Artillery Spotting

John Tiller's Campaign Series exemplifies tactical war-gaming at its finest by bringing you the entire collection of TalonSoft's award-winning campaign series. Containing TalonSoft's West Front, East Front, and Rising Sun platoon-level combat series, as well as all of the official add-ons and expansion packs, the Matrix Edition allows players to dictate the events of World War II from the tumultuous beginning to its climatic conclusion. We are working together with original programmer John Tiller to bring you this updated edition.

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marcbarker
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by marcbarker »

ORIGINAL: Dualnet

The simple thing is to make it an optional rule if you don’t like it don’t play it, but don’t stop the rest of us.

I have to agree here, if you don't like it don't use it...How hard is it to create a FO or add the attribute....not too much but again don't want to drag this up and dust it off but, the individual can't mod or create on the fly without submitting a form to the powers that be.....I have resigned myself to this fact, to me it is a joke. I have already modded the battalion oob for the US up to division for the campaign. I scarpped that green a -c junk and redid the OOB by the Orginization with dates in and out of theater. So I chose what units I wanted to include, except for the fact that I cannot create any new ones...se la vis
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Jason Petho »

ORIGINAL: barker
se la vis

C'est la vie.

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Borst50
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Borst50 »

I agree that spotters should be used...i would very much like to see this addition added as an option. However, the gulf between historical accuaracy, vs. game playability is going to a paramount issue here. And while PBEM and stand alone senarios would greatly benefit from this addition, I remain circumspect about the outcome vis a vie DCG's. I realize that DCG's are not a very high priority, rather the emphasis seems to be placed on PBEM and designer senarios.

So to that end i request some thought should be given to how this will affect DCG's as a whole. Prior to this, such has not been the case.

In fact, I would also request that the pre-1.03 artillery rules be in affect as standard, with the present rules as an option. I still have issue with the fact that a 3 sp US 60mm mortar on opportunity fire could destroy 2 Pz VIB's, disrupt the remainder of the platoon, and force a retreat. So I would ask this issue be addressed--artillery fire vs. tanks.
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marcbarker
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by marcbarker »

your still having problems Borst? I ran into that the other day...2 plattons of V's comming into visibility range, Hear the pop saw the flash and 3 V's gone from the first platoon at 5 hexes, second platoon goes up and blam 3 more V's out of action, I then moved an infantry unit to where the flsh was and low and behold 1 lousy 57mm AT gun, the other hex had a 60mm mortar.....so much for that one eh?
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MrRoadrunner
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by MrRoadrunner »

ORIGINAL: Dualnet

Again I couldn't disagree more. This game is very good, but everyone I know; (about 6 people) who play it, have always questiond the Artillery rules,

<snip>

The simple thing is to make it an optional rule if you don’t like it don’t play it, but don’t stop the rest of us.

The simple things are not always the best things, especially if based on what 6 people did not like and not what is most historically accurate, and playable, within the scope of the game. I won't put what you and six friends like above the integrity of the game.

Quite simply don't make change for change sake. Make changes for the right reasons and optional if that is the right way to go.
Though, I believe if the change is for the good then don't make it an option (it will effect all scenarios prior to it's implementation - but, that has not stopped Matrix before).

Thanks for your, and the six other's, input. [:)]

RR
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&#8213; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
FM WarB
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by FM WarB »

barker,
60mm mortars had los and dropped their rounds right down the turret hatches...LoL
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timshin42
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by timshin42 »

Mr Roadrunner:

Can you please explain to me how this NONSENSE about having a bunch of jeeps running around with FO's ever got started?

Are there actually maneuver folk out there who don't realize that EVERY U.S. maneuver unit company Commander, be it Infantry, Tank, or Cavalry, has an assigned Field Artillery LT, or if not, an FA NCO, or if not , an FA PFC, all trained in the fine art of adjusting observed fires, right next to him at all times?

Are there maneuver folk unaware that not all fires need to be adjusted? That predicted fire (equivalent to "indirect fire by the map"), with proper registration and meteorogic data, was quite routine, very effective and was developed by the US Field Artillery PRIOR to WWII? And used extensively throughout that war!

Are there maneuver folk out there who don't understand that , with properly trained gun crews and fire direction center crews, it is quite normal for a towed field artillery unit to delivery fire to any place on the battlefield within its range, in a matter of MINUTES? And with self propelled artillery even faster? (Yes Virginia, it did take longer with "Pigs" -- 8" towed units!).

So if you plan to have FO's running around in jeeps on the game screen, the same logic dictates that you must have a distinct jeep, tank, or foot leader for every company sized unit, running around cluttering up the board.

EVERY US COMBAT MANUEVER COMPANY BY DEFINITION HAS ITS OWN FO ASSIGNED, except when it is in reserve. Artillery is never kept in reserve, so now you will have all the reserve maneuver units distinct FO graphical symbols also running about the board at all times, creating an enormous graphicall mess on the board (screen)!

The Soviets, on the other hand, did not even bother with "observed fires". ALL artillery fires were preplanned, and massed. Up to 35 percent of all Soviet artillery was centralized in Artillery Divisions and Corps, controlled at Army, Front and even STAVKA level! Not believing in observed fires, they had no need for FOs! In the rare case where fire adjustment was attempted, the Soviet BATTERY commander climbed up on a high spot of land and ORDERED (not requested, there was no real Batallion Fire Direction Center) fires from his own battery!

THE SUREST WAY TO MAKE THE ARTILLERY SIMULATION "LUDICROUS" AS WELL AS "REDICULOUS", NOT TO MENTION "SUPERFICIAL" AND JUST PLAIN "SILLY", is to base your model on some formula of varying numbers of graphical FO symols by national doctrine (ie: Americans get 3 FO units per Regiment. Brits get 4 per Division, Soviets get 1 per Corps, Japanese get them ocassionally on a random throw of the dice!)

Any change not based on the ability of Artillery units to mass fires (can that be done in JTCS? I hope so!) AND the assignment of unit missions to artillery unit ( attachments, direct support, general support. Keep it simple and forget about reinforcing or general support reinforcing; that is getting too detailed for maneuver folk!) is a step backwards, not forwards!

I have provided my Field Artillery credentials to Jason! I will be delighted to discuss the FA subject in detail off-forum with anyone who cares enough to discuss "sensible improvemnts to field artillery in gaming'!

In the meantime, please think carefully about the entire scope and scale of the "problem" before making pronouncements or proposals to introduce a very complex "improvemnt" or "change" in a simplistic or illogical or just plain unrealistic way.


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FM WarB
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by FM WarB »

timshin,
Your expertise is welcome, I'm sure. Right now Russian and US artillery have the same capabilities. Using chain of command, would not having most Russain arty separated from the maneuver elements help?
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by FM WarB »

My hope is simply this, bearing in mind that Jason says this is quite on the back burner:

Come up with an improvement that does not add too much complexity for the players, or require too much effort for the programmers. Get input from players and researchers to make it as good as possible.

My suggestions may well be simplistic, but I start from not adding new unit capabilities, but using the chain or command to restrict which units can spot for which arty. There is alot that oob designers can do with this alone.

Just incase it aint perfect, and to maintain old scenarios that may not accomodate it, make it optional.
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timshin42
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by timshin42 »

KEY POINTS:

1. SOVIETS

-- High emphasis on preplanned fires-- on a massive scale.
-- very strong capability to mass fires -- absolutely essential.
-- rolling barrages ---- very desirable.
-- forget about FOs and observed fire.

2. US

-- actually rather satisfactory as a base model.
-- desirable-- TOT capability (convergence of fires on a single target from multiple units). (Just as multiple unit maneuver assaults multiply assault factor).
--very desirable--artillery capabilities based upon ARTY unit mission assignments (attachment, direct support, general support).
--very desirable--effective predicted fires (by the map).

3. BRITISH

--application/recognitiopn of superior skill of oberved fires (more reliable observed fires due to higher ranked/more experienced FOOs)
--Commomonwealth Redlegs, please help out here!

4. ITALIAN
--need someone knowledgable about doctrine and tactics (not just weapons systems).

5. JAPANESE
-- really don't know.




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MrRoadrunner
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by MrRoadrunner »

[X(] Quite simply?
I do not know what the hell you are talking about. I agreed with everything you've written thus far? [&:]

RR
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timshin42
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by timshin42 »

Mr RR,

I know that! And vice versa!

That was sort of a rhetorical question based on some of the statements made in this discussion!

Definitely no offense intended! [:-] Quite the opposite! [&o]
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Lesbaker
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Lesbaker »

I can’t say much on the Organisation and use of Artillery for other nations but for the British over the period that JTCS covers it will be nearly impossible to replicate historically as the formations and the way they were used changed so much during the war years, Here’s a quick (Well really quite long&nbsp; ) summation of the Royal Artillery’s formations and use over the war years.
ORGANISATION AND GROUPING
&nbsp;
Principles
&nbsp;
The main&nbsp;concepts for the use of artillery were:

Cooperation with the supported arm.
Concentration of firepower.
Surprise.
Economy of firepower - particularly reflected in&nbsp;the use of neutralisation and the ability to concentrate.
Mobility of firepower - the ability to concentrate firepower when and where it was needed without re-deploying the guns. [/ul]
It being a principle that artillery did not go into reserve, the firepower of the regiments or divisions in reserve was available to those in contact with the enemy. &nbsp;There were two principles governing artillery command and control:

that command was centralised under the highest commander 'who can exercise effective control without risk of failure', and
Formation, etc, commanders should not have to deal with more than one artillery commander (who was responsible for field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery). [/ul]
This led to two command and control relationships:

'Under Command'; and
‘In Support’, which made firepower available, normally all guns within range, and enabled firing across divisional and higher formation boundaries. [/ul]
The British Army did not recognise the principle of Unity of Command in the way that other armies did. The consequence of these simple arrangements was highly flexible mobile firepower that could be provided where and when it was needed. &nbsp;'Under Command' meant that control was centralised under the commander, while 'In Support' meant decentralisation. &nbsp;From late 1942 there were in effect only two levels of command with organic guns - division (divisional field regiments) and army (all other field, medium and heavy&nbsp;regiments). &nbsp;Typically a regiment 'under command' of a division would be 'in support' to a particular brigade, but this did not prevent it firing in support of formations to its flanks. &nbsp;Corps became the primary level of artillery control for counter-battery action (as it was in WW1) and in the final year of the war for major offensive fire plans. &nbsp;Control was usually centralised for defensive and major attack operations and decentralised for an advance. &nbsp;However it was rare for command to be decentralised below divisional level and decentralisation mostly applied to the army artillery being assigned to corps or division level.
&nbsp;
Organisation, Affiliation and Equipment
From early in the 20th century the basic organisation of the artillery was divisional artillery comprising 2 to 4 units, called 'field brigades'. &nbsp;These brigades had sub-units called 'batteries', which in turn were split into 'sections' each of 2 guns. &nbsp;After WW1 there were additional field, medium and heavy brigades above divisional level. &nbsp;&nbsp;However, in 1938 the field brigades were renamed regiments, lost their survey sections and reorganised in two batteries of guns, regimental HQ was significantly increased in size including gaining a second in command. &nbsp;The batteries were reorganised with sections being grouped into 'troops'. &nbsp;&nbsp;Each field battery of 12 guns was organised as three troops (except RHA batteries that had eight guns in two troops) and medium brigades became regiments of 2 batteries. &nbsp;The Commonwealth armies followed suit, in some cases not until early 1940. &nbsp;The field regiments changed again after 1940 as the lessons of the campaign in France were absorbed.
&nbsp;
Regiment&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Pre 1938&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1938 -1940&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;After 1940
Field&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 4 x 6 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2 x 3 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 3 x 2 x 4 Guns
RHA&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 3 x 6 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2 x 2 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 3 x 2 x 4 Guns
Medium&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 4 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2 x 2 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2 x 2 x 4 Guns
Heavy&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 4 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;4 x 4 Guns&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 4 x 4 Guns
&nbsp;
Each troop had a command post (CP) as did the battery. &nbsp; Troops were sequentially lettered within a regiment and divided into two sections (left and right) each of two guns. &nbsp;Guns being called ‘sub-sections’ and sequentially lettered within the battery. &nbsp;In consequence guns were colloquially called ‘subs’.
In earlier times the battery commander (BC – a major) had been the battery's observer, although he often brought forward a junior officer from the gun position to act as an 'observing officer'. The 1938 organisation introduced troop commanders who were captains and became their battery's main observers, although the third (in the three troop organisation) was severely limited by poor communications facilities. &nbsp;They operated as either Observation Post Officers (OPO) if the battle was static or Forward Observation Officers (FOO) if they were moving with the infantry or armour. &nbsp;The BC remained in the forward area with his troop commanders. &nbsp;This highlights the distinguishing feature of the British artillery system, the more senior battery officers were forward. &nbsp;It reflected key lessons of 1917-18:
&nbsp;

That artillery commanders and tactical commanders must be co-located at all levels of command.
That artillery command must be well forward.
That artillery command and control must be directly linked to the all-arms tactical plan. [/ul]
It had many important consequences, not the least of which was that they spoke authoritatively to the supported commanders and gave orders, not requests, to the guns. &nbsp;It also eliminated the risk of the artillery conducting their own private war controlled from the rear. &nbsp;In 1941 General Montgomery, as chief umpire on Exercise BUMPER,&nbsp;stated 'the business of the Gunner Commanding Officer is first to train his regiment and then to train the infantry and armoured brigadiers to use it properly'.
&nbsp;
The regiment's second-in-command was responsible for its gun area. &nbsp;Regimental HQ (RHQ) was there and operated by the adjutant. The senior officer on each battery position was the (battery) Captain (BK), who had particular responsibilities for administration. There was a command post officer (CPO) in the battery CP (BCP) and a gun position officer (GPO) at each troop CP (TCP) all with an officer assisting. The CPO was responsible for the overall gun position including its gunnery and local defence. &nbsp;Mid-war a new role&nbsp;- Section Commander (or section officer) - was introduced. &nbsp;This was an&nbsp;officer, warrant officer or NCO appointed by each&nbsp;GPO to supervise each section in the troop in addition to their other duties, it was a role and there was no change in establishment.
&nbsp;
Medium regiments always had two medium batteries, each with eight guns. &nbsp;Heavy regiments had batteries of four guns, which were not organised into troops so they had only one CP. &nbsp;After Dunkirk they had four batteries with 7.2-inch howitzers as these became available. &nbsp;In 1943 155-mm M1 guns replaced 7.2-inch in two of these batteries and in early 1945 the 7.2-inch started converting to the longer range Mk 6 on the M1 carriage. Super heavy batteries had two guns, with three batteries in each mixed regiment. The various mountain and light batteries varied from four to eight howitzers, and mortar batteries generally had 16 tubes.
&nbsp;
With the exception of the heavies, regiments usually had a single type of gun. &nbsp;However, in Burma after 1942 mixed equipment regiments were common and in other theatres some field regiments had both towed and SP batteries. &nbsp;In 1944 in Burma anti-tank regiments became dual equipped, each detachment had an anti-tank gun and a 3-inch mortar (12 per battery).
&nbsp;
Most field regiments were under command of the divisional artillery commanders, the CRA, a brigadier. &nbsp;All divisions and corps had their own HQRA, with both command and control roles. &nbsp;At divisional level this small HQ had 3 staff officers as well as the CRA. Above corps level HQs had an artillery staff branch, usually headed by a brigadier (BRA) at army or command and major general (MGRA) at army group or major command&nbsp;level, with advisory and command roles to and through the Commander and general staff.
Initially there was a second HQRA at corps under command of the CCMA who commanded the corps medium artillery and any GHQ field, medium and heavy regiments allocated to the corps, this position was abolished for inexplicable reasons in 1941. &nbsp;The basic scale for corps artillery, not always achieved, being two army field regiments, two medium regiments and a survey regiment as corps troops. In France in 1940 GHQ had an additional 19 regiments, half of them medium. &nbsp;This gave the BEF (11 divisions in 3 corps) 60 regiments totalling 1280 guns. &nbsp;The British Liberation Army that returned to France in 1944 had 11 divisions (including 3 armoured plus many independent tank and armoured brigades, but excluding Canadian, Polish, Belgian and Dutch formations) in 4 corps with over 65 regiments, of which 30 were in divisional artilleries.
&nbsp;
From September 1942 AGRAs were formed as 'army troops' with heavy, medium and field regiments, they provided organisation for the regiments under army command. &nbsp;An ad hoc medium artillery group was used at El Alamein under command of a regimental commander and several months previously at Bardia. &nbsp;The creation of AGRAs meant that corps field artillery was reduced to a survey regiment but an AGRA nominally comprised a corps' scale of army artillery. &nbsp;From late 1943 (after the conversion of some field regiments to medium) the scale of two field, one medium and one heavy regiment per corps increased to one field regiment, one medium regiment plus one medium regiment per division supported and one heavy regiment.&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;
The AGRAs were under army command and assigned to corps as required, normally one to each corps. &nbsp;Nevertheless for major operations a corps might get additional AGRAs, and sometimes they were allocated to a division and sometimes additional field and medium regiments were allocated to a division for an extended period. &nbsp;However, it was not British practice to routinely distribute non-divisional artillery regiments among divisions because this conflicted with the principle of centralised control. &nbsp;Initially AGRAs were without a signal company. As the war progressed their roles increased, particularly in counter-battery. &nbsp;Survey regiments remained at one per corps and were not part of an AGRA.
Some army field regiments became semi-permanently attached to independent armoured and tank brigades. There were quite a lot of these. &nbsp;For example at El Alamein there were 3 armoured divisions, each established with a single armoured brigade. However, there were actually 8 tank and armoured brigades present. &nbsp;These independent tank and armoured brigades were assigned to infantry divisions as necessary, although sometimes they reinforced armoured divisions. &nbsp;In either case they often had to be provided with artillery.
&nbsp;
Regiments that were not in corps or divisional artilleries or AGRAs were under theatre command and allocated to 'Under Command' of other formations as required. &nbsp;Some of these regiments were War Office Reserve or WO Pool. &nbsp;Reserve regiments were for emergencies and could not be allocated without WO authority, pool regiments were allocated as required by the theatre HQ but could revert to WO authority.
By early 1945 in NW Europe 21st Army Group (6 corps) had 7 British and 2 Canadian AGRAs. &nbsp;The largest AGRA was 1st Canadian in Italy that reached 10 regiments (mostly British), but most were about 6 regiments, while the smallest was a super-heavy AGRA with 2 regiments. &nbsp;Although AGRAs were formed in India, there were never any in Burma and only one in the final months of the North African campaign (1st AGRA, in action with 19 French Corps in January 1943). &nbsp;Some army field regiments were converted to medium and heavy regiments as guns became available, and HAA regiments in the ground role were also allocated to AGRAs as the air threat decreased.
The divisional artillery comprised field regiments. &nbsp;Three regiments in infantry divisions and eventually 2 (one self-propelled) in armoured divisions. &nbsp;However, forward infantry divisions in an advance were usually allocated a total of four field and two medium regiments, totalling 128 guns. &nbsp;The additional regiments usually came from AGRAs. &nbsp; In NW Europe heavy and HAA batteries were also routinely allocated to divisions for counter-mortar tasks.
The 1939 War Establishments were found to lack manpower and in May 1940 revisions were approved but never implemented. &nbsp;In October 1940 field regiments were reorganised into three batteries each with eight guns (two troops) and their survey sections re-formed. &nbsp;This change did not happen instantly everywhere and the new organisation for a battery was not finalised until well into 1941, although the proposed organisation and procedures were promulgated in January 1941. Minor changes continued throughout the war. &nbsp;The changeover took two forms, some regiments changed to 2 batteries of 8 guns while others changed to 3 batteries each with a single gun troop of 6 guns. &nbsp;The reorganisation to regiments of 24 guns was not completed until well into 1943 because it took some time to produce all the required NCOs and specialists, particularly for regiments overseas. At El Alamein in late 1942 10 of the 39 field regiments still had only 2 batteries. &nbsp;The new organisation increased the number of vehicles and signallers. &nbsp;In 1943 establishments were standardised army wide so that similar numbers and ranks were authorised for similar tasks.
By the end of 1943 a towed field battery's war establishment strength was 198 including 10 officers and an SP battery's was 186, again with 10 officers. &nbsp;Medium batteries (4.5/5.5-inch) were bigger, 252 (still 10 officers), because their gun detachments were larger. &nbsp;Heavy batteries were only 166 with 6 officers. &nbsp;These large batteries enabled sustained 24 hour operations. &nbsp;It also proved a boon in Burma for local defence against ground attack.
An RA regiment comprised several elements from the establishment perspective. &nbsp;By 1943 these were the regiment itself, mostly RA cap badge, but included attached cooks (from the new Army Catering Corps by this time), a medical officer, and tradesmen from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). &nbsp;Then there was the signal section from Royal Signals, with its own officer and finally the Light Aid Detachment (LAD) from REME, about 13 strong. &nbsp;The RA soldiers were divided into Tradesmen and Non-Tradesmen. &nbsp;The former included driver-operators (signallers), driver-mechanics, gun fitters, vehicle- mechanics, equipment repairers, clerks, store men and the 'Battery Surveyors' in the regimental survey section. &nbsp;By number the main non-tradesmen were gun numbers, drivers IC and signallers. The final element in the regiment was the 'First Reinforcements' who replaced RA battle casualties. &nbsp;They included officers, NCOs and gunners, including tradesmen, and in a field regiment totalled 54 including 5 officers.
The regimental headquarters was some 88 strong including 9 officers; this figure includes the regiment’s LAD and signal section as well as the&nbsp;10 strong survey section with its officer. &nbsp;
The 8 gun field battery included four defence teams equipped with an AAMG (LMG) and ATk rifle. &nbsp;&nbsp;However, initially only about 30% of the battery had personal weapons, although this changed to 100% in early 1943. The official scale was a pistol per officer, a machine carbine for Warrant Officers, drivers and motor cyclists, and members of LMG detachments. The rest carried rifles. In mid 1943 20-mm AA guns were approved for all arms, with mountings capable of firing on the move and issued to towed artillery regiments, and PIATs started replacing ATk rifles. &nbsp;However, the extent to which&nbsp;20-mm AA guns were&nbsp;issued is unclear. &nbsp;The totals for a field regiment were 25 × LMGs, 13 × PIATs and 8 × 20-mm.
A 1941 25-pdr field battery had 12 motorcycles and 38 other vehicles of which five were for cable laying. &nbsp;&nbsp;By 1944 the number of motor-cycles had decreased to 7 and 4 jeeps ('Car, 5-cwt, 4 ×&nbsp;4' in British terminology) had appeared, to total 46 vehicles and motor-cycles.
In August 1941 the first Air OP (AOP) Squadron formed, these had light aircraft (Austers) with artillery officers as observer-pilots, eventually there was a squadron per corps (except in Burma), normally providing a flight of four aircraft to each forward division and AGRA. These squadrons first flew operationally in Tunisia. &nbsp;Each aircraft ('section') with its RA pilot and mixed RA/RAF ground crew could deploy independently. &nbsp;The engagement of targets found by other RAF aircraft, the Arty/R procedure, and a subject of extensive planning and preparation in the years before the war, continued. &nbsp;AOPs could engage targets on clear moonlight nights and developed an air photo capability and also directed naval gunfire. In the SW Pacific Australia did not create an AOP organisation and relied entirely on 'army cooperation' aircraft of the RAAF. &nbsp;Canada (initially), New Zealand and South Africa did not create AOPs either and their formations were supported by British squadrons.
Just as, if not, more significant in 1941, was a ‘bottom up’ tactical innovation that emerged in the surrounded town of Tobruk on the Libyan coast between Australian infantry and British artillery – close affiliation between a battalion and its supporting battery. &nbsp;This relationship spread rapidly throughout the British and like-minded armies. &nbsp;It was the critical element for a harmonious and trusting relationship between artillery and the supported arm, and the forward presence of the battery's senior officers was probably its key. &nbsp;With it came guaranteed fire support because the observers could order targets to their battery. &nbsp;However, it did raise a problem in that the supported arm tended to view the battery as ‘theirs’, often failing to recognise that artillery fought at both the tactical and operational level, and the implications of ‘In Support’ and mobile firepower.
The main problem was four companies in a battalion but only two observers in a battery, so the latter often had to move between companies in battle. This could be a problem, particularly in Burma, where it was found that a battery had to deploy up to five observation parties. &nbsp;This was usually achieved by rotating gun-end officers and soldiers through the additional observation parties. &nbsp;
Close affiliations developed between brigades and their supporting regiments. The regimental commander (CO) increasingly accompanied the supported brigade commander wherever he went and by late 1943 this became official artillery policy, with the CO establishing a small HQ at brigade HQ (a policy first established in 1918). &nbsp;In regiments without a directly supporting role to, or under command of, a brigade the CO was based at regimental main HQ in the area of his battery gun positions. &nbsp;BCs mirrored this with the battalions and regiments they supported.
As the war wore on the field role of anti-aircraft and anti-tank batteries increased because their specific targets decreased. The former often provided a significant component of major fire plans and HAA batteries (3.7-inch guns) were increasingly used against opportunity targets. &nbsp;The main reason that HAA were not used more extensively in the field role was that they were not officially authorised to have the necessary technical fire control equipment until late 1944.
&nbsp;
Organisation and Equipment - Observers
From after the Fall of France each troop commander (and BC (Battery Commander)) had an OP assistant, usually a bombardier although the BC's might be a lance sergeant. By 1942 each party had three radios, one fully integrated in their vehicle, one FOO (Forward Observation Officer) man pack and one on the supported infantry or armour net. &nbsp;The last improved situational awareness and enabled the supported arm to indicate targets to a FOO/OPO. If the observer was unable to see the target then the supported arm directed fire via the observer using simplified procedures (giving either corrections or observations). A third observer party could be deployed from resources at the gun position if the battery was up strength. If a troop commander was required to act as an FOO or liaise with the supported arm then the OP assistant would takeover, inevitably this also happened when observers became casualties. &nbsp;In Burma additional observer parties were created often led by warrant officers or sergeants from the battery and it was general practice to rotate officers and soldiers through the battery's OPs when conditions were static, although signallers were rotated more often. &nbsp;In some cases in Burma OP deployment was planned regimentally to ensure optimum coverage in difficult terrain. &nbsp;
The observation officer's duties (whether operating as an OPO or FOO) were:

Observe and report the tactical situation.
Maintain close contact with the supported arm and give required support at the earliest moment.
Direct and control the fire of the allotted guns. [/ul]
In most types of regiment BCs and troop commanders had an armoured tracked vehicle; the Universal Carrier (Lloyd or Windsor carrier) called an 'Armoured OP' in field batteries. COs in field regiments were equipped with Universal Carriers from mid 1943. &nbsp;However, these Armoured OPs were less than ideal so other armoured vehicles were adopted.
OP tanks were first introduced in 1942, by early 1943 batteries in armoured divisions had 2 OP tanks and one armoured OP, in infantry divisions it was the other way around. &nbsp;Army field regiments had no OP tanks but each tank 'battalion' in tank brigades held 2 tanks for OPs. &nbsp;Other types of vehicle were also adopted including light tanks, armoured cars and M14 half-tracks ('Truck, 15-cwt, half-track' in British terms). &nbsp;&nbsp;In early 1944 the official position was as follows:

SP regiments:- CO - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, BCs - Truck, 15-cwt, half-track with 2 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets, GPOs - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (total 13 OP tanks).
Field or RHA Regiments:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets (INF Div), Tp Comds - Tank OP 3 wireless sets (Armd Div) or Armd OP 2 wireless sets (INF Div). A BCs Lt Tk OP could be a Tank OP as an alternative and in Italy one of the Armd OPs would be an armd car.
Medium regiments:- BCs - Lt Tank OP 3 wireless sets, Tp Comds - Armd OP 1 wireless set or Armd Car 1 wireless set.
Heavy regiment:- BCs - Armd OP 2 wireless sets or Armd Car, Subaltern - Armd OP 2 wireless sets. [/ul]
In mid 1944 the policy changed again with the decision to remove all heavy AFVs from infantry divisions. SP regiments retained their 13 OP tanks and the other field regiment in an armoured division had 6 for its OPs. &nbsp;They were withdrawn from all other units although Armoured and Tank Brigades held 8 OP tanks.
The basic policy was that OP tanks should be the same type as used by the supported tank unit. &nbsp;However, the policy could not always be followed and in some cases Ram tanks were used (a Canadian design used as the carriage for Sexton SPs but not as a tank in armoured units). &nbsp;Radios were standardised as 2 × No 19 sets and 1 × No 38 set per OP tank and stowage modified for some artillery equipment. &nbsp;In some cases (eg Covenanter, Crusader and Ram) a dummy gun was fitted to permit space for the wirelesses. &nbsp;Apart from dummy guns, the differences between OP tanks and standard control tanks was an additional wireless and stowage for other OP equipment.
&nbsp;The tanks held by Armoured and Tank Brigade HQs were a pool for use by regiments in support (or allocated under command) of these formations. &nbsp;They had RAC crews who were joined by an OP officer and his OPA, unlike the tanks held by RA regiments that were fully crewed by RA (usually the OPO, his OPA, a driver-operator and a driver-mechanic). Armoured divisions also held an OP tank for their CRA. &nbsp;The tanks for GPOs also provided immediate replacements for OPs.
The observers’ basic equipment was binoculars, map, compass and protractor. Man pack OPs became important in some theatres, this was achieved by reinforcing the normal 4 man OP party with 6 'porters' to help carry the 2 wirelesses and associated equipment.
Batteries also held telescopes, tripod mounted stereoscopic binoculars, optical range finders, directors and artillery boards for their OPs, the last 3 to enable 'silent' or 'instrumental'&nbsp;registration. However, such equipment was not always conducive to a well concealed OP and certainly inappropriate for an FOO. &nbsp;The Telescope, Stereoscopic, was tripod mounted (full size or 16 inch) with azimuth and inclination scales and gave ×8 magnification, it was binocular and the binocular tubes could be either vertical to provide a short periscope or horizontal to give enhanced stereoscopic vision.
As can be seen the way that Artillery is perform by JTCS at the moment where every Manoeuvre unit can direct fire on to a target conforms well with the way British Artillery was setup near the end of the war; except that they should only be able to call on their Divisions assets, However for early war years most Infantry Divisions had very limited communication with their Artillery and relied on the BC's and FOO's attached to their unit HQs.
Les.
&nbsp;
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Jason Petho
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Jason Petho »

Wow, Les!

That's brilliant!!

Thank you for the information.

Jason Petho
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timshin42
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by timshin42 »

Thanks Les!

Most informative. A Commonwealth Field Artillery Offisers Advanced Course in a nutshell! St Barbara would be very proud!
I read every word and learned a great deal!

I raise a cup of artillery Punch in gratitude. [&o]

timshin42
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Lesbaker
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Lesbaker »

Thank you for your kind words&nbsp;for my inadequate ramblings, I bask in the light of superior beings&nbsp;.
Dualnet
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by Dualnet »

The introduction of FOs is secondary to artillery being controlled by either the organisation it belongs to or has been assigned to.

What I object to is the ability of any unit on the battlefield to spot for all of the artillery on the battlefield from one moment to the other.

If your unit has had artillery assigned to it for a particular job, the artillery wouldn't just switch to a completely different task on the say so of some private. Competing needs would determine that guns be allocated and not switched without the chain of command’s knowledge.
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by timshin42 »

TRUE!

That's why we have artillery Fire Planning, and more specifically "ON-ORDER MISSIONS" previously planned and identified in operation orders. These would normally be implemented by the Artillery Fire Support Coodinator (an FA CPT at each maneuver battallion; the DIRECT SUPPORT FA Battalion Commander at Regimental/Brigade Level; the DIVARTY Commander at Division level, the CORPSARTY Commander; the ARMYARTY Commander.........
(the above by US doctrine).

As YOU fill all these roles in the game, as well as FO/FOO and maneuver commander at all levels, the speed at which decisions are made and implemented are a function of how rapidly YOU can follow and comprehend the evolving battlefield! [8D]


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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by MrRoadrunner »

&nbsp;Pleasant thoughts!
&nbsp;&nbsp;You da man!
&nbsp;
RR
“The object of life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane.”
&#8213; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
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RE: Artillery Spotting

Post by kool_kat »

Gents:

There has been a lot of discussion that the current artillery spotting rules must be changed from a "realism" standpoint. However; I have read little to nothing on how any of these proposed changes would impact game play.

My view on artillery is that the current rules are adequate and work well within the JTCS game mechanics. Artillery; when one side is blessed with it, works as intended. Combat units can spot and call in artillery fire that will land in the turn following the request. Some artillery; like the Russian BM-13 Katyusha rocket launcher, takes an additional turn to reload its rocket tubes. Pretty straight forward.

IMO; as a JTCS player - not scenario designer, I like this abstracted artillery treatment. I don't want to micro manage my artillery forces. I want to focus on how artillery will support my troop advances - not that my FO is out of position and whoops, that combat unit can't call in fire from a particular artillery battery because it is not in the same chain of command.

Sorry; but for me, it is enough that I need to try to keep my combat units within support range of their assigned battalion HQs for supply purposes.

I am against adding an additional level of complexity (yes, all artillery change support postings advocate an increased level of complexity - adding additional units like FOs. Changing the chain of command to call in artillery strikes, etc.), in the name of "realism". Also any purposed artillery changes that I have read would fundamentally change how artillery spotting works and would have a major and unknown impact on game play. I don't see any of these proposed changes as incremental ones.

Finally; as a JTCS player, I have never played a PBeM game in which myself or any of my opponents have cited the current artillery spotting rules as being so flawed as to negatively impact on game play or flow. This has been my experience and to be frank, I have never considered "revamping" the artillery spotting rules. IMO, it should not have a higher priority versus other JTCS rule issues such as extreme assault, variable visibility, and existence of weird units like the "magical" bombers and "bathtub" navy. (not to open that discussion in this thread!) [X(]

Again, I believe the impact of these proposed artillery spotting rules to game play and balance need further discussion.

Regards, - Mike

"You have to learn the rules of the game. And then you have to play better than anyone else." - Albert Einstein
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