Amphibious invasions - gamey?

[aprezto]

Hi Folks;

It has recently been bought to my attention that amphibious invasions are gamey? or, and I'm unsure here, that amphibious invasions of about 100k troops is gamey.

Is this considered so?

Aprezto

[Mus]

I think the biggest expeditions of the time were about half that, so to an extent it could be considered gamey, but with the way the siege formulas work you need a large force to take a place anyways.

Since the patch you also suffer strategic disorder and fairly significant losses abstracting the idea of fortified places and local forces based on the number of gun levels in the province being landed in.

I would do it without shame.

[aprezto]

That was my thought, you need a serious force to get by the forts so you are forced to bring a number. The only other way I could see was to do multiple lifts, but this almost guarantee's that your endeavour will fail.

It certainly does disorder and cause large losses.

[Marshal Villars]

I do know that it wasn't me who told you this aprezto. However, I have, on occasion, had the same feeling.

Look, I feel that COG:EE is the best over all Napoleonic game I have ever played. I do feel there are certain things setting it apart from a simulation (indeed, even Harpoon isn't a TRUE simulation (THAT IS OPINION!!!!--NOT PRESENTED AS FACT)). Consider ALL of the modelling which would have to be done of psychological factors in different situations, the ability of metal to flow like a fluid when under enough pressure, and the breakdown of engine oil. NO ONE MODELS THIS STUFF! So, it isn't REALLY a simulation. But people CAN get closer to a simulation if they like I guess. But you are talking $30 Million-$100 Million Pentagon budgets I am guessing.

I have just brought this amphibious invasion issue up myself and will see what comes up in the way of discussions.

What I do know is that WCS is dedicated to improving the game where they can within the time constraints they have, and they seem to have a strong commitment to doing what they can to improving the game and perhaps incorporating more "realism"--as long as it does not ruin the gaming experience. I am amazed at WCS's attention to patches and interest in improving the game long after its initial release. They really aren't even "required" to do more than patch it, yet they seem to insist on actually improving it!

I can say that amphib operations were perhaps the most administratively complex operations of the day, and 35k to 40k troops were the largest operations I have found (which were launched--however, Napoleon's cross channel attempt before the 1805 invasion of Austria may have been larger). One thing history has shown is that the French, with all of their plans to land in England were probably overly ambitious and could have never managed due to poor administration or incredibly complicated plans to sail portions of the fleet as far away as the West Indies before re-concentrating in the Channel before the English could react (this in an age before the cell phone or GPS!). In 1779, for instance, a numerically superior combined French and Spanish fleet had actually managed to clear the channel of English opposition but called off the operation to land 25,000 men in England ready to go from from Normandy because of the miserable state of the combined French and Spanish fleets. Fleets were incredibly complicated to maintain and support at sea for any length of time and the French never really got the hang of it. Neither did the Spanish. Resources on the channel were incredibly over stretched for such operations.

I would personally recommend that there be some kind of a limit on the number of men which a nation can have at sea in any given turn (perhaps 20k in 1792 for France and Britain), these can then be landed in enemy held regions or in friendly ports. Some people may say, HEY! what about the build up of 40,000 or 70,000 English troops I want to accomplish in a friendly Portugal? I say fine, but you have to get them there over 2 to 4 months until I am convinced that a special rule needs to be written to allow for more than this to be transported per turn--even to friendly ports. Carrying a lot of troops, and the supplies for their operation was an overwhelming task. Maybe there are naval advances which allow players to increase these numbers somewhat.

For instance, the 1809 British raid on Flushing (just north of Antwerp) was an operation in which 35,000 troops embarked on a total of 625 ships! Their goal was to destroy the naval facilities which Napoleon was building up in the area, destined to be the second largest naval support base in France, after Toulon. The force which sailed from England was the largest armada the British/English had ever assembled. And you know what? It failed. It failed because they were a little indecisive and the French had time to react. It failed because a lack of research into the local conditions failed to reveal to those making decisions that malaria was a common problem to outsiders in the low lying country where they would be landing (a problem which was in many low lying coastal areas of the time, including around the French port of La Rochelle in the west). After losing a few troops, wasting a week on the siege of a secondary target, and loosing 10,000 men to illness, they fleet quietly sailed away and returned home. After all of that fanfare.

Yes. Amphibious operations were complicated. Indeed, in a survey I just did of amphibious operations in the 1700s, it seems a full 1/4 to 1/3 were outright failures--meaning they were aborted before they arrived or were aborted very shortly after landing. This includes several raids on the French coast by British forces. Problems leading to failure could be that the admiral in command felt that conditions were not perfect, illness breaking out on board the ships, inadequate supply, bad weather either delaying operations or outright destroying ships, or inadequate understanding of the situation on the target shore before departing.

As Mus indicates, if one were to change the number of men being transported by fleets for invasions, there might have to be a rethinking of the values required to initiate sieges. I won't go into that now. But I have considered it and done some research into it, which I will be presenting soon.

[Mus]

Another limitation with PBEM is the fact that there is little finesse involved in the battles. It's all about the big stacks.

[evwalt]

I don't think the invasions are 'gamey' at all. We must remember that we are talking about a 1 month period across a territory of hundreds of miles. If it makes you feel any better, just consider that you conducted a small invasion that seized a port and the rest of your troops were shipped in normally.

[Marshal Villars]

Mus,

When you say that the game is all about big stacks, what do YOU mean exactly? I know what I mean when I agree. What do YOU mean? I want to hear it from you first, because I do not want to lead you in your response but am terribly interested in hearing this...

(have at it, I am listening intently)

[Mus]

All I mean by it is that all things being equal (morale, unit distribution between inf/cav/arty and special subtypes, doctrinal upgrades, etc., which isn't always the case) the larger more concentrated army will prevail more often than not in quick/instant combat. It is also easier to keep your forces concentrated, at full strength and fully supplied in big stacks than I think it ought to be. If I am mid campaign and far enough into a game to the point that I am not restricted by resources or lack of forces it is VERY RARE that I would ever have a formation smaller than 2 Corps in 1 Army of around 100,000 men. Most of my PBEM experience has been as Britain so I have been restrained by mobilization limit or I would move them around in even larger stacks of 150,000-200,000 men.

In reality, forces moved more spread out and were not at 100% strength. At the end of a long logistical tether, enough supply would not get forward, foraging would have to be done to supplement. Also replacements coupld not keep up with all the kinds of attrition taking place in camapigns. Battles started in meeting engagements of smaller forces with Corps moving into position over the course of a couple days.

Read about the leadup to Borodino as an example of what I am talking about in regard to moving in full strength. Look at the OOB of the French Grand Armee in reality at Austerlitz versus COG EE. Much bigger stacks in COG EE, at nearly full strength. Think the 2 Grand Armee units represent like double what Napoleon really had at Austerlitz.

It is just a very difficult task to abstract the battles over a month turn scale I think. A TURN in COG EE represents all of the decisive part of Napoleon's 1805 campaign in Austria.

Anyways, if somebody moves around in an unconcentrated fashion they are simply toast in PBEM. If they do stuff like cross rivers and force march unintelligently it's even worse.

[Anthropoid]

Agree about the big stacks, and I think the naval part of the game is a touch gamey. Still a fantastic game though.

[Marshal Villars]

I actually also agree about big stacks. It seems that my big forces rarely, if ever, get beaten by smaller forces.

It seems to me that there should be more of a combat matrix (flank, assault, defend, echelon, etc--even if chosen by the computer!), which would allow for the possibility of smaller forces beating larger ones more often--or at least more surprises (low losses, high losses)!

[aprezto]

So, as such, without the ability to be able to land the big stacks any amphibious invasion of mainland Europe is doomed to failure, unless the enemy is very out of position. But maybe there is the out - no amphibious invasions of mainland Europe?

[guctony]

hello everybody

Well As player Of France in a recent PBEM.

I feel it gamey to have the ability to send more then 100 000 to mainland with a assult landing. Perhaps a landing to a friendly base is more acceptable. In 1944 allies were able to land more then 150.000 soldiers in DDay but it took 3 years of planning. Some people are correct to mention that in 30 days you can land 100 000 soldiers but what about support personel, supply, guns, horses. And if we divide 100 000 soldiers to 30 days daily landing will be 3333 soldiers. Which means that if I had a force of 20 000 soldiers and a coastal fort with gun it would be like turkey hunting. This operation requires passification of Forts and land defence. And what about Reserve forces. In 30 days defensive forces could bring anyting to comfort the invaders.

I feel there should be a limit to assult landings. But Friendly port landing is something different. There should be large looses and attack penalties in assult landings. Consider river assults, currently I belive they are more costy then naval attacks. As France I feel I am trapped I have to keep double amount of forces at all time. 120 000 army to keep Paris safe and another 120 000 for offensive operations.

Which in Reality should be 60 000 for defence 180 000 for attack.

[guctony]

All I mean by it is that all things being equal (morale, unit distribution between inf/cav/arty and special subtypes, doctrinal upgrades, etc., which isn't always the case) the larger more concentrated army will prevail more often than not in quick/instant combat. It is also easier to keep your forces concentrated, at full strength and fully supplied in big stacks than I think it ought to be. If I am mid campaign and far enough into a game to the point that I am not restricted by resources or lack of forces it is VERY RARE that I would ever have a formation smaller than 2 Corps in 1 Army of around 100,000 men. Most of my PBEM experience has been as Britain so I have been restrained by mobilization limit or I would move them around in even larger stacks of 150,000-200,000 men.

In reality, forces moved more spread out and were not at 100% strength. At the end of a long logistical tether, enough supply would not get forward, foraging would have to be done to supplement. Also replacements coupld not keep up with all the kinds of attrition taking place in camapigns. Battles started in meeting engagements of smaller forces with Corps moving into position over the course of a couple days.

Read about the leadup to Borodino as an example of what I am talking about in regard to moving in full strength. Look at the OOB of the French Grand Armee in reality at Austerlitz versus COG EE. Much bigger stacks in COG EE, at nearly full strength. Think the 2 Grand Armee units represent like double what Napoleon really had at Austerlitz.

Well I think that armies become bigger because of players playing style. We tend to be more defensive in posture. Maybe game dictates this but most of us prefer small calculated moves rather then radical push to the limit attitude. I think it is good. This leaves players like me to perform Napoleon Tactics. Move fast destroy Enemy Retreat reorganize and pick another foe. Dont care for loses they can be replenish.

regards

Guctony

[Mus]

ORIGINAL: guctony

Well I think that armies become bigger because of players playing style.

Don't really think style has anything to do with it. When you see the side that does a better job of remaining concentrated at a single point winning 9 times out of 10 you start to adapt.

Also, that isn't to say that players don't move their big stacks around rapidly and aggressively. They do, they just move around... big stacks.

[;)]

ORIGINAL: Marshal Villars

It seems to me that there should be more of a combat matrix

Some kind of player interaction with the combat results in future WCS PBEM content is a must, I agree with you on that.

As it is in COG:EE You just try to stack all the operational factors in your favor and cross your fingers. The more factors the player's skill can help tilt in his advantage by design the better.

Obviously some of this is theoretical wishlist for future product type stuff, but I think it's germane.

[guctony]

quote:

ORIGINAL: guctony

Well I think that armies become bigger because of players playing style.

Don't really think style has anything to do with it. When you see the side that does a better job of remaining concentrated at a single point winning 9 times out of 10 you start to adapt.

well I think that proves my conclusion. we are playing concentrated because we became defensive in posture. it is a closed loop. Games wins in terms of effecting our play style. But in the end this is our decision to play concentrated. Maybe problem is in the long turn sequence.We have no good control over manuvering small forces to harras enemy efficiently. If players decides to take action more actively more intresting results can occur. But at the moment Capitals are like honey to bear. Normaly an undetected small force can break havok to a army camp. etc....

Regards

[Mus]

ORIGINAL: guctony

well I think that proves my conclusion.

Sounded to me like you were originally saying big stacks prevail because of playing styles, not because of game design. If you meant that the game design effects playing style, obviously nobody would disagree with that.

[ericbabe]

The hardest level of march attrition is closest to historical levels, yet even that probably falls short.  One thing we found with FOF is that players -- even those who say that really want a realistic game -- hate having their troops quickly dwindle away on them.  For FOF we had historically realistic levels of disease, and one of the #1 requests was for ways that players could mitigate losses to disease to the point where disease wasn't much of a problem.  Napoleonic armies -- even just sitting in camp -- suffered huge levels of attrition.  Since players seemed to hate these kinds of losses, we ignore them under the (rough) assumption that they are happening at nearly the same rate for all players.

So, I tell people to think of the troop numbers used in the game as being more like the paper-strength of their armies rather than the actual number of men in the field.

A hard limit on the number of troops allowed at sea wouldn't work easily for several AI- and interface-related reasons.  With the changes we made in June, it seemed to me there was a strong disincentive to land large stacks of men into enemy territory simply because of the new amphibious attrition rules -- much better to land the troops in nearby friendly territory and proceed from there.  If this still isn't a strong enough disincentive, we might consider some other rule tweak.

[guctony]

The hardest level of march attrition is closest to historical levels, yet even that probably falls short. One thing we found with FOF is that players -- even those who say that really want a realistic game -- hate having their troops quickly dwindle away on them. For FOF we had historically realistic levels of disease, and one of the #1 requests was for ways that players could mitigate losses to disease to the point where disease wasn't much of a problem. Napoleonic armies -- even just sitting in camp -- suffered huge levels of attrition. Since players seemed to hate these kinds of losses, we ignore them under the (rough) assumption that they are happening at nearly the same rate for all players.

Well attrition levels something that can be decided between player. As you mention it realy doesnt make big difference in play balance. I personally find high levels are neccesary. It forces players to either medium sized formations and implies the importance of short lnes of communications.

A hard limit on the number of troops allowed at sea wouldn't work easily for several AI- and interface-related reasons. With the changes we made in June, it seemed to me there was a strong disincentive to land large stacks of men into enemy territory simply because of the new amphibious attrition rules -- much better to land the troops in nearby friendly territory and proceed from there. If this still isn't a strong enough disincentive, we might consider some other rule tweak.

Well considering exposed to a 100.000 plus soldier landing in a very early date "1793". I fnd it very early. I thing one solution would be to make assult landing two or three turn affair. Relative the size port, and number of troops. A small landing for suprise attacks up to 20.000 soldiers which can be increased with further exprience levels.

And large assult landings 25.000 to 50.000 sized should take 2 month. 50.000 and up to three. Why first it should require certain planning time to make this kind of assult. Second it is a fine balance to attacker. Instead of just quick suprise he or she would have to plan in detail. Because in 3 turns such a large landing can loose its importance etc.

Regards

[Anthropoid]

I think there are a couple of issues here that are intertwined. First, singleplayer versus PBEM games. I have mostly played SP games (in both FoF and CoGEE) but have also played some PBEM in both. I think a general principle applies to both games, the SP version and the PBEM version are totally different experiences. Mostly my sense is that this is because of how some game mechanics are optimized for SP play but then produce some incongruities in PBEM play.
 
March Attrition: okay, if the highest level is the most historically realistic, I can go with that, but how about applying that most historically realistic principle to all aspects of the game? Example1: The Russian army cannot force march one tile (in supply) inside Russia without taking 15% casualties, but a British fleet can stay floating in the Baltic for literally years on end without suffering attrition? This I think is related to the issue of large invasions, and also to the issue of game mechanics balanced for SP play. Example2: how about having enemy foragers/plunderers impact pop in provinces? This one I'm not as certain about, but it also seems a reasonable prospect. Sieges in a province might have an even more appreciable effect on province pop?
 
Ideas: (1) I see that provinces have limits on foraging numbers so it would seem the mechanics would allow for some sort of overstacking impact? Example: in Another PBEM, I just DoWed Austria (me Russ) I have stacks of like 200 to 300 troops in konigsberg and the neighboring province. Indeed, they are in supply, but is it reasonable to presume that just because I'm paying for supply to flow in to that province that 300K guys can be equally as much "in supply" as 200K or 100K? The values for foraging max for provinces maybe could be applied as modifiers for supply? If need for supply for naval units could also be modeled, and sea provinces also have forage values, then my gripe (and I think other guys too like Barbarossa2) about infinite naval supply could also be addressed.
 
(2) I also see that containers have "Initiative" values. Perhaps if these mechanics could be more fully articulated the PBEM experience could be enriched? vis a vis the Guctony's comments about small nimble forces being able to disrupt/harass big ones, and Mus comments about the challenges of concentrating large numbers.
 
Also I just wanted to say, I largely agree with Guctony's comments about the unrealistic large/early amphibious invasions.
 
As complicated as this engine/system is, I tend to think that with some clever tweaking or rigging of functions it should be possible to reduce some of these incongruities both in SP and PBEM play, or at least I hope!?

[LexLegis]

I think, the problem of stacks could be adressed by two things:

1.) Less supplies.
One could simply make a rule, that depots cannot raise supply by more than 50.
This would force players to keep their forces apart, but close to each other (which is exactly what the corps systems was invented for

2.)Less movement speed
Lets face it:
Movement in COG EE is far to fast. Napoleon needed almost six month to march from northern France to Austerlitz. In COG EE I can do the same feat in half the time, with armies two or three times the size of the historical army. Movement should be limited to one province per month. Force marching could raise that (movement of two provinces, but costs attrition)

Less movenment speed would force players to watch their back. If you march to Austerlitz, you should be pretty sure, the English and/or Spanish do not invade France meanwhile. Deploying armies to the east would mean, you have less forces at the west and vice versa.