ORIGINAL: mdiehl
And regularly did same.
Well, as "regularly" as Tigers showed up anyway. There weren´t really that many of them in the West between 1943 and 1945. High point is probably Normandy (around a 100 all told over the entire fight).
Moderator: maddog986
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
And regularly did same.
But nowhere near as "regularly" as might have been liked.
The 76mm would still be in service today if folks round here ran the ordnance board.
I don't have time tonight to get back into this one fully, hope to get chance tomorrow, but I wanted to say thanks for the extensive Hunnicut excerpt.
Secondly, you were not so rhetorically devious as to leave out
ORIGINAL: Big B
As for the Tiger I
Conclusion: The Successes and Failures of the PzKpfw VI Tiger I
Anyway, the maximum degree of success attained by the Tiger units was limited and/or localized tactical superiority. The truth was that the German industry simply couldn't produce Tigers in sufficient numbers to make any difference in the big picture -
The Sherman however DID win it's war...
By the way – the Matilda II was single handedly responsible for winning the Western destert Campaign in 1940 and destroying the will of an entire Italian Army.
The M1A1 Abrahms did much the same to to Iraq in 1991.
What great achievement did German heavy armor achieve to rank with those above?...
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
But nowhere near as "regularly" as might have been liked.
Panthers drivetrains didn't function correctly "as often as might be liked" yet they are the paragon of virtue.
The 76mm would still be in service today if folks round here ran the ordnance board.
I told the story, the Board did what the board did. Fault them if you will - but they were trying to pursue the sort of "listen to the guys who been there" that you supposedly support.
I don't have time tonight to get back into this one fully, hope to get chance tomorrow, but I wanted to say thanks for the extensive Hunnicut excerpt.
I have no reason to do else but lay the facts out and let them fall where they may...
Secondly, you were not so rhetorically devious as to leave out
I also stopped beating my wife...[:'(]
The gist of the whole thing is, in a perfect hindsight we would have ser up a production line to build 17lbers. When we didn't do that in 1942 and chose instead to modify the 90mm AA for at use (not an absurd decision on its face), we were stuck with the 90, or 76. We also made the decision in 42 the M6 was not as good as 2 Shermans (another decision not absurd) and that development of the T26 (M26) would be required to meet projected enemy threats (yet again hardly absurd).
The effort on the 90 was focused on the Pershing (ANOTHER decision that is not absurd) vice both the Pershing and the Sherman - but a shift back to modding the Sherman set back the M26 at least 6 mos and development issues another few. . So we had the 3in/76. Better guns cannot be extruded from people's buttock's, so we made the best we could of getting the 76 integrated into the Sherman once, that was deemed to be too "improvised". They went back and "did right" - by that time it was nearly OBE. Had everything worked as expected,and the focused stayed on M4 +TD in Medium units, and M26s in Heavy units we would have had several hundred Pershings in theater in time for Cobra, if not for D-Day itself.
"The Plan" was not a bad one. - the notion of tanl regiments having a company of Pershings for CObra - or even at the Bulge - would likely have prevented only a few Sherman losses - though likely would have meant higher casualties to Tiget and Panther units. That Heavy German tanks could knock out a disproportionate number of Medium tanks is unlikely to have changed significantly unless we had field a large number of heavy tanks of our own - decsiosn made ofr logistical reasons, that one can debate, but was hardly stupid.
That when faced by their equvalent they did well belies the notion that somehow the Sherman was "not capable" - despite the fact it was not designed to fight heavy tanks. again my naval equivalent - did tin can sailoirs bitch when they had to go up agaisnt heavy and light cruisers - sure, but they did their duty anyway and 40-knot Burke was legend, despite having to write a LOT of letters to the bereaved. Did the fact a Jap light cruiser outgunned a Fletcher make the Fletcher "crap" or the decision to field so many a bad one?
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
The gist of the whole thing is, in a perfect hindsight we would have ser up a production line to build 17lbers. When we didn't do that in 1942 and chose instead to modify the 90mm AA for at use (not an absurd decision on its face), we were stuck with the 90, or 76. We also made the decision in 42 the M6 was not as good as 2 Shermans (another decision not absurd) and that development of the T26 (M26) would be required to meet projected enemy threats (yet again hardly absurd).
The effort on the 90 was focused on the Pershing (ANOTHER decision that is not absurd) vice both the Pershing and the Sherman - but a shift back to modding the Sherman set back the M26 at least 6 mos and development issues another few. . So we had the 3in/76. Better guns cannot be extruded from people's buttock's, so we made the best we could of getting the 76 integrated into the Sherman once, that was deemed to be too "improvised". They went back and "did right" - by that time it was nearly OBE. Had everything worked as expected,and the focused stayed on M4 +TD in Medium units, and M26s in Heavy units we would have had several hundred Pershings in theater in time for Cobra, if not for D-Day itself.
"The Plan" was not a bad one. - the notion of tanl regiments having a company of Pershings for CObra - or even at the Bulge - would likely have prevented only a few Sherman losses - though likely would have meant higher casualties to Tiget and Panther units. That Heavy German tanks could knock out a disproportionate number of Medium tanks is unlikely to have changed significantly unless we had field a large number of heavy tanks of our own - decsiosn made ofr logistical reasons, that one can debate, but was hardly stupid.
That when faced by their equvalent they did well belies the notion that somehow the Sherman was "not capable" - despite the fact it was not designed to fight heavy tanks. again my naval equivalent - did tin can sailoirs bitch when they had to go up agaisnt heavy and light cruisers - sure, but they did their duty anyway and 40-knot Burke was legend, despite having to write a LOT of letters to the bereaved. Did the fact a Jap light cruiser outgunned a Fletcher make the Fletcher "crap" or the decision to field so many a bad one?
Not 40,000 T-34s and 49,000 Shermans - those were good tanks produced in enough numbers to crush Germany and actually win a war - not just play 'king of this bridge or that hill" [:-][;)]ORIGINAL: Speedy
If that's so Demo then the same can be said by any other AFV....[8|]
Compare that to the automotive reliability of a Sherman and you can begin to see that there is more to a good AFV than it's gun or armor - it also has to be able move great distances and keep running.However, the Tiger I was not free from problems either, and the most common were those related to the transmission - the weight of the Tiger was too much for the German transmissions available at the time, so Henschel designed a special one to work with the Maybach gearbox with eight forward speeds. The result was a surprisingly light set of controls for the driver, but that had a tendency to breakdowns, if adequate periodic preventive maintenance was not done. Since it was not always possible to do this preventive maintenance as required, many Tigers broke down and had to be destroyed and then abandoned. That fact is evidenced by the following excerpt from the Experience Report of the Tiger Abteilung 506, dated 15 January 1944: "During long term operations, which stretched over 12 days, time for care and maintenance of the Tigers was too short and losses were correspondingly high. On 2 January 1944, the Abteilung went into action with 13 Panzers. Not a single Tiger was still operational on the evening of 14 January. The last two Tigers had driven a distance of about 340 kilometers. Without being given any time for care and servicing, most of them managed to cover 250 kilometers" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).
I haven't read many { or indeed any } combat reports or biographies of German tankers asking thier commanders to be allowed to swap thier mkv + vi for Shermans. { where is the 'give me a squadron of spitfires' quote?}
ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
And regularly did same.
Well, as "regularly" as Tigers showed up anyway. There weren´t really that many of them in the West between 1943 and 1945. High point is probably Normandy (around a 100 all told over the entire fight).
ORIGINAL: Big B
The fact is, Tigers were effective Tank Destroyers, but lousy ..."tanks".
I quote"Compare that to the automotive reliability of a Sherman and you can begin to see that there is more to a good AFV than it's gun or armor - it also has to be able move great distances and keep running.However, the Tiger I was not free from problems either, and the most common were those related to the transmission - the weight of the Tiger was too much for the German transmissions available at the time, so Henschel designed a special one to work with the Maybach gearbox with eight forward speeds. The result was a surprisingly light set of controls for the driver, but that had a tendency to breakdowns, if adequate periodic preventive maintenance was not done. Since it was not always possible to do this preventive maintenance as required, many Tigers broke down and had to be destroyed and then abandoned. That fact is evidenced by the following excerpt from the Experience Report of the Tiger Abteilung 506, dated 15 January 1944: "During long term operations, which stretched over 12 days, time for care and maintenance of the Tigers was too short and losses were correspondingly high. On 2 January 1944, the Abteilung went into action with 13 Panzers. Not a single Tiger was still operational on the evening of 14 January. The last two Tigers had driven a distance of about 340 kilometers. Without being given any time for care and servicing, most of them managed to cover 250 kilometers" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).
(Oh, and Panthers were worse in this respect than Tigers...throughout the war).
ORIGINAL: Big B
The Sherman was not at all obsolescent in 1944 - your are just comparing it to tanks out of it's class.ORIGINAL: IronDuk
...
The Sherman wasn't crap in 42/43, it was just relatively obselete by 1944.
The majority of German tanks in 1944 were still PZ IVs' and STG III's, and the M4 Sherman never had a problem dealing with these types.
Tigers and Panthers are another story, they are not 30 ton medium tanks - and even the T-34 (rated by many as the best tank design of WWII) had the same difficulties with these heavier German tanks.
Saying the M4 Sherman was obsolete because of difficulties in dealing with Tigers and Panthers - is no diferent than saying a Panther was obsolete, or a poor design, because it couldn't effectively deal with a JS III.
B
ORIGINAL: hawker
According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), "The Tiger's armor was invulnerable to attack from most tank guns firing normal armor-piercing shells or shot at ranges over 800 meters, including the American 75 mm and the Russian 76 mm. It is obvious that the 17-pdr. firing normal APCBC rounds could defeat the frontal armor of the Tiger I at most combat ranges for tank vs. tank actions in Europe. However, by 23 June 1944, only 109 Shermans with 17-pdrs. had landed in France along with six replacements. By the end of the war, on 5 May 1945, the British 21st Army Group possessed 1,235 Sherman tanks with 17-pdrs., while the remaining 1,915 Sherman tanks were all equipped with the 75 mm M3 gun".
The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but edit...
ORIGINAL: IronDuke
What makes German maneouver in the later years stand out though is surprise. Ardennes, the Gran, etc, they start a concealed offensive. Where did they manoeuver a la Mansteins backhand?
ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen
Where did they have the necessary room to maneuver in? Manstein could maneuver as he did because the forde to space ratio was low as a reult of soviet overextension.
If they can prepare, they can husband enough to get going, but there was no chance of a fluid battle given the fuel and air situation.
Or the size of the enemy opposition, which is either high form the get go (Operation Konrad, The Lorraine Battles) or becomes so within a week due to superior operational mobility (The Bulge for instance).
One time they quickly tried to operationally redeploy to meet a battlefield situation was at Mortain and that ended in tears, first because of air power, and secondly because they didn't have fuel enough left to retreat hard enough.
Also because the US units engaged shot the pants of their german opposites [:'(]. The stopping of Market garden and the attempted stopping of Pattons rampage in lorraine might also qualify as "operational redeployment" of significant assets in the west (at least if we don´t count armour as the sole measuring stick of "operational redeployment).
Since you ask, here it is: http://www.fprado.com/armorsite/tiger1.htmORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: Big B
The fact is, Tigers were effective Tank Destroyers, but lousy ..."tanks".
I quote"Compare that to the automotive reliability of a Sherman and you can begin to see that there is more to a good AFV than it's gun or armor - it also has to be able move great distances and keep running.However, the Tiger I was not free from problems either, and the most common were those related to the transmission - the weight of the Tiger was too much for the German transmissions available at the time, so Henschel designed a special one to work with the Maybach gearbox with eight forward speeds. The result was a surprisingly light set of controls for the driver, but that had a tendency to breakdowns, if adequate periodic preventive maintenance was not done. Since it was not always possible to do this preventive maintenance as required, many Tigers broke down and had to be destroyed and then abandoned. That fact is evidenced by the following excerpt from the Experience Report of the Tiger Abteilung 506, dated 15 January 1944: "During long term operations, which stretched over 12 days, time for care and maintenance of the Tigers was too short and losses were correspondingly high. On 2 January 1944, the Abteilung went into action with 13 Panzers. Not a single Tiger was still operational on the evening of 14 January. The last two Tigers had driven a distance of about 340 kilometers. Without being given any time for care and servicing, most of them managed to cover 250 kilometers" (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.).
(Oh, and Panthers were worse in this respect than Tigers...throughout the war).
I understood they weren't after the initial issues were ironed out, but am willing to look at any evidence anyone has.
The only german tank that was faster than the Tiger I was the Panther, with a road speed of 46 km/h and a cross country speed of 24 km/h. But, overall, the Panther was not more reliable than the Tiger I, and the Tiger I had better protection than any Panther model, due to the quality and thickness of its armor, relative to the opponents tank and anti-tank guns calibers and penetration power. The table below demonstrate that the percentage of Tigers operational at the Front was about equal to the PzKpfw. IV and as good as or better than the Panther.
Percentage Operational At The Front:
EASTERN FRONT / WESTERN FRONT
Pz IV Panther Tiger Pz IV Panther Tiger
31 May44 84 77 79 88 82 87
15 Sep44 65 72 70 80 74 98
30 Sep44 65 60 81 50 57 67
31 Oct44 52 53 54 74 85 88
15 Nov44 72 66 61 78 71 81
30 Nov44 78 67 72 76 71 45
15 Dec44 79 69 79 78 71 64
30 Dec44 72 61 80 63 53 50
15 Jan45 71 60 73 56 45 58
15 Mar45 54 49 53 44 32 36
Overall 68 62 70 71 65 65
Source : JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; ISBN 0-7643-0225-6
Kelley's Heroes was a funny picture[:D] But to the point - they made a point of saying that Oddball's tank had a 76, but in fact the vehicle was a 75 model with extra pipe added to the tube. Moreover, since the "soft" rear of a real Tiger IE is 82mm and the same as the sides - it would have made no diference attacking from the rear in reality - and the "point blank in a$$" in real life would have ment at 100 yards or so anywhere but the front for a common 75mm Sherman.ORIGINAL: IronDuke
ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
And regularly did same.
Well, as "regularly" as Tigers showed up anyway. There weren´t really that many of them in the West between 1943 and 1945. High point is probably Normandy (around a 100 all told over the entire fight).
Indeed, and many of those would have faced the Commonwealth forces where they would have been bested by the 17 pdr.
If memory serves, Kelly's battlegroup did meet one outside the bank and Oddball's Sherman had a few issues if memory serves, but don't quote me since it was 20 years ago when I read the AAR and he may have been using a 75 and/or had none of the gold dust HVAP available. [;)]
Paul,
Whenever "is A better than B" gives a "complex" answer, the reality is that it was a bit narrower than everyone thought IMHO.
ORIGINAL: Paul Vebber
Complex enough to have a nearly 600 page book written about the "rest of the story" Usualy when "A is better than " is assumed cut and dried, its by someone examining the case in hindsight IMHO.
If the AORG had tested the Sherman 76 or 75 against the Panther 75, there would have been nothing complex about the answer, would there?
Hunnicuts book never references any of the datasheets to AORG reports. Given the 17lber was only slightly inferior tothe Panther 75 one would think it would have been a no brainer to just install it, no? Well in the wordsof Hunnicutt:
I'm not extrapoloating anything, its just that I seem to be the only one listening to the Americans on the ground (despite not speaking the language) whilst everyone else tries to tell me everything was fine (albeit only in a complex sense on paper. )
The Sherman wasn't crap in 42/43, it was just relatively obselete by 1944.
So then you must consider the Panther to be a similar failure, as its early mechanical unreliability resulted in "Germans on the ground" bemoaning its inability to get to battle, and its late armor quality problems that resulted in "Germans on the ground" decrying its vulnerability to 122 and 152 HE. IF "users on the ground" complaining about a weapon are grounds to consider it crap (your words) than pretty much every weapon made has been 'crap' in someone's eyes. Those of us not "listening" are not trying to say 'everything was fine' just that RELATIVE to other SIMILAR vehicles (ie medium tanks) the Sherman was one of the better examples, all things considered, of the war.
The 75 M4 was a decent vehicle compared to the MKIII and MKIV Panzers, the Valentine series, and the early T-34s. The 76mm was comparable to the Cromwell, the late MKIV Panzers, and was comparable the T-34/85 (very good specimins of which were better, but production quality varied so much that a great deal of them were not due to flawed armor, defective power trains and bad lots of ammo.) Its continued modification and performance in the Arab Isreali wars demonstrated it was hardly obsolete.
Interestingly, much of the delay getting the 76mm fielded was taken up problems identified by perhaps too much "listening to the gripes of troops on the ground". While in hindsight a singular focus on "hole-punching" while ignoring the other issues that may have prevented that capability from being effectively used was a Hobson's choice. Rushing the 76 out would likely have resulted in troops on the ground complaining about poor rate of fire, turret freezing in rough terrain, and inability to effectively taget after the first few rounds.
Is it better to have guns that can hit the target with marignal effectiveness or a gun that can penetrate, if you can get a hit, but for which that is a more difficult task? And given the problem was engaging enemy heavy tanks, where does the decision to abandon the M6 Heavy tank - a decision that implicitly accepted the risk of sending more medium tanks which could be assumed to find themselves up agaisnt enemy heavy tanks? Would it have been better, rather than using tank destroyers in independant battalions (later companies) or say attach a platoon of them to each tank company? By the time the answers were understood, the war would be over before they could be fielded. And one can't discount the fact that Sherman armored forces in North Africa and Italy wer nonetheless successful at driving the Germans back.
Was the Sherman perfect? Hardly, but neither were any of the other tanks its comparable to.
ORIGINAL: mdiehl
I haven't read many { or indeed any } combat reports or biographies of German tankers asking thier commanders to be allowed to swap thier mkv + vi for Shermans. { where is the 'give me a squadron of spitfires' quote?}
I haven't read any biographies where German tankers requested to pull a TOW missile out of their Bag of Holding either. Was "here's a captured Sherman, now go find some ammo for it, or else you can drive this [insert any German AFV here]" ever a choice?
The more relevant question would be this one: "Would you rather have one PzVIE, or a PzIVJ and three other PzIVJs fighting along side you?" I wonder what German tankers would have thought if offered that choice.