Why is it that artillery units can be built in the same amount of time (or in some cases even less) as an infantry brigade (line infantry, that is)? Wouldn't it take a bit longer than 20 or so days to even build a cannon? (Most artillery units are filled out in about 20-30 days.) Then, wouldn't it take at least a couple of months to adequately train the crew? (Figuring out how to manuever a large artillery piece and getting it to come close to its target when fired are quite a bit more involved than simply marching around in various formations and firing a weapon that most recruits already knew how to use in the first place.)
Also, why is R E Lee given the (dis)ability of not being able to adequately retreat in the face of combat? Granted, at Gettysberg, he got dragged into a fight in a piecemeal fashion, but that was more or less only due to the fact that JEB Stuart was off showboating rather than doing his job of scouting/screening. In most other cases, Lee was exceptional at picking when and where he would fight. If he saw that he was at a serious disadvantage, he would retreat to fight another day. In fact, you could say that his ability to take combat avoidance to an art form is what allowed him to extend the war for so long.
Historical Questions
Moderator: Pocus
RE: Historical Questions
Why would it take longer to build a battery of four or six guns than to build several thousand muskets? And, unlike a musket, which has one man doing everything from loading to firing, a cannon has several.
As for Lee, what battle did he ever refuse to fight? He didn't have to fight at Antietem. He didn't have to fight at Gettysburg. Extended the war? Past the point it should of ended, yes.
Why would it take longer to build a battery of four or six guns than to build several thousand muskets? And, unlike a musket, which has one man doing everything from loading to firing, a cannon has several.
As for Lee, what battle did he ever refuse to fight? He didn't have to fight at Antietem. He didn't have to fight at Gettysburg. Extended the war? Past the point it should of ended, yes.
Watched a documentary on beavers. Best dam documentary I've ever seen.
RE: Historical Questions
Small arms were relatively abundant at the start of the war (at least in proportion to the initially small armies fielded by both sides). Many infantrymen provided their own muskets and there were caches of small arms stored in various arsenals throughout the country. So, the first few units raised shouldn't have had a tough time getting themselves armed. After that, production issues could figure in to the build time a bit more.
Artillery pieces, on the other hand, were very hard to come by, especially early on in the war. In addition, while common civilian use provided a market for small arms (and hence a basis for manufacturing), there was little demand for cannons and therefore, few manufacturing sites/foundries existed (your average Joe didn't have much use for a 10-lb Parrot gun).
With regard to training, you didn't have to teach firing a musket from scratch. At least for the early-war southern volunteers, most of them had been firing muskets since they were boys (think of the tales of early-war marksmanship advantages of the primarily rural southern recruits). So, about all you had to do was teach bayonet use (and how difficult can that be?), marching (walking) and formation issues (2 weeks of high-school marching band practices should do the trick).
Operating a cannon would be a whole other issue. To properly aim, you would have to learn a good deal of physics (projectile motion) and/or go through a lot of trial and error. Also, whereas a musket requires no teamwork/timing (if one disregards the minimal amount associated with volley firing), the work of an artillery crew would have to be precision-timed to ensure an acceptable rate of fire. Simply limbering and unlimbering with any kind of speed would require lots of training.
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As for Lee's avoidance of combat, you ask "what battle did he refuse to fight?". The ones that didn't happen - that's the whole point! Lincoln's frustration with the inability of his commanders to engage Lee is testament to Lee's ability to avoid combat. Granted, many of the Union commanders were overly cautious, but even Grant didn't exactly find it easy to nail Lee down to decisive engagements. You also have to remember, we aren't exactly talking about a large theater of operations in Northern Virginia. To avoid complete destruction at the hands of a vastly superior enemy force in such a small area for so long a time, an army commander would have to be rather adept at avoiding fighting on the enemy's terms.
Artillery pieces, on the other hand, were very hard to come by, especially early on in the war. In addition, while common civilian use provided a market for small arms (and hence a basis for manufacturing), there was little demand for cannons and therefore, few manufacturing sites/foundries existed (your average Joe didn't have much use for a 10-lb Parrot gun).
With regard to training, you didn't have to teach firing a musket from scratch. At least for the early-war southern volunteers, most of them had been firing muskets since they were boys (think of the tales of early-war marksmanship advantages of the primarily rural southern recruits). So, about all you had to do was teach bayonet use (and how difficult can that be?), marching (walking) and formation issues (2 weeks of high-school marching band practices should do the trick).
Operating a cannon would be a whole other issue. To properly aim, you would have to learn a good deal of physics (projectile motion) and/or go through a lot of trial and error. Also, whereas a musket requires no teamwork/timing (if one disregards the minimal amount associated with volley firing), the work of an artillery crew would have to be precision-timed to ensure an acceptable rate of fire. Simply limbering and unlimbering with any kind of speed would require lots of training.
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As for Lee's avoidance of combat, you ask "what battle did he refuse to fight?". The ones that didn't happen - that's the whole point! Lincoln's frustration with the inability of his commanders to engage Lee is testament to Lee's ability to avoid combat. Granted, many of the Union commanders were overly cautious, but even Grant didn't exactly find it easy to nail Lee down to decisive engagements. You also have to remember, we aren't exactly talking about a large theater of operations in Northern Virginia. To avoid complete destruction at the hands of a vastly superior enemy force in such a small area for so long a time, an army commander would have to be rather adept at avoiding fighting on the enemy's terms.
RE: Historical Questions
For the first, the US army stocks (A lot of which was taken by the South) had roughly 20-25,000 modern rifled muskets at the beginning of the war, which wasn't enough to equip even one of the two armies that fought at Bull Run. Yes, people brought their own shotguns, squirrel guns, etc, but do you have any idea how hard it would be to supply units with ammunition if they were allowed to keep those personal weapons? That's why, soon after the war began, commanders began shifting weapons and men to at least have some continuity. And the units were re-equipped to get some uniformity in armament as soon as possible, and it still took nearly two years.
Think of the cannon time as the period to equip and train the gunners with cannon out of your stock. Personally, I think the CSA should have a time bonus since a large percentage of their guns were actually captured guns and not homemade.
It's actually quite a bit simpler to make your average Civil War 12 lb. Napoleon than it is to make a Springfield rifle. The rifle requires much more manual handiwork. The assembly line was developed for those, btu that really didn't kick in until the war was well under way. Most of the artillery would learn on the field anyway, with some help from more senior commanders. As long as you have an actual gun commander who knows what's going on, the remaining positions can be handled by relatively untrained men.
Lee was a commander who took risks. He knew he had to, so he did it. Often he attacked in ridiculously horrible situations. Sometimes he won, but more often he lost when he attacked. Malvern Hill was a prime example of a time when he would have been much better served by holding back, but instead threw a large part of his army into a meat grinder to no purpose. Once Lee began battles, he did not let go. If he was the leader of the Northern armies, he would have been Grant before Grant ever had a chance to get going. As it was, he led an army that could not stand to suffer large amounts of casualties. Unless he got a knockout blow quick, he would be in trouble. Gettysburg, the Seven Days, Antietam (If Little Mac hadn't been too afraid to attack on the second day anyway)...all these are battles that he allowed, or would have allowed in the case of Antietam, to go on too long because he refused to stop in a timely manner.
Think of the cannon time as the period to equip and train the gunners with cannon out of your stock. Personally, I think the CSA should have a time bonus since a large percentage of their guns were actually captured guns and not homemade.
It's actually quite a bit simpler to make your average Civil War 12 lb. Napoleon than it is to make a Springfield rifle. The rifle requires much more manual handiwork. The assembly line was developed for those, btu that really didn't kick in until the war was well under way. Most of the artillery would learn on the field anyway, with some help from more senior commanders. As long as you have an actual gun commander who knows what's going on, the remaining positions can be handled by relatively untrained men. Lee was a commander who took risks. He knew he had to, so he did it. Often he attacked in ridiculously horrible situations. Sometimes he won, but more often he lost when he attacked. Malvern Hill was a prime example of a time when he would have been much better served by holding back, but instead threw a large part of his army into a meat grinder to no purpose. Once Lee began battles, he did not let go. If he was the leader of the Northern armies, he would have been Grant before Grant ever had a chance to get going. As it was, he led an army that could not stand to suffer large amounts of casualties. Unless he got a knockout blow quick, he would be in trouble. Gettysburg, the Seven Days, Antietam (If Little Mac hadn't been too afraid to attack on the second day anyway)...all these are battles that he allowed, or would have allowed in the case of Antietam, to go on too long because he refused to stop in a timely manner.
"I started out this morning with the determination to be a hell of a man. I've been a hell of a fellow long enough. If anybody else wants to be a hell of a fellow, I've no objections. But it's too damned risky."-Lt. Nicholas Day-Seige of Port Hudson
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Icedawg
As for Lee's avoidance of combat, you ask "what battle did he refuse to fight?". The ones that didn't happen - that's the whole point! Lincoln's frustration with the inability of his commanders to engage Lee is testament to Lee's ability to avoid combat. Granted, many of the Union commanders were overly cautious, but even Grant didn't exactly find it easy to nail Lee down to decisive engagements. You also have to remember, we aren't exactly talking about a large theater of operations in Northern Virginia. To avoid complete destruction at the hands of a vastly superior enemy force in such a small area for so long a time, an army commander would have to be rather adept at avoiding fighting on the enemy's terms.
The ones that didn't happen? My dear fellow, Lee never backed off from a fight. He either started it, or didn't back off from one. Grant didn't need to fight a decisive engagement, he just needed to keep him engaged. I'll bet that in the same period, Joe Johnston accomplished as much with fewer losses against Sherman. And his army never got nailed down to a seige.
In the book Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, a table lists that 121,000 of Lee's men were killed/wounded during his time in command, while Grant lost 94,000. With numbers like that, considering that the North had a 4 to 1 manpower advantage..........
Watched a documentary on beavers. Best dam documentary I've ever seen.
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Capt Henry_MatrixForum
- Posts: 103
- Joined: Fri Apr 01, 2005 7:23 pm
RE: Historical Questions
I'm not sure if it's quite fair to compare Johnston/Sherman to Lee/Grant. It seems to me that Johnston had a lot more territory to work with than Lee. Lee was defending a fixed point in Richmond that was much closer to Grant than Atlanta was to Johnston. Johnston could fall back to the next defensive position but I'm not sure that Lee had any defensive positions to fall back to (at least in front of Richmond) if he let Grant turn his right flank. I'd compare Johnston in the Peninsula to Lee except that Johnston was lucky enough to be opposing McClellan.
One question to hopefully improve my understanding of the Lee/Grant casualty comparisons. Could you define what period of time is being covered by the two figures. Lee's "time in command" would seem to me to be much longer than Grant's and he commanded a larger force than Grant earlier in the war. I don't disagree with the basic point that Lee's victories often resulted in more casualties than he could afford in the long run.
Interesting discussion.
One question to hopefully improve my understanding of the Lee/Grant casualty comparisons. Could you define what period of time is being covered by the two figures. Lee's "time in command" would seem to me to be much longer than Grant's and he commanded a larger force than Grant earlier in the war. I don't disagree with the basic point that Lee's victories often resulted in more casualties than he could afford in the long run.
Interesting discussion.
RE: Historical Questions
Grant's first battle that he was in charge of was Belmont in Nov 1861. Lee's first was Cheat Mountain two months earlier. As an army commander, Grant from Dec 1861, Lee June 1862. (wikipedia)
Another tidbit. While in round nembers Lee lost 20% of the total, he inflicted 15% (134,602) on his opponents.
In the first 14 months he commanded the AVN, he lost 80,000 against inflicting 73,000.
Daring? Yes he was. Bold? I would say so. But when you're on the short end of the 4 to 1 ratio, you can't fight the way he did.
How Robert E Lee lost the Civil War is an interesting book.
I compare the two because they were both defending geographical objectives. True, the Western theatre was larger, but Johnston did keep Sherman out of Atlanta. I don't know if he would of fought for the city when it came down to it. But I think he would of done far better than Hood did.
I think when it got down to brass tacks, he would rather lose a city than an army.
I must say that this game has me reading all the CW books I have again.
Another tidbit. While in round nembers Lee lost 20% of the total, he inflicted 15% (134,602) on his opponents.
In the first 14 months he commanded the AVN, he lost 80,000 against inflicting 73,000.
Daring? Yes he was. Bold? I would say so. But when you're on the short end of the 4 to 1 ratio, you can't fight the way he did.
How Robert E Lee lost the Civil War is an interesting book.
I compare the two because they were both defending geographical objectives. True, the Western theatre was larger, but Johnston did keep Sherman out of Atlanta. I don't know if he would of fought for the city when it came down to it. But I think he would of done far better than Hood did.
I think when it got down to brass tacks, he would rather lose a city than an army.
I must say that this game has me reading all the CW books I have again.
Watched a documentary on beavers. Best dam documentary I've ever seen.
RE: Historical Questions
My two cents:
A game of this scale has to have some abstractions, and the training times of various units seems fairly reasonable to me. The units may have existed for some time before their official creation, and the training times represent the time needed to form up the actual units and get them on their way. That's why the reinforcement pools are limited at any given time. The force pools contain already-trained soldiers, gun crews, etc. who are awaiting assignment to combat units. Does that make sense?
As for Lee, I'm not sure Lee ever avoided combat, at least not after he took command of the ANV. He had every opportunity to do so but chose to fight, even at long odds. Chancellorsville was the perfect example.
A game of this scale has to have some abstractions, and the training times of various units seems fairly reasonable to me. The units may have existed for some time before their official creation, and the training times represent the time needed to form up the actual units and get them on their way. That's why the reinforcement pools are limited at any given time. The force pools contain already-trained soldiers, gun crews, etc. who are awaiting assignment to combat units. Does that make sense?
As for Lee, I'm not sure Lee ever avoided combat, at least not after he took command of the ANV. He had every opportunity to do so but chose to fight, even at long odds. Chancellorsville was the perfect example.
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Capt Henry_MatrixForum
- Posts: 103
- Joined: Fri Apr 01, 2005 7:23 pm
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Aurelian
Grant's first battle that he was in charge of was Belmont in Nov 1861. Lee's first was Cheat Mountain two months earlier. As an army commander, Grant from Dec 1861, Lee June 1862. (wikipedia)
T- hank you, not sure if this argument works for me yet, even though you gave the data I asked for, as it seems to me Lee commanded larger bodies of men earlier than Grant, but I'm at work so will not be able to run to my library. Grant also had some down time when he was serving under Halleck in the Corinth campaign.
Another tidbit. While in round nembers Lee lost 20% of the total, he inflicted 15% (134,602) on his opponents.
In the first 14 months he commanded the AVN, he lost 80,000 against inflicting 73,000.
Daring? Yes he was. Bold? I would say so. But when you're on the short end of the 4 to 1 ratio, you can't fight the way he did.
- I agree entirely. My nephew and I have had some long discussions on this as he thinks Lee is the ideal general. His theory is that Lee was trying to win smashing victories, regardless of casualties, to create northern war weariness as Lee knew he couldn't win a long term fight and an aristocrat couldn't be a guerilla. Of course, my nephew lives in Virginia so he might be a bit biased [;)]
How Robert E Lee lost the Civil War is an interesting book.
I compare the two because they were both defending geographical objectives. True, the Western theatre was larger, but Johnston did keep Sherman out of Atlanta. I don't know if he would of fought for the city when it came down to it. But I think he would of done far better than Hood did.
- I think there is some chance that you or I might have done better than Hood [:D] I think Lee might even agree with me there. After all, Hardee has more experience managing an army. Just for fun, I'll point out that if Johnston isn't wounded before Seven Days, even McClellan might have managed to get into Richmond. I know Johnston was supposed to have a plan, but I'm not sure what he would have done against McClellan's seige tactics.
I think when it got down to brass tacks, he would rather lose a city than an army.
- A fascinating discussion for another time. You need your army, but without the cities where do you draw supplies from? I certainly don't have an answer as to which the superior choice would be.
I must say that this game has me reading all the CW books I have again.
Forgive me if I've messed up the quotation feature. This is my initial attempt to use it so I'm sure it's scrambled beyond recognition.
RE: Historical Questions
I guess my 19th Century American History professor was way off then. That class was about 40-50% devoted to the Civil War and one of the key points I took out of that class was that Lee extended the war greatly by being very selective about when he would stand and fight. This selectivity is what caused Lincoln's frustration with his Eastern Theater commanders. They were unable to successfully deal the "knock out blow" to crush the ANV.
Maybe the professor didn't know what he was talking about or maybe I was too often too hung over in class to keep things straight. (I suspect it may have been the latter. College was a bit too much fun I guess. [:D])
Maybe the professor didn't know what he was talking about or maybe I was too often too hung over in class to keep things straight. (I suspect it may have been the latter. College was a bit too much fun I guess. [:D])
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Capt Henry_MatrixForum
- Posts: 103
- Joined: Fri Apr 01, 2005 7:23 pm
RE: Historical Questions
I don't know if it's a question of absolute right or wrong. This type of issue can be quite subjective and we all look at it a little differently. Just a quick look, from memory, at Lee's major battles.
Seven Days - Lee launches an attack immediately upon taking command. He may be careful about how he launches the attack, but he doesn't look for better ground to redoploy to before attacking. Of course, he doesn't have any territory to work with, either.
Second Bull Run - I think Lee chooses carefully here. He's helped by the fact that a large portion of the Union Army is still in transit from the Peninsula.
Antietam - Due to a staff officer, Lee doensn't have much choice about fighting but does pick a good position. Of course, he doesn't have many options if he does not retreat.
Fredricksburg - Brilliant defensive action that never would have been in the Union could have gotten pontoon bridges to Burnside when he was ready for them. Burnside chooses to fight Lee on Lee's ground.
Chancellorsville - Another brilliant action, but once again undertaken because Hooker completely fools Lee prior to freezing once across the river. At least one Union Corps never engages.
Gettysburg - Blame Stuart, blame Heth, blame Early, credit Buford, credit Reynold, credit Hancock, but Lee does not fight on ground of his choosing here.
Wilderness - Lee hits Grant where he is most vulnerable and does not want to be hit. Lee selects the ground.
Spotsylvania - Lee has to fight for control of a crossroads. Grant is dictating at this point.
Cold Harbor - Grant again chooses to attack Lee, and a very poor choice it was. Lee picks a great spot to receive an attack, but Grant is still dictating.
After Cold Harbor, Grant gets to the James River, the place Lee has said Grant must not reach or the end result is inevitable.
Petersburg - Grant confuses Lee and gets to Petersburg first. Beauregard and blundering Union Commanders give Lee time to get there. Other than Fort Stedman, Lee never regains initiative.
I've probably missed several, but it looks to me like Lee couldn't always choose his battlegrounds. I think Lee was a great general, but much of it was helped by his reputation (which is part of being a great general). Lee had Hooker beat before sending Jackson on his march because Hooker, facing Lee, had already lost faith in himself. "I just lost faith in Joe Hooker" or words to that effect was Hooker's statement. Lee "knew" he was going to beat McClellan just as McClellan (with Pinkerton's help) "knew" he was outnumbered and in danger of being destroyed. I've always liked Lee's quote on how he was afraid the Union would keep changing commanders until they got someone he didn't understand. Shelby Foote said that never happened, but that the Union got Grant, who knew how to beat Lee and did. I've also always liked Grant complaining how the AoP leaders are worried that Lee is going to turn flips and land on their flanks and rear all at once. Other Generals worried about what Lee would do. I'm sure Grant did also, but he also thought about what his goal was.
Lee does make mistakes, but reacts very quickly to them. Lee is helped, just as Grant is early in his career, by not being up against the best generals the Union can offer.
On a totally unrelated note, just to stir things up, put Grant against Lee in '62 and I think Lee does quite a bit better.
Seven Days - Lee launches an attack immediately upon taking command. He may be careful about how he launches the attack, but he doesn't look for better ground to redoploy to before attacking. Of course, he doesn't have any territory to work with, either.
Second Bull Run - I think Lee chooses carefully here. He's helped by the fact that a large portion of the Union Army is still in transit from the Peninsula.
Antietam - Due to a staff officer, Lee doensn't have much choice about fighting but does pick a good position. Of course, he doesn't have many options if he does not retreat.
Fredricksburg - Brilliant defensive action that never would have been in the Union could have gotten pontoon bridges to Burnside when he was ready for them. Burnside chooses to fight Lee on Lee's ground.
Chancellorsville - Another brilliant action, but once again undertaken because Hooker completely fools Lee prior to freezing once across the river. At least one Union Corps never engages.
Gettysburg - Blame Stuart, blame Heth, blame Early, credit Buford, credit Reynold, credit Hancock, but Lee does not fight on ground of his choosing here.
Wilderness - Lee hits Grant where he is most vulnerable and does not want to be hit. Lee selects the ground.
Spotsylvania - Lee has to fight for control of a crossroads. Grant is dictating at this point.
Cold Harbor - Grant again chooses to attack Lee, and a very poor choice it was. Lee picks a great spot to receive an attack, but Grant is still dictating.
After Cold Harbor, Grant gets to the James River, the place Lee has said Grant must not reach or the end result is inevitable.
Petersburg - Grant confuses Lee and gets to Petersburg first. Beauregard and blundering Union Commanders give Lee time to get there. Other than Fort Stedman, Lee never regains initiative.
I've probably missed several, but it looks to me like Lee couldn't always choose his battlegrounds. I think Lee was a great general, but much of it was helped by his reputation (which is part of being a great general). Lee had Hooker beat before sending Jackson on his march because Hooker, facing Lee, had already lost faith in himself. "I just lost faith in Joe Hooker" or words to that effect was Hooker's statement. Lee "knew" he was going to beat McClellan just as McClellan (with Pinkerton's help) "knew" he was outnumbered and in danger of being destroyed. I've always liked Lee's quote on how he was afraid the Union would keep changing commanders until they got someone he didn't understand. Shelby Foote said that never happened, but that the Union got Grant, who knew how to beat Lee and did. I've also always liked Grant complaining how the AoP leaders are worried that Lee is going to turn flips and land on their flanks and rear all at once. Other Generals worried about what Lee would do. I'm sure Grant did also, but he also thought about what his goal was.
Lee does make mistakes, but reacts very quickly to them. Lee is helped, just as Grant is early in his career, by not being up against the best generals the Union can offer.
On a totally unrelated note, just to stir things up, put Grant against Lee in '62 and I think Lee does quite a bit better.
RE: Historical Questions
To add to Capt Henry's list, at the North Anna River in the '64 campaign Lee might very well have inflicted a severe defeat on the northern troops, or at the very least have had an earlier Cold Harbor. I think Lee's actions during the Overland Campaign were brilliant, but he did not have the "weight" to throw at the right times.
As for Grant versus Lee in '62: I just returned from a visit to Shiloh, and it seems to me that -- all things being equal -- Grant would have held his ground against Lee. So many of the eastern battles saw the Union commanders yield the battlefield prematurely. McClellan could have turned on Lee on the Peninsula after Malvern Hill or unleashed a fresh corps at Antietam. Hooker should have stood his ground at Chancellorsville. Meade might well have bagged the ANV after Gettysburg. I think Grant might have taken a beating at Lee's hands in a hypothetical battle in the west, but he would have counterattacked as soon as possible and kept up the pressure, as he did at Shiloh.
As for Grant versus Lee in '62: I just returned from a visit to Shiloh, and it seems to me that -- all things being equal -- Grant would have held his ground against Lee. So many of the eastern battles saw the Union commanders yield the battlefield prematurely. McClellan could have turned on Lee on the Peninsula after Malvern Hill or unleashed a fresh corps at Antietam. Hooker should have stood his ground at Chancellorsville. Meade might well have bagged the ANV after Gettysburg. I think Grant might have taken a beating at Lee's hands in a hypothetical battle in the west, but he would have counterattacked as soon as possible and kept up the pressure, as he did at Shiloh.
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Capt Henry
I'm not sure if it's quite fair to compare Johnston/Sherman to Lee/Grant. It seems to me that Johnston had a lot more territory to work with than Lee. Lee was defending a fixed point in Richmond that was much closer to Grant than Atlanta was to Johnston. Johnston could fall back to the next defensive position but I'm not sure that Lee had any defensive positions to fall back to (at least in front of Richmond) if he let Grant turn his right flank. I'd compare Johnston in the Peninsula to Lee except that Johnston was lucky enough to be opposing McClellan.
One question to hopefully improve my understanding of the Lee/Grant casualty comparisons. Could you define what period of time is being covered by the two figures. Lee's "time in command" would seem to me to be much longer than Grant's and he commanded a larger force than Grant earlier in the war. I don't disagree with the basic point that Lee's victories often resulted in more casualties than he could afford in the long run.
Interesting discussion.
Actually the straight line difference between the locations is about the same. Washington to Richmond = 96 miles, Chattanooga to Atlanta = 102 miles. And Sherman had the much easier job as once he was south of Chattanooga, he didn't really face many real natural obstacles. He was able to make wide sweeps around the flanks whenever he so chose. Grant was faced by a much more restrictive area, and quite a few decent obstacles, especially rivers, which were all cutting around the path he needed to take. He only had one flank that he could try to get around, since if he shifted around Lee's Left flank, he would be moving further away from Richmond. Both armies had been preparing fallback positions for the defenses, Lee's were the strongest that would be seen (Other than Washington DC) until the siege really got going around Petersburg, while Johnston's were less massive, but based on good high ground.
I have always thought that Johnston got the shaft for that campaign, I believe he did a masterful job of delaying the single most powerful force in the Union Army for as long as he did. The Army of Tennessee was qualitatively, probably the best army on either side in the war at this point. Well led, very well equipped, and extremely powerful.
"I started out this morning with the determination to be a hell of a man. I've been a hell of a fellow long enough. If anybody else wants to be a hell of a fellow, I've no objections. But it's too damned risky."-Lt. Nicholas Day-Seige of Port Hudson
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Capt Henry
Antietam - Due to a staff officer, Lee doesn't have much choice about fighting but does pick a good position. Of course, he doesn't have many options if he does not retreat.
Lee picked a really horrible position. He had his back to a major river, so if things went wrong and he needed to retreat, he was going to end up leaving basically everything on the field. His right flank was "covered" by a very shallow stream that could have been forded at nearly any point. If Burnside had bothered to check, that flank would have been crushed, and Lee's army would have been trapped since Burnside would have been astride the only easy crossing for Lee to retreat across. As it was, only the incredible timing of AP Hill kept the CSA from losing that road. The approaches on the left flank were somewhat covered also. One reason the fighting got so thick there was that the Union troops were able to advance with partial to total cover until the range was appallingly short. Course, this advantage evaporated fairly quickly as the fire took down most of that cover. All in all, Lee was amazingly lucky that he didn't lose his entire force in this fight. Against any general who could coordinate attacks, and actually use a reserve, he would have been crushed. As it was, he stayed on the field the next day ans was willing to fight again with his decimated army, and Little Mac had a completely fresh corps he could have thrown in if he had chosen to continue it.
"I started out this morning with the determination to be a hell of a man. I've been a hell of a fellow long enough. If anybody else wants to be a hell of a fellow, I've no objections. But it's too damned risky."-Lt. Nicholas Day-Seige of Port Hudson
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Icedawg
I guess my 19th Century American History professor was way off then. That class was about 40-50% devoted to the Civil War and one of the key points I took out of that class was that Lee extended the war greatly by being very selective about when he would stand and fight. This selectivity is what caused Lincoln's frustration with his Eastern Theater commanders. They were unable to successfully deal the "knock out blow" to crush the ANV.
Maybe the professor didn't know what he was talking about or maybe I was too often too hung over in class to keep things straight. (I suspect it may have been the latter. College was a bit too much fun I guess. [:D])
I think part of the problem wasn't that Lee picked such great times and places, it was more along the lines of the fact that he would always attack in what seemed like the worst possible times. When you KNOW you have a huge advantage on an enemy, and you expect him to fall back in order to avoid being crushed (Hooker at Chancellorsville), then instead he turns and attacks, you have to wonder just what the hell this guy knows that I don't. Did he get reinforced? Did I leave a hole in my dispositions that he's going to take advantage of? Lee's sheer aggressiveness just took each and every opponent out of his plan up until he finally met a general as aggressive as he was, and one who understood modern war better than anyone before him had.
"I started out this morning with the determination to be a hell of a man. I've been a hell of a fellow long enough. If anybody else wants to be a hell of a fellow, I've no objections. But it's too damned risky."-Lt. Nicholas Day-Seige of Port Hudson
RE: Historical Questions
Wonderful thread, but one thing struck me:
This is what is popularly believed, but I've read several sources that indicate that Stuart was NOT purposefully show-boating, but was simply cut off from the ANV due to a vast underestimation of their reaction speed.
All through 1862, the AoP army averaged about 6 miles per day. This had been the norm for the entire war up until this point. Meade's march north, moving his supply train aside and sending troops first, covered over 20 miles per day!
Stuart was not out having a good time showing off, he was struggling for his survival. Cavalry could not sustain a 20-30 mile per day march any more than infantry could, and since he found himself cut off from the ANV, he had to keep moving to get around to link up with Ewell. His orders from both Lee and Longstreet actually encouraged him to move between the AoP and Washington:
And in fact, there wasn't really anywhere else for him to cross the Potomac...he couldn't go west of South Mountain, he'd be competing for roads with the Infantry. He couldn't cross east of South Mountain, as the AoP held the crossings. His only hope of getting in to Maryland and linking up on Ewell's right was to move 'behind' the AoP.
In other words, Stuart simply followed orders.
The rapid re-deployment of the AoP was completely unexpected by anyone in the ANV (an in fact, Lee did not believe the entire AoP was present even on Jul 3, which is likely his reason for being over-aggressive).
Stuart's men 'borrowed' horses from the Maryland and Pennsylvania countryside to keep up the pace, and many were riding plow-horses.
Stuart was no more a victim of the unanticipated rapid movement of the AoP than the other ANV generals. He'd followed his orders, and pushed his division to it's limits to do so despite extremely adverse conditions. He did an admirable job.
I love General Lee, but something has bothered me for some time...why weren't the cavalary brigades left to screen the mountain passes to the south called up to screen/scout east of the ANV after Harrison's reports were received? Had Lee not steadfastly waited for Stuart to report, but instead used his other cavalry forces to develop a more clear picture of the AoP's movements he might not have been sucked in to a fight on ground he didn't choose.
As to the original topic, I don't think it would take much longer for northern industry to build 6 cannon (edit: or southern, for that matter...or to just buy some from England
) than it would to build a thousand muskets. The training for artillerymen would be considerably longer, but who says they have to be trained on the exact pieces they're going to serve? Perhaps the Army has some 'training' pieces that they teach folks on, then it takes a few weeks to put the men and the equipment together.
but that was more or less only due to the fact that JEB Stuart was off showboating rather than doing his job of scouting/screening.
This is what is popularly believed, but I've read several sources that indicate that Stuart was NOT purposefully show-boating, but was simply cut off from the ANV due to a vast underestimation of their reaction speed.
All through 1862, the AoP army averaged about 6 miles per day. This had been the norm for the entire war up until this point. Meade's march north, moving his supply train aside and sending troops first, covered over 20 miles per day!
Stuart was not out having a good time showing off, he was struggling for his survival. Cavalry could not sustain a 20-30 mile per day march any more than infantry could, and since he found himself cut off from the ANV, he had to keep moving to get around to link up with Ewell. His orders from both Lee and Longstreet actually encouraged him to move between the AoP and Washington:
"If you find that he [Hooker] is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General [Richard] Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."
Lee
"I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the enemy."
Longstreet
And in fact, there wasn't really anywhere else for him to cross the Potomac...he couldn't go west of South Mountain, he'd be competing for roads with the Infantry. He couldn't cross east of South Mountain, as the AoP held the crossings. His only hope of getting in to Maryland and linking up on Ewell's right was to move 'behind' the AoP.
In other words, Stuart simply followed orders.
The rapid re-deployment of the AoP was completely unexpected by anyone in the ANV (an in fact, Lee did not believe the entire AoP was present even on Jul 3, which is likely his reason for being over-aggressive).
Early in Stuart's march, he captured a Union wagon train. Many historians criticize Stuart for keeping this train, which supposedly slowed his march. What is seldom mentioned is that a primary cargo of this train was oats. If one grazes the horses on grass, one needs five hours of grazing a day, and one can't push the horses too hard for two hours after they graze. A wagon train full of oats allowed more time on the march. While a fully rested pure cavalry column can outpace a wagon train, Stuart's mounts were exhausted by the time they captured the oats, and were likely not slowed by the train. The combined column, with the wagon train and its oats, moved 15, 30, 22 and 26 (as the crow flies) miles in subsequent days. They fought at Westminster, Hanover, Carlisle and Gettysburg. This was a pace sufficient to kill horses. It was not a joyride.
Stuart's men 'borrowed' horses from the Maryland and Pennsylvania countryside to keep up the pace, and many were riding plow-horses.
Stuart was no more a victim of the unanticipated rapid movement of the AoP than the other ANV generals. He'd followed his orders, and pushed his division to it's limits to do so despite extremely adverse conditions. He did an admirable job.
I love General Lee, but something has bothered me for some time...why weren't the cavalary brigades left to screen the mountain passes to the south called up to screen/scout east of the ANV after Harrison's reports were received? Had Lee not steadfastly waited for Stuart to report, but instead used his other cavalry forces to develop a more clear picture of the AoP's movements he might not have been sucked in to a fight on ground he didn't choose.
As to the original topic, I don't think it would take much longer for northern industry to build 6 cannon (edit: or southern, for that matter...or to just buy some from England
) than it would to build a thousand muskets. The training for artillerymen would be considerably longer, but who says they have to be trained on the exact pieces they're going to serve? Perhaps the Army has some 'training' pieces that they teach folks on, then it takes a few weeks to put the men and the equipment together. "La Garde meurt, elle ne se rend pas!"
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: MrBoats
... Grant would have held his ground against Lee. So many of the eastern battles saw the Union commanders yield the battlefield prematurely. McClellan could have turned on Lee on the Peninsula after Malvern Hill or unleashed a fresh corps at Antietam. Hooker should have stood his ground at Chancellorsville. Meade might well have bagged the ANV after Gettysburg ...
Would, could, should, might, but didn't because Lee, like Rommel, had an almost supernatural effect on the enemy whenever his name was evoked in their ranks.
I recall Grant was so beside himself over Lee's effect on his troops morale that he said his men should "stop asking what Bobbie Lee was going to do to them, but what we were going to do to him," or words to that effect.
It's certainly an advantage when a commander has a reputation that preceeds him before he even sets foot on the battlefield.
Stratford, Connecticut, U.S.A.[center]
[/center]
[center]"The Angel of Okinawa"[/center]
Home of the Chance-Vought Corsair, F4U
The best fighter-bomber of World War II
[/center][center]"The Angel of Okinawa"[/center]
Home of the Chance-Vought Corsair, F4U
The best fighter-bomber of World War II
RE: Historical Questions
ORIGINAL: Malagant
I love General Lee, but something has bothered me for some time...why weren't the cavalary brigades left to screen the mountain passes to the south called up to screen/scout east of the ANV after Harrison's reports were received? Had Lee not steadfastly waited for Stuart to report, but instead used his other cavalry forces to develop a more clear picture of the AoP's movements he might not have been sucked in to a fight on ground he didn't choose.
From what I remember reading, over time he came to rely on Stuart too much. If the info wasn't from Jeb, it didn't get the same amount of trust.
Watched a documentary on beavers. Best dam documentary I've ever seen.
RE: Historical Questions
I want to respond to a few points.
Training artillery crews doesn't require a new gun for every new crew. Multiple crews can take turns practicing on a single gun. Production is somewhat abstracted. A cannon foundry would work on a longer contract and produce a steady stream of guns over a period of time. However it seems right to me that a gun could be produced from scratch in far less than a month at a properly tooled factory.
The often made claim that southern boys were better with rifles than northern boys is not entirely fair. A man from Michigan was just as likely to own a gun and hunt as a man from Mississippi. The claim that southerners were better may have been true at 1st Mannassass if the AoP was drawn mostly from major cities in the Northeast. But, it was surely not true for all areas of the war and at all times. Perhaps the reason the Union did so well in the west is that Midwesterners were somewhat better than city slickers from the east.
In '61 when many soldiers were using private weapons resupply was not that much more difficult. The same powder and precussion caps work with any gun. If some of the guns were the wrong caliber it would be hard to provide them with Minnie balls, but ordinary balls can be melted at any campsite with simple tools.
I don't know if Lee should have the stubborn trait. But Chancellorsville is the best example. He gambled everything, and he could have been crushed if the AoP attacked his position.