive towards Stalingrad but was ordered to call it off with the collapse of the Italian and Hungarian army's northwest of him.
If historic credit was given to manstein for being the greatest field marshall of WWII then Hoth is without a doubt the greatest general! Oh for you american and russian general lovers anyone can win with brute force the greatness of a general is his skill not his ablity to mass the biggest army!!! Thats why history remembers Lee's greatness not Grant or his predecessors
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RE: Test Question

Post by Skanvak »

I am surprised only one person cite Guderian? I still have to read the books I bought on both of them but I think that Guderian defenitly beat Patton as Guderian are as bold if not more wihtout Patton flaws.

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RE: Test Question

Post by Flaviusx »

I'm pretty sure that Grant hasn't been forgotten except by those determined to forget him.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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RE: Test Question

Post by wworld7 »

ORIGINAL: punkjock

Thats why history remembers Lee's greatness not Grant or his predecessors

Gen. Grant "forgotten"? You were either sleeping in history class or not there at all. Or perhaps your dog ate your textbook...
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