Modeling of Carrier Battles

[jwilkerson]

I'm starting this thread in response to some discussion Ron and I were having over in another thread. I think the scope of this discussion could include pretty much anything related to the pros and cons of the US and Japanese carrier forces, especially in 1942 and how these aspects are modeled (or not modeled) in the game(s) (UV/WITP/WPO/AE).

I'll post some more on this topic in a bit.

[el cid again]

A more general but related problem is air search efficiency. This matters vitally to carrier vs carrier battles, but also in carrier vs land battles (and any air vs ship battle). Mathmetically speaking, air search is usually too effective in WITP for the number of aircraft and the distances covered. But - if the number of aircraft is large enough - it actually works rather well.

There was a thread - forgotten I assume by most - which came to the conclusion that air searches ought to be range limited to something like half the number of hexes as the number of searching planes (rounding up). Thus four aircraft could search 360 degrees to a radius of two hexes. If there was some way to limit search sector - and one passive way is "if there is a continent behind you your sector is only 180 degrees" sort of thing - these values could be increased in proportion to the reduced search area.

IF somehow air search efficiencies could be made more reasonable THEN the concept of a "two phase search" (an early war Japanese concept which gave them an advantage when used - and which did not when they failed to use it as at Midway) might then be worth looking at.

[jwilkerson]

A while back I tried to come up with a list of "factors" which would influence carrier battles. Actually, I think there was more than one version of that list, but here is at least one version to kick things off.

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance
(11) Strike Targeting (1-Pre-strike-targeting 2-Base-to-target-strike-navigation 3-tactical-over-the-enemy-fleet-targeting)




Also note that the "scope of discussion" should be specified. We could be discussing:

(a) General capabilities, within a particular timeframe (such as early 1942, all of 1942, the entire war, etc.)
(b) Specific examples (such as the four carrier battles of 1942).
(c) Game capabilities

[witpqs]

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

[trollelite]

I would suggest to add some more "uncertainty" in it.

For example, under current condition a 250KG AP bomb is absolutely useless against british carrier, because it never penetrate. Under current condition, a non-penetrating bomb is useless. However, it would be better if a 250AP bomb hit (as well as other non-penetrating hit) has some certain chance of increasing its victim's sys damage significantly.

The other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

[Nomad]

ORIGINAL: trollelite

I would suggest to add some more "uncertainty" in it.

For example, under current condition a 250KG AP bomb is absolutely useless against british carrier, because it never penetrate. Under current condition, a non-penetrating bomb is useless. However, it would be better if a 250AP bomb hit (as well as other non-penetrating hit) has some certain chance of increasing its victim's sys damage significantly.

The other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

That is an untrue statement about being useless. A 250kg AP bomb can and will destroy secondary weapons. But, I would agree that a very small chance of penetration should be given.

[okami]

ORIGINAL: trollelite

IThe other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

At what point does a carrier capable unit become in essence a carrier trained. Currently you areone or the other, and can not become the other. But would not all new squadrons be essentially carrier capable and at some point attain carrier trained. I agree mishaps amung the former should be higher but they should eventually convert to the later as they would IRL.

[witpqs]

Also it's only ops losses that should be different (and they already are IIRC) - flying and fighting are the same.

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: okami

ORIGINAL: trollelite

IThe other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

At what point does a carrier capable unit become in essence a carrier trained. Currently you areone or the other, and can not become the other. But would not all new squadrons be essentially carrier capable and at some point attain carrier trained. I agree mishaps amung the former should be higher but they should eventually convert to the later as they would IRL.

4,142 Officers were lost in non-combat aviation related accidents in WWII (1941-1946). Unfortunately the source does not break it down further, and this number does not include numbers lost in training. Only 1,514 where killed due to enemy action in air combat. This is approx 2.6:1 loss ratio. SO non-combat related attrition should be higher than what we are now seeing in WITP?

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/onl ... #enemy_off

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

A while back I tried to come up with a list of "factors" which would influence carrier battles. Actually, I think there was more than one version of that list, but here is at least one version to kick things off.

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”

There is no English translation, but the JNAF had this idea expressed organizationally. When carriers operated together, they formed supra - carrier air group organizations - one each for fighters, bombers and carrier attack planes. The senior officer for each type was the type commander. And the senior attack officer was air group leader. At Pearl Harbor, this officer was Capt. Fujida. He controlled the strike - in a detail tactical sense: he could have aborted the mission, and he could have ordered it to go in with different tactics from a set of options. He also remained at the rondezvous point and led fighter stragglers (which lacked navigation equipment) back to the ships - being last to land.

Which brings up two interesting points:

a) Can this Japanese type organization (which was very flexable in attack missions) be simulated in any way?

b) Can different kinds of attacks be run in according to factors such as "was surprise achieved"?

The specific Japanese names for these organizations - and an outline of how it worked - see the introduction to Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

Number of lifts/elevators might be a factor - or maybe not as our turns are so long.

Number of catapults (including zero) might affect launch rates in dead calm situations. Particularly if a carrier is moored or anchored. [If we know that]

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: trollelite

I would suggest to add some more "uncertainty" in it.

For example, under current condition a 250KG AP bomb is absolutely useless against british carrier, because it never penetrate. Under current condition, a non-penetrating bomb is useless. However, it would be better if a 250AP bomb hit (as well as other non-penetrating hit) has some certain chance of increasing its victim's sys damage significantly.

I don't think this is true. A 250 kg bomb penetrates 132 mm of armor in RHS, 65 mm in CHS, and 65 mm in stock. The deck armor of Illustrious class armored carriers is 75 mm in stock and CHS, 76 mm in RHS. Because of the way the routines use die rolls, in all three variations 250 kg bombs SOMETIMES penetrate (but more often in RHS), and ALSO there is a chance they hit some system not protected by deck armor at all (losing radar, guns, starting fires, etc.) It appears that the stock/CHS values are relatively incorrect, but it only affects the proportion of the time the bombs penetrate. The difference in data may depend on assumptions about the release height and aircraft velocity at bomb release - but for example the 1000 pound AP bomb should penetrate 149 mm - and is rated at 105 mm - so Allied bombs are as much underrated as Axis ones are. This is not a problem just of the 250 kg bomb - if it is a problem at all - and it can easily be addressed by using defined and consistent data standards. Whatever values are set, the die rolls will let them have serious effect some times but in no case all the time.

Finally, it should be said that "British" armored carriers were remarkably hard to damage fatally - and to the extent WITP makes this so - it has it right - rather than wrong.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: trollelite

I would suggest to add some more "uncertainty" in it.

The other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

In principle, more uncertainty is always better.

But why should effectiveness of carrier capable squadrons be reduced compared to regular ones? I think it depends on the unit - and I don't understand a general principle which would make this true. Please explain.

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: AlaskanWarrior

ORIGINAL: okami

ORIGINAL: trollelite

IThe other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

At what point does a carrier capable unit become in essence a carrier trained. Currently you areone or the other, and can not become the other. But would not all new squadrons be essentially carrier capable and at some point attain carrier trained. I agree mishaps amung the former should be higher but they should eventually convert to the later as they would IRL.

4,142 Officers were lost in non-combat aviation related accidents in WWII (1941-1946). Unfortunately the source does not break it down further, and this number does not include numbers lost in training. Only 1,514 where killed due to enemy action in air combat. This is approx 2.6:1 loss ratio. SO non-combat related attrition should be higher than what we are now seeing in WITP?

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/onl ... #enemy_off

Yes - with the qualifier that not by that ratio. We don't see the training losses - and we don't do a number of other kinds of air missions. You can be taking a joy ride and get unlucky and die. But a higher ops loss rate is a good idea - and should apply to transfer missions - and should be somewhat related to mission duration / range. But once again, we are mainly talking about things more general than just carrier ops.

[el cid again]

If the Japanese should enjoy greater operational efficiency offensively (at least in 1941 and 1942, and maybe forever since no one else ever organized quite as flexably)

the Allies should enjoy greater operational efficiency defensively. Especially if/when radar is operational on the carriers. Perhaps a special case should exist for a CVL with a dedicated night fighter air group as well? [As far as I know, these don't exist in CHS or stock, but they do in RHS, and did IRL. Extensive trials of night fighters in other ways - detachments on carriers - land based - indicated that a dedicated carrier was significantly more effective and efficient.]

Similarly, the nature of a screen should matter. Since players do not control formations, this could be done according to the number of escort vessels.

Players can decide how many carriers are in a single task group - and how many escorts in each task group. All task groups in the same hex may be presumed to cooperate air group wise. BUT EACH separate task group might be assumed to be organized such that:

if there are 1 to 6 escort vessels, these are all in a single inner screen. Incoming screens are limited to half their AAA - or better AAA decided by facing - vs incoming strikes.

if there are 7 to 18 escort vessels, these are assumed to include an inner screen and an outer screen: the outer screen is 6 to 12 vessels; the inner screen is 18 minus the outer screen count. Thus 18 escorts = inner screen of 6 and outer screen of 12; 7 vessels = inner screen of 1 and outer screen of 6; and so on. Outer screen vessels differ from inner screen vessels in that ALL their AAA is usable against incoming strikes.

if there are more than 18 escorts, the additional ships are distant early warning pickets. A picket differs from a screen vessel in that only one vessel may engage any given incoming strike (random selection).

A carrier task group might be limited in ship count to about 30 vessels. In which case, if there were four carriers in it, 6 inner screen and 12 outer screen, there would be 8 picket vessels.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

A while back I tried to come up with a list of "factors" which would influence carrier battles. Actually, I think there was more than one version of that list, but here is at least one version to kick things off.

(1) Idea that multiple carriers constitute an “air group”
(2) Aircraft handling facilities and practices (such as ability to bring ordnance to the flight deck)
(3) Light Landing System
(4) Air Search
(5) Damage Control (both designed in DC as well as “as practiced”
(6) Air frames (for example, in early ’42 we have A6M2, D3Y, B5N versus F4F, SDB, TBD)
(7) Air Crew Skills
(8) Shipboard and Fleet anti-aircraft
(9) CAP control
(10) Air Ordnance



Also note that the "scope of discussion" should be specified. We could be discussing:

(a) General capabilities, within a particular timeframe (such as early 1942, all of 1942, the entire war, etc.)
(b) Specific examples (such as the four carrier battles of 1942).
(c) Game capabilities

In reading through the posts, I see a couple of things to comment on.

(i) The "ground crew" aspect would seem to roll up into item (2) on the list "aircraft handling facilities and practices".

(ii) The modeling of "carrier capable" units would roll up under (7) Air crew skills.

(iii) As to the modeling of the "multi-carrier airgroup" - I think this falls under item (1) which ITG (in the game) is represented by the American CV strike penalty. So this is modeled as "the US don't have it fully until 1944 - whereas the Japanese have it from the start". Other aspects could be modeled, but I think this is the way it is in the game currently.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

I'm starting this thread in response to some discussion Ron and I were having over in another thread. I think the scope of this discussion could include pretty much anything related to the pros and cons of the US and Japanese carrier forces, especially in 1942 and how these aspects are modeled (or not modeled) in the game(s) (UV/WITP/WPO/AE).

I'll post some more on this topic in a bit.

I assume you've seen my comment on carrier operations. The important thing is that carriers steam into the wind to launch and land. This reduces the rate of advance of air TFs and increases their fuel usage. The Japanese had good reasons to decentralise their air search to the cruisers--it meant the carriers weren't slowed by air operations as much. Also see Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Naval Institute Press--the 2000 edition. I think the people working on AE need a copy on their office bookshelf. He has a tactical model of carrier warfare on pages 99-108, followed by a discussion of the tactical problems. On page 111, he points out that the Japanese continually sought a night surface action with the American carrier TFs. If they had been able to make contact, it would have been unpleasant for us. He mentions the 200 mile distance that air TFs tried to maintain on page 97. I don't know how to model this in game terms--you know the game engine--but it does mean air TFs should approach spotted enemy TFs during the day and move away during the night. Surface TFs should probably do the opposite.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Ground crew skills (affects quickness of getting off strike, turn-around time for additional strikes, readiness of aircraft).

That's basically sortie-generation rate, except that CVs can 'surge' (get everyone in the air) since they can move out of range to recover.

[m10bob]

The inability of a player to delegate targets to his planes has never been addressed, by any mod nor by AE.
Nobody questions the fact that IRL identification of ships was poor on occasion, but that should be somehow rated by the experience level of the aircrews, and certainly the naval fliers should have a better chance of ship ID than would army pilots.
The number of times naval fliers could not identify the difference between a carrier and a cruiser are far less than in game, which currently allows a smart carrier player to provide several "escorts" of worthless decoy groups in his general area to soak up some of those enemy attackers.
As in earlier Grigsby games of this genre, I would like to see the ability to search certain compass quadrants, and to specified ranges, with a keen and managed "target-type" for both spotters and attackers.

Till this issue is addressed, the carrier vs carrier type battle will be ever flawed........

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Nomad

ORIGINAL: trollelite

I would suggest to add some more "uncertainty" in it.

For example, under current condition a 250KG AP bomb is absolutely useless against british carrier, because it never penetrate. Under current condition, a non-penetrating bomb is useless. However, it would be better if a 250AP bomb hit (as well as other non-penetrating hit) has some certain chance of increasing its victim's sys damage significantly.

The other suggestion is carrier capable squadron's effective should be reduced drastically, now they are almost as effective as regular ones. A 40% reduce should be more fair. And combined with more severe op losses, especially under heavy weather condition.

That is an untrue statement about being useless. A 250kg AP bomb can and will destroy secondary weapons. But, I would agree that a very small chance of penetration should be given.

Especially for RN carriers--if the ship is caught by surprise and an elevator is down.