Blood!

[Q-Ball]

Is this a typical result in AE? This is the Guadalcanal Scenario, just playing the US AI, nice result, but WOW is this lopsided! Granted I probably caught this TF unloading at the pier, but still......this seems BLOODY to me. Complete wipeout!

Do I even carry this much ammo on board?

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR Aug 22, 42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Lunga at 114,138, Range 10,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Chokai, Shell hits 3
CL Tenryu
CL Tatsuta, Shell hits 14
CL Yubari
E Yunagi

Allied Ships
DD Bagley, Shell hits 11, and is sunk
DD Blue, Shell hits 15, and is sunk
DD Helm, Shell hits 5, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Henley, Shell hits 9, and is sunk
DMS Zane, Shell hits 6, and is sunk
DMS Trevor, Shell hits 4, and is sunk
AP Hunter Liggett, Shell hits 25, and is sunk
AP American Legion, Shell hits 22, and is sunk
AP George F. Elliot, Shell hits 15, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
AP Fuller, Shell hits 4, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
AP McCawley, Shell hits 22, and is sunk
AP Henderson, Shell hits 18, and is sunk
AP President Jackson, Shell hits 15, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
AP President Adams, Shell hits 15, and is sunk
AP President Hayes, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
AP President Monroe, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk
AP Crescent City, Shell hits 16, and is sunk
AP Heywood, Shell hits 11, and is sunk
AKA Bellatrix, Shell hits 10, and is sunk
AKA Libra, Shell hits 16, and is sunk
AKA Fomalhaut, Shell hits 20, and is sunk
AKA Betelgeuse, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
AKA Alhena, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 3, and is sunk

PS: I loaded up the US Side to check FOW....It's all real!

[AttuWatcher]

Wow that is bloody. SCTF's are nothing to scoff at.

Who needs carriers...wiping out the PM invasion force in Coral Sea:

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR May 07, 42
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Time Surface Combat, near Milne Bay at 99,134, Range 19,000 Yards
 
Japanese aircraft
      no flights
 
Japanese aircraft losses
No Japanese losses
 
Japanese Ships
      CM Tsugaru, Shell hits 13, and is sunk
      DMS W.20, Shell hits 3, and is sunk
      AMc Fumi Maru #2, Shell hits 1, and is sunk
      xAKL Hagoromo Maru
      xAKL Noshiro Maru #2
      xAK Canberra Maru
      xAK Kansai Maru
      xAK Kagu Maru, Shell hits 1
      xAK Asakaze Maru
      xAK Tatumiya Maru, Shell hits 3,  heavy fires
      xAK Kamikaze Maru, Shell hits 1
      xAK Sinsei Maru
      xAK Chicago Maru
      xAK Ikushima Maru, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
      xAK Kasuga Maru #2
      xAK Aso Maru, Shell hits 5, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
 
Allied Ships
      CA Australia, Shell hits 1
      CL Hobart
      DD Whipple
 
Japanese ground losses:
      669 casualties reported
         Squads: 24 destroyed, 5 disabled
         Non Combat: 35 destroyed, 27 disabled
         Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
      Guns lost 4 (0 destroyed, 4 disabled)

[Scott_USN]

With that multi-targetting I think it is possible. Blue, Helm Henley are decent destroyers for the time period but 1 heavy and 3 light cruisers would play hell and once the escorts are dead well those AP's are just nice fat slow targets.
 
Maybe got really lucky?

[Iridium]

I love the new surface combat routines. There's less poking at one or two ships and then leaving and more aggressive battles being waged with almost every ship involved.

Can't wait to see BBs go toe to toe.[:D]

[Hornblower]

No more unescorted TF's would seem ...

[denisonh]

[;)]

ORIGINAL: Hornblower

No more unescorted TF's would seem ...

[Rexor]

ORIGINAL: denisonh

[;)]

ORIGINAL: Hornblower

No more unescorted TF's would seem ...

I think by now almost every player knows this. This example, however, was the AI. Does the AI know it....?

[treespider]

Some may find this interesting and enlightening ...see what just a few destroyers can do....

Several accounts of the Battle of Balikpapan - 24 January 1942

Light Cruiser Naka and 9-10 Japanese Destroyers escorting 15-16 Transports....accompanied by minesweepers and patrolcraft

This one lifted from the Hyperwar site....

quote:


Both arms of the Japanese pincer were closing a little tighter. In the west the British were beginning to talk of their army's retreating all the way to Singapore. In the east the Japanese completed their occupation of Tarakan, while the ships which had landed their force at Menado were reported gathering at Kema. This latter activity seemed to point to a movement to Kendari (southeast Celebes) and Ambon in the near future. Thus by the middle of January it was evident that the Japanese were preparing for another move down either Makassar Strait or Molucca Strait or both.

Our submarines were stationed accordingly. Two Dutch submarines were ordered to patrol the western side of Makassar Strait between I° and 2° south (i.e., off Balikpapan) and Admiral Hart directed that three American submarines be placed in the strait also.

Meanwhile Admiral Hart planned to attack the enemy force gathering at Kema. It was to be a night torpedo attack by destroyers supported by the Marblehead. Three submarines were stationed to cover the return of our ships. The attack was to take place on the night of the 17th and was to be in conjunction with an attack by Army planes operating from Kendari. Our ships had already made the greater part of the difficult run toward Kema when Pike and Permit, which had been sent in for reconnaissance, reported that no enemy forces of importance were present, and the attack was cancelled. A few days later (on the 21st) Seawolf saw a convoy assembling off Kema but could not attack. Not long afterwards this force came down and took Kendari.

It was next planned to make an attack in Makassar Strait, already patrolled by our submarines. One of these, the S-36, went aground on January 19th at Taka Bakang. It proved impossible to get her off and she had to be abandoned. On the 20th there was a Dutch army report of a large convoy heading southward toward the important oil port of Balikpapan. That night Porpoise and Pickerel were stationed in Makassar Strait between North Watcher and Mangkalihat, with Sturgeon to back them up, while Spearfish, Saury, and S-40 were placed off Balikpapan.

On January 22d Porpoise and Pickerel reported the enemy force moving. Sturgeon to the south had just uncoded the message when she made sound contact with a multiple screw ship which she thought was either a cruiser or a carrier. She sent two torpedoes into this vessel, but had no opportunity to observe results. This event she celebrated by the triumphant message, "Sturgeon no longer virgin." Her maidenhood was well lost. There had been considerable air activity in the area on the previous day and there was none the following day, so that our surface vessels were able to make their attack and withdrawal without sighting an enemy plane. This unusual circumstance indicates that the Sturgeon probably damaged or sank a carrier. Apart from this, our submarines had no success in breaking up the enemy expedition.

It was planned to make a surface attack on this enemy force similar to that planned in the abortive attempt on Kema. Houston was on important convoy duty and was not available, so that it was planned to conduct our raid with four destroyers, the Ford, Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones, supported by the Boise and Marblehead. This force was commanded by Admiral Glassford, with Comdr. Paul H. Talbot in command of the destroyers.

The destroyers fueled from the Marblehead in Koepang Bay, Timor, and started north. On the way through Sape Strait (between Soembawa and Komodo Islands) the Boise struck an uncharted pinnacle rock.

A long gash was torn in her bottom near the keel, so that she had to return at slow speed to port on the south coast of Java. There it was found that she would have to go to India for repairs and so she did not participate further in the campaign. Admiral Glassford transferred his flag to the Marblehead, but difficulty with a turbine reduced her speed to 15 knots. Therefore the destroyers were ordered on ahead to make the attack, while the cruiser trailed along to provide air reconnaissance and to cover their withdrawal.

Patrol Wing TEN had maintained contact with the enemy force and reported 9 transports, 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers moving toward Balikpapan in small groups. The PBY's conducted this reconnaissance without meeting any air opposition, due probably to Sturgeon's success a day or two earlier. On the afternoon of the 23d Dutch bombers attacked the convoy and claimed hits on 2 cruisers, 4 transports, and a destroyer.

Our four destroyers were just south of the Postillon Islands, about midway between Soembawa and southwest Celebes, when on the morning of the 23d they received orders from CINCAF to move northward for the attack. They proceeded at 22 to 25 knots in order to arrive off Hoek Mandar by nightfall. There were heavy north swells running in the lower part of Makassar Strait and our destroyers took on several, which broke bridge windows and buckled spray shields.

During the afternoon Comdr. Talbot issued his orders for the action: "Primary weapon torpedoes. Primary objective transports. Cruisers as necessary to accomplish mission. Endeavor launch torpedoes at close range before being discovered . . . Set torpedoes each tube for normal spread. Be prepared to fire single shots if size of target warrants. Will try to avoid action en route . . . Use own discretion in attacking independently when targets located. When torps are fired close with all guns. Use initiative and determination."

Course was set directly for Mandar Bay in order to deceive the enemy reconnaissance planes which were expected, but the only patrol plane sighted proved to be one of our own. An hour after sunset our little force changed course to the northwest and, passing Cape Mandar abeam to starboard, struck out across Makassar Strait toward Borneo. Speed was increased to 27 knots, just about the maximum that their old engines could maintain. There was concern on board Pope whether she could hold that speed, but she did.

A little after 2200 Java time, as our ships were approaching the Little Paternoster group, what appeared to be a searchlight beam was seen on the horizon ahead and course was changed to avoid a possible enemy contact. A little later, course was set directly for Balikpapan with the expectation of arriving about 0300.

At 2357 as our ships approached Balikpapan a light was seen far ahead. At first it appeared to be a searchlight but a little later was seen to be a fire, now flaring up, now subsiding. It was evidently in the water some distance from shore, but sometime afterward a second fire was seen at Balikpapan itself. Apparently the Dutch bombers had done a good afternoon's work. Perhaps because of the fires a light haze hung over the water and visibility, which had been good, decreased. The seas had moderated considerably during the run up the strait.

Course was set to make certain of arriving at Balikpapan north of the pilot ship and well clear of the mine field. Our ships were now drawing close. The first contact with the enemy came at 0245 when a column of several enemy destroyers appeared ahead, crossing our course from starboard to port. They challenged by blue blinker tube, but our ships only turned a little to starboard to avoid closer contact. The lookout on the Ford thought he saw the Japanese destroyers turn and follow to investigate.

As our ships thus sailed through the enemy's patrol they were in column, moving at high speed. The John D. Ford, with Comdr. Talbot aboard, was in the lead, followed by Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones, in that order. They were in constant communication by voice radio, with transmitters set up on the bridge of each destroyer, except for the Paul Jones, on which the transmitter failed.

It is difficult to form an entirely accurate picture of the events of the following hour, during which our little column steamed back and forth among the enemy vessels, firing first their torpedoes and then their guns at dim outlines of ships, spreading havoc and confusion among the Japanese. Two or three minutes after passing the enemy's destroyer screen several ships were sighted on the port bow, dimly silhouetted against the glow from the fire at Balikpapan. Someone on the Ford counted nine ships 5,000-6,000 yards distant. It seems likely that this was one of the larger groups scattered along the shore and it was probably in this group that we sank several when our destroyers turned back south.

A minute or two after sighting these vessels, the Ford, still leading the column northward, met an enemy destroyer on opposite course which passed close to starboard. The Ford fired a torpedo, but it missed astern. Pope could not bring her tubes to bear in time, and Parrott, warned by voice radio to "get him," fired five torpedoes (fired by percussion at the tubes; it was intended to fire only three) as the ship passed 500 to 1,000 yards to starboard. But the trainers had not been able to swing the tubes rapidly enough and all five passed astern of the target. This broadside left Parrott with only one torpedo in her starboard battery. The Paul Jones bringing up the rear fired one torpedo, but it too apparently missed.

At 0300 Parrott sighted a group of three ships 4,000 to 6,000 yards to port and fired three torpedoes at the largest. This time her aim was good, for a few minutes later there was a tremendous explosion in the midst of the group and flames shot up 500 feet into the air.

Meanwhile Comdr. Talbot in Ford decided that our ships had pretty well run through the enemy and started a turn to the right to run back through. Ford had already swung around to a course of 090° when she heard the explosion of Parrott's hit, off her starboard beam as she was then heading.

At 0307, now heading back southward for another run through the enemy, Ford sighted a large ship to starboard and fired three torpedoes, apparently without success. At about the same time, or perhaps a little before, Pope coming along behind Ford fired a torpedo at an enemy destroyer (possibly the same ship) which she passed abeam to starboard, but it missed.

As our column steamed back south Pope saw several heavy ships about 4,000 yards to starboard blinking lights, seemingly as a result of the explosion caused by Parrott's hit a few minutes before. (This group may have been the one first sighted, outlined by the light on shore.) Pope fired her five remaining starboard torpedoes at the group and in about 4 minutes was rewarded by two large explosions in the area of the target. Meanwhile, very shortly after Pope fired her five torpedoes, Parrott behind her fired her one remaining starboard torpedo at a destroyer 2,000-3,000 yards to starboard-possibly one of the group at which Pope had fired. Two minutes later there was a great explosion on the destroyer, a column of flame leapt toward the sky and when it died down there was only wreckage where the destroyer had been. At about the same time Paul Jones, coming up behind, had fired a torpedo at a ship on her starboard bow. There were two quick explosions on the ship which broke up and sank immediately. As the Parrott at the same moment claimed a hit (by voice radio) it seems likely that she and the Paul Jones fired at the same target. It is impossible to say whether this too was the same explosion that Pope observed or whether each destroyer scored a hit.

Perhaps it was a minute later that Pope (at 0309 according to her log) fired a torpedo at a destroyer to port, but could see no explosion. In another minute Parrott reported that she had hit the destroyer Pope had fired at, and the explosion was seen. It is not clear whether this destroyer was the same as that described in the preceding paragraph, or whether it was a separate success. The times were about the same, but the first was to starboard while this was said to be to port.

At 0312 Pope reported a submarine to starboard sending recognition signals, and a moment later Parrott sighted what seemed to be a submarine on the surface.

From this point on there is a greater discrepancy in the times noted in the logs of our destroyers and it is even more difficult to know what happened. The column next swung westward. (Ford puts it at 0320, but the others put it somewhat earlier.) Soon after turning, Ford fired a torpedo to port. Pope not long after turning also fired her remaining torpedoes at a destroyer which passed on her port beam (possibly the same ship at which Ford had fired). Parrott, coming along behind Pope, heard Pope report that she had fired torpedoes at the enemy destroyer and that it had fired some at her. Parrott then fired her three remaining port torpedoes at the destroyer, believing that Pope had missed. There was an explosion near the stern of the destroyer and a high column of smoke rose (Pope reported two explosions). It is not clear whether Pope or Parrott deserves credit for this hit. At the same moment both ships saw torpedo wakes and both felt jars as if they had been hit by torpedoes which did not explode. Possibly they had struck logs or floating wreckage.

While this was taking place Paul Jones in the rear of our column at 0322 observed a transport on her port beam on a course to cross astern of her. Paul Jones fired one torpedo, and, as the transport turned sharply to the left (perhaps to avoid it), followed with a second which caught her on the starboard bow. "This ship was later observed sinking with stern high out of the water."

By this time Pope and Parrott had exhausted their torpedoes and were directed to use gunfire if further targets appeared. This began what might be called the second phase of the action. Having run through the enemy group, our ships made a loop to the left and turned north through it again. Back on a northerly course Pope at 0325 opened fire with her guns on two destroyers, then a transport, then another destroyer. As she passed at high speed her gunners could not remain long on any one target, and the flash of the guns blinded the lookouts, but she thought she got three hits on a cargo vessel and probable hits on the destroyers. Five minutes later Parrott fired starshells to illuminate a ship (believed to be a destroyer) 2,500 yards to port. Seven rounds of 4-inch shells were fired at the enemy ship before it was lost from sight. Possibly there was one hit. At the same time Paul Jones fired a torpedo at a ship challenging on her port beam and believed she scored a hit.

Shortly afterwards Ford passed the smoking hulk of a merchant ship standing on end with lifeboats nearby. As our column swung by this wreck Ford slowed and stopped, believing she was approaching the edge of the mine field. Pope behind her swerved sharply to avoid ramming her, and Parrott coming up at full speed, put her rudder hard right to avoid colliding with the hulk. As she turned she saw gun flashes ahead. Ford and Pope were in a melee with enemy destroyers. Our column split and our ships lost contact with each other. Pope, Parrott, and Paul Jones all made turns to the right and began to withdraw to the south. Ford continued to run up to the northwest close to the shore.

Shortly after losing the rest of the column Ford sighted a destroyer 2,500 yards to port. Seeing this destroyer fire torpedoes, she backed her port engine full to avoid them. Then resuming her course she fired a torpedo at a large merchantman to port and followed with gunfire. The blast of the resulting explosion could be felt on board the Ford, and the merchantman was seen to list about 45° to port. At about the same time (0347) Ford herself was hit by a shell, our only casualty of the entire action. It did only slight damage, however. It was of small caliber (about 3-inch) and hit the port side of the after deck house, where the torpedo workshop was located. The small fire which it started was quickly controlled.

Changing course to the right for a moment, Ford passed under the bow of a merchant ship, then swinging left she passed close by another which seemed to be on fire. She opened fire on this with her main battery and obtained several hits, and in addition strafed it with her machine guns as she passed. She then completed her turn to the left, steadied out on a course of 120° and began her retirement.

As our ships withdrew Pope opened fire at about 0350 on a destroyer. Parrott, seeing shells falling around her, told her that she was probably firing on her sister ship, and action ceased before any damage had been done. Aside from this the withdrawal was uneventful. Parrott and Pope joined around 0350, and Paul Jones came up about 0400. Ford found the others about daybreak.

At 0700, being well clear of the enemy area, speed was reduced to 23 knots in order to insure that fuel would last to make port. Shortly afterwards our destroyers sighted a plane from the Marblehead which signaled that the cruiser was 50 miles to the south. Some time later the Marblehead was sighted. The destroyers formed a screen around her and the little force moved southward.

Our destroyers had performed the almost incredible feat of steaming back and forth through a considerably superior enemy force for over an hour. Surprise had, of course, been the major element in our success. Our plan of using torpedoes first probably prevented the Japanese from realizing what had happened for at least half an hour. Evidently they at first thought that they had got into a mine field or that a submarine was among them. It was a particularly fortunate circumstance that a column of their own destroyers was under way on patrol at the time. That may explain why our own destroyers excited no more suspicion than they did at first or why the Japanese hesitated to fire on them. The Japanese fear of firing on their own vessels was evident, while due to our column formation we were under no such restraint until near the end of the action when our ships became separated.

It seems fairly certain that we sank at least 5 or 6 ships. Two of these, because of the nature of the explosion and of their burning, were thought to have been fuel ships. One was a destroyer, which was completely demolished, and at least 2 merchantmen were sunk. It is entirely possible that there were other hits unrecorded due to the poor visibility, and there seems no doubt that several ships were further damaged by gunfire. The commander of a Dutch submarine, which was present through the action and next morning, reported that our forces had destroyed 13 enemy ships, but there is some doubt as to the accuracy of his count.

Our men were disappointed in the results of their torpedo fire. The suddenness with which targets presented themselves, the high speed of our ships, the close ranges and shallow water probably explain the small percentage of hits. It is comforting that the Japs did worse, for they undoubtedly fired several torpedoes at our ships.

The whole action took place within an area of only 4 or 5 miles radius, with its center about 4 or 5 miles northeast of Balikpapan lightship.

Our own submarines and two Dutch which were in the vicinity had been warned to keep clear of our surface attack. One Dutch submarine was, however, actually on the spot and left only when, as the commanding officer put it, "I saw that my friends were doing very well." The following morning this submarine torpedoed a Japanese cruiser from such close range that the explosion damaged the submarine. It had to lie on the bottom till dark, when it proceeded on the surface to its base.

and this account from :

http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battl ... kpapan.htm

quote:


Battle of Balikpapan
January 24, 1942
by Vincent P. O'Hara
Map of the Battle and Area

Balikpapan anchorage, Borneo
TIME: Early morning, 0246-0350
WEATHER / VISIBILITY / SEA STATE:
Calm/Moonless night. Japanese ships backlit by onshore oil fires and hidden by heavy smoke from fires/rough
in approach, but calm at time of action.
SURPRISE: USA

On January 23, 1942 Allied aerial reconnaissance spotted a convoy of fifteen transports carrying the 56th Infantry regiment and 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) bound for Balikpapan, an important oil field in southeastern Dutch Borneo. Admiral Hart, commander of the Asian Fleet and ABDAFLOAT ordered USN light cruisers Boise and Marblehead and six destroyers stationed at Kupang, Timor to intercept this convoy. En route Boise struck an uncharted pinnacle in Sapeh Strait tearing a hole in her bottom. She was forced to turn back to Java, keeping Barker as her escort. Then, Marblehead burned out a turbine reducing her speed to 15 knots; she received Bulmer as her escort. These misfortunes reduced the attack force to Destroyer Division 59, John D. Ford, Pope, Parrot and Paul Jones. Marblehead and Bulmer followed the division north so the cruiser's six inch guns could provide a rendezvous point for the destroyers to fall back to after their attack.

After losing half his ships and almost all his firepower, it would have been understandable if Admiral Glassford, the American commander, had aborted his apparently jinxed mission. Instead, he pressed his luck and, against the odds, his elderly destroyers managed to elude the powerful Japanese escort of a light cruiser and ten modern destroyers and surprise the transports anchored at Balikpapan. This escort, 4th Destroyer Flotilla led by light cruiser Naka, dashed off just as the Americans arrived, apparently in response to an attack by Dutch submarine K-XVII that damaged Tsuruga Maru. From Ford it seemed that: "a whole division of Jap destroyers burst out of the gloom and oil smoke on our port bow and steamed rapidly across in front of us and off into the darkness to starboard. . . I don't know why they didn't see us." Japanese lookouts usually did excellent work; they probably mistook DesDiv 59 for a friendly force.

The Japanese force, meanwhile, had been suffering steady attrition. On the evening of the 23rd nine Dutch B-10 bombers out of Samarinda damaged one and sank another transport off Balikpapan. The convoy arrived at 2045 hours on the 23rd and anchored off shore in two rows; eight ships near the shore and five more further off. At 0045 on the 24 the Dutch submarine K-XVIII torpedoed another transport. She made a second attack shortly before the Americans arrived and was damaged by subchaser No. 12.

The American destroyers sighted the Japanese at 0245 about 9,000 yards distant. The transports were anchored in two lines, the furthest five miles off shore and silhouetted periodically against the lurid fires of burning oil storage tanks. Three patrol boats, converted World War I destroyers, four minesweepers and four subchasers provided close protection to the convoy.

Between 0246 and 0255, the Americans made a high speed run toward the outer line of transports. Ford led followed by Pope, Parrott and Jones. They fired ten torpedoes in four salvos. Parrott opened with three, to port and then, two minutes later, with five more at what she thought was a destroyer or cruiser 1,000 yards to starboard, i.e. to sea, that was in fact W15, one of the 700 ton mine sweepers. Next, Ford fired one at an anchored transport to port and astern. Finally, Paul Jones let go with one more to starboard, W15 again. All missed (or
failed to explode). The six torpedoes launched at W15, a small target stern on and withdrawing, were difficult shots in any case.

By 0300 the American column had run north, past the outer line of transports. Talbot ordered a turn to starboard to lead his ships south for another pass. Parrott, the third ship in line and the most ready to use her ordnance, sighted a target to port just before commencing her turn and let loose three more torpedoes. At 0302 she was rewarded with at least one hit on the Sumanoura Maru of 3,519 tons displacement.

This blow announced to the Japanese that they were under attack, but did not disclose the agent of the attack. At 0302 the Americans were north of the Japanese and embroiled in the midst of the smoke stream from the oil tanks. Dutch submarines and planes had been harrying the Japanese force with some success. Nishimura mistook this event for another submarine attack and at led his ships once again from the anchorage out to sea.

As the powerful Japanese escort chased phantoms, the four American destroyers headed south parallel to the outer line of transports. At 0306 Pope fired five torpedoes at a silhouetted target to starboard followed by Parrott at 0308 and Paul Jones at 0310. These salvos resulted in one hit on the Tatsukami Maru, an ammunition ship of 7,064 tons displacement, which, not surprisingly given her cargo, blew up and sank. At 0314 Ford made a hard swing to starboard to penetrate the southern end of the Japanese line. Her three consorts followed. At 0319 Pope and Parrott heading west fired two and three torpedoes respectively at a target less than 2,000 yards to port. Three hits were scored on PC-37. The patrol boat sank and although she was later raised from the shallow water, her damage was so great she never returned to service.

At 0322 Ford and Paul Jones each let go one torpedo at a merchant ship about 1,000 yards to port. This vessel was underway and managed to evade both shots; however, Ford let the column around her, first south and then back east and Paul Jones scored with one more torpedo fired at 0325. This sank Kuretake Maru 5,175 tons.

Continuing her swing around the stricken Kuretake Maru, Ford led the column back north. By this time, Pope, Parrott and Paul Jones were all out of torpedoes. According to the battle plan, these ships opened fire with their 4" guns. Then, at 0335 Ford turned northwest through the first line of transports. The others, having conformed with their flag's movements for almost an hour, failed to keep up with her this time. First Parrott and Paul Jones peeled off, circling back south and out of the action, followed shortly after by Pope. Ford continued through the inner line of transports, firing her guns and her remaining stock of torpedoes. At 0332 she scored gunfire hits on Asahi Maru and caused some damage. Another transport was also damaged by Ford's gunfire during this portion of the battle. At 0335 her last two torpedoes found and sank Tsuruga Maru, 6,988 tons which had been torpedoed by the Dutch submarine K-XVIII about four hours earlier. At 0347 one of the transports gained a small measure of revenge when she hit Ford on her aft deckhouse wounding four men. This was the only damage inflicted on the Americans. Ford had to circle back to the southeast to avoid running aground and by 0400 she was steaming south.

The battle was over. Naka, Minegumo and Natsugumo from the escort finally realizing the true nature of the attack, collected themselves and chased the Americans, but without success. By 0642 the four destroyers reunited south of Balikpapan and at 0800 they rejoined Marblehead and Bulmer.

While clearly winning a tactical victory, Morison and others have criticized the Americans for failing to better exploit the perfect set-up fortune presented them: of 48 torpedoes fired at close range against clearly visible, stationary targets, "sitting ducks," only six struck home. Lack of experience, a hasty approach and/or defective torpedoes are given as the primary factors behind the American failure to achieve greater results. These factors doubtless all told, nonetheless, a year and a half would pass, filled with bitter and hard fought battles, most of them defeats, before American torpedoes fired from a surface warship would again damage Japanese ships. The Americans sank a quarter of the Japanese force with torpedoes that truly were defective, with vastly superior enemy forces nearby, and escaped effectively unharmed.

Now imagine a cruiser and three light cruisers replacing the DD's

[Dili]

I love the new surface combat routines. There's less poking at one or two ships and then leaving and more aggressive battles being waged with almost every ship involved.

That is not very usual. Usually 1 or 2 destroyers fight the bigger ships and the others escape.

[Tophat1815]

 At 10,000 yds range and 4 US DD's along with 2 DMS ships how do they effectively screen that HERD of transports?
 Scare them? Seems the Japs were unimpressed.

[Q-Ball]

Here is another, same game, this time with a large escort:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Munda at 111,134, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Maya
CA Chokai
CA Aoba
CA Kinugasa
CA Kako
CL Jintsu
CL Yura
DD Kagero
DD Hatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Maikaze
DD Isokaze

Allied Ships
CL Hobart, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
DD McCalla, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farenholt, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Gridley, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Maury, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dunlap, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
PG Isabel, Shell hits 5, and is sunk
AK Murzim, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Esperance Bay, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk

OUCH!

[castor troy]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Here is another, same game, this time with a large escort:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Munda at 111,134, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Maya
CA Chokai
CA Aoba
CA Kinugasa
CA Kako
CL Jintsu
CL Yura
DD Kagero
DD Hatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Maikaze
DD Isokaze

Allied Ships
CL Hobart, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
DD McCalla, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farenholt, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Gridley, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Maury, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dunlap, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
PG Isabel, Shell hits 5, and is sunk
AK Murzim, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Esperance Bay, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk

OUCH!

I´m sure AE is a far better product than WITP but those ongoing posts of such slaughters make me sceptic.

[Scott_USN]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Here is another, same game, this time with a large escort:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Munda at 111,134, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Maya
CA Chokai
CA Aoba
CA Kinugasa
CA Kako
CL Jintsu
CL Yura
DD Kagero
DD Hatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Maikaze
DD Isokaze

Allied Ships
CL Hobart, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
DD McCalla, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farenholt, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Gridley, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Maury, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dunlap, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
PG Isabel, Shell hits 5, and is sunk
AK Murzim, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Esperance Bay, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk

OUCH!

What time frame?

I mean yeah it seems wild but consider that in the early war Night Surface engagement at the battle of Savo

US
8 cruisers,
15 destroyers

Japanese
7 cruisers,
1 destroyer

The outcome 4 dead US Cruisers, 1 damaged 2 destroyers damaged

The cost to the Japanese 3 crusiers needing repair.

Redo in 1944? Or is this 1943 at Munda Point?

At any rate roll the dice. I killed easily 2 Japanese CL's at Wake old and tired but they are dead. One battle doesn't set the game it is just a snap shot of hundreds and hundreds of turns and dozens and dozens of battles.

Either way your surface fleet was lacking against 5 Japanese Heavies period.


Should the Japanese taken hits for sure but the dice rolled snake eyes.

I would be more worried if mear 1939 6 inch gun could sink a CA at what 6 miles? Its absolute range was what 13000 yards and expect what? Even early 8 inch guns on the CA would have what 21000 yard range? The outcome if the Japanese can keep a 11,000 yard range is history... 8 inch guns are going to destroy your pop guns.

Most of those were killed by the Longlance 52 knots at 23000 yards? Just a bad day for the weak escort they ran in to hell and had the pay.

[moose1999]

ORIGINAL: Dili

I love the new surface combat routines. There's less poking at one or two ships and then leaving and more aggressive battles being waged with almost every ship involved.

That is not very usual. Usually 1 or 2 destroyers fight the bigger ships and the others escape.

I've had lots of transport TFs ambushed by small japanese TFs (2-3 cruisers and 2-3destroyers usually).
The transports all had escorts, mostly destroyers and the odd cruiser.
I've never seen anything like what you describe.
The superior japanese forces just sweep their guns across my whole fleet like a garden hose and wipe everybody out. And I mean everybody. NO survivors.
Well, not quite true, I've had a CA get away once, but that is all.

I love the idea of this 'screening' feature, but I've yet to see it in my game.

[Speedysteve]

Feels right to me. All types of results should be posible in SC. If limited escorts or massively outclassed/overpowered and also if in a bay or surprised why shouldn't the more powerful force have a field day?

[Fishbed]

Well don't cut the combat reports too early. It would be interesting to know if the assaulted forces were static or not! If you want a real escort, you'll have to put a SC TF while they are unloading. Apparently, you can't count on screen to patrol while the transports are static...

[moose1999]

Yes, that seems like a logical explanation.
Indeed, most of the cases, if not all, have been ambushes of unloading TFs.
Of course this would make it hard for the cargo ships to get away.

[treespider]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Here is another, same game, this time with a large escort:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Munda at 111,134, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Maya
CA Chokai
CA Aoba
CA Kinugasa
CA Kako
CL Jintsu
CL Yura
DD Kagero
DD Hatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Maikaze
DD Isokaze

Allied Ships
CL Hobart, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
DD McCalla, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farenholt, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Gridley, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Maury, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dunlap, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
PG Isabel, Shell hits 5, and is sunk
AK Murzim, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Esperance Bay, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk

OUCH!

Need more information here --- was the Transport/Amphib TF unloading (ie staitionary) when the Japanese cruiser force attacked?

[Puhis]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

Here is another, same game, this time with a large escort:

Night Time Surface Combat, near Munda at 111,134, Range 11,000 Yards

Japanese Ships
CA Maya
CA Chokai
CA Aoba
CA Kinugasa
CA Kako
CL Jintsu
CL Yura
DD Kagero
DD Hatsukaze
DD Hayashio
DD Maikaze
DD Isokaze

Allied Ships
CL Hobart, and is sunk
DD Monssen, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
DD McCalla, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Farenholt, Shell hits 8, and is sunk
DD Gridley, Shell hits 2, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Maury, Shell hits 3, Torpedo hits 1, and is sunk
DD Dunlap, Shell hits 6, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
PG Isabel, Shell hits 5, and is sunk
AK Murzim, Shell hits 7, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk
xAP Esperance Bay, Shell hits 1, Torpedo hits 2, and is sunk

OUCH!

Well, I had opposite result in my first Guadalcanal game vs allied AI. Allied CAs, CLs and DDs surprised my TF (5 CA 1 CL) during night (0 % moonlight), and hit me real hard. Only 3(!) hits to allied ships, but my every ship was quite badly damaged. Next day US carriers sunk 3 CAs and CL. I think only one CA will survive back to Rabaul...

[ny59giants]

My observation is that many of us, me included, are trying to play AE the same as we did WITP. We were able to get away with things then, but that style of play will cost you heavily in AE. Welcome to the learning curve. [:D]
 
I have lost count of threads about lightly escorted transports able to get away from warships (speed of 10 escaping 30 knot plus warships [:(]). Now, we see that they cannot. Great news!! It looks like a SC TF is very important to have with your invasion TF. No more going in with a few patrol craft and surviving a SC TF coming in.
 
Thank you AE Team. [&o]