Proposal for CHS - Remove the Zero bonus. Any opinions?

[mogami]

Hi, You should really go rent the movie "Zero" it will make you cry from laughing too hard.
Watch for that first US Army pilot in P-40 when he sees the A6M2 for first time (He is even wearing a flying scarf)

From Stomp Tokyo review (Movie is also known as "Zero burns" and "Zero aflame"

"From the creators of Godzilla comes this epic that attempts to tell the entire history of Japan's participation in World War II from the perspective of an airplane. Not a single airplane, but rather a type of airplane. That airplane is the Japanese Zero fighter, which was a technological marvel when it first entered combat. Apparently this was a great surprise to the Americans in the film, one of whom declares, "[Japan] can't make what we would call a good car!""

[mdiehl]

We've debated the relative merits of the Zero vs Wildcat ad nauseum. When compared to the Wildcat, the Zero was the better fighter for air combat maneuvering.

That statement in that simplistic form is at worst flatly wrong and at best misleading. At all airspeeds the F4F had a higher roll rate, which is one important component of maneuver. At high airspeeds, the F4F had a greater roll rate, smaller turning radius, and greater turn rate per second. Your statement is only partially true (never correct for roll rate) and only true at airspeeds on the order of 270 mph or slower.

The majority of US Wildcat pilots who engaged the Zero at Coral Sea and Midway all stated that the Zero was by far the better perfoming aircraft.

And by many standards it in fact was. That nevertheless did not result in the Zero enjoying *ANY* period of marked success against the wildcat. Which goes back to my original point. Guys like you maintain that the Zeke was a better plane, and the Japanese pilots better pilots, but those two statements are contradicted by the results of air to air combat.

The only advantage the Wildcat had over the Zero in this regard was a faster dive speed.

That is incorrect. F4F had better dive characteristics, superior roll rate, and better maneuverability at speeds in excess of about 279 mph. The F4F was also substantially more rugged in construction, had armor, self sealing tanks, and better armament.

One on one, the Zero was able to best any early war opponent. That is because they Japanese were dictating the terms of the fight.

That statement is incorrect. At Pearl Harbor two P36s bested several Zeroes. Among the AVG aircraft with better maneuverability than the Zero (Oscar) were consistently the losers against the P-40. In combats in SE Asia that I have been able to track, P-40s did well when they did not have substantial positional disadvantage. The fact is that only the faster aircraft can ever "control the fight" because only it can choose to disengage. The P40 (all marks) was simply faster than the A6M. What mattered most was how you used the aircraft. When the F4F and P40 were flown to their strengths, they were simply better aircraft than the A6M.

It doesn't matter how much firepower your aircraft has if it's unable to put those weapons on the target.

Fortunately the F4F had a superior roll rate and USN training at deflection shooting was vastly superior to anything that the Japanese had encountered. As a result, it was often the case that even at modest airspeeds F4Fs were able to put six guns on a Zero before it could out-turn the F4F. Indeed, the Zero pilots had a tendency to rely on the Zero's superior low airspeed high angle of attack stall ("non-stall" is a better description) characteristics to disengage an Allied plane. It worked well against Chinese pilots in 1936. In 1942 it often simply killed the Japanese pilot, because going vertical too close in front of an F4F was a very dangerous thing to do, even for very brief intervals. This was a consequence of the intersection of excellent USN/USMC training in deflection shooting, the fragility of the Zero, and the substantial damage that a .50cal could inflict in a very brief interval of time.

It's a poor weapons system when its best advantage is to dive away from combat. Put it this way, one on one, which fighter will achieve a kill position more often?

By the results, clearly the F4F was in a killing position more often than not. But your understanding (or at least characterization) of the F4F's flight characteristics is something with which I cannot agree because many USN pilots commented on the relative ability of the F4F to outroll a Zeke and outmaneuver it at high speed.

It was the early superiority of their Zero, the lack of knowledge of US pilots in combatting it and the inpreparedness of the US that allowed for its successes.

The Zero did not enjoy any substantial interval of success against the Wildcat unless "breaking even" is the standard for success.

US pilots had it drummed into them that if they wanted to survive, they had to use mutually supporting tactics. But in early 1942, US forces were still operating under their flawed peacetime fighter doctrine that emphasized classic dogfight tactics.

That is inocrrect insofar as USN/USMC pilots go. There are numerous accounts of USN/USMC training in tactical doctrine in 1941 emphasizing mutual support. I have not been able to determine what USAAF standards of the day were though, so you might be correct insofar as USAAF doctrine (excepting the AVG of course) goes.

But they learned rather quickly that fighting to Zero on its terms would result in higher losses regardless of the tactics used. Coral Sea and Midway showed that the Zero's could be neutralized through mutually supporting tatics.

Coral Sea and Midway were the first substantial engagements between the F4F and the A6M. From what other battles do you imagine the USN pilots learned to their discontent about the Zeke's capabilities? That is my point. Apart from Wake (a bunch of F4Fs horridly outnumbered and caught taking off in Dec 1941) there WERE no prior engagements between F4Fs and A6Ms. And when they met, the F4Fs immediately fought the Zero to a draw or better. Clearly the prewar USN doctrine had an immediate payoff.

As it was they barely held their own.

Well, it can only be said of the A6M that it also barely held its own, at least at Guadalcanal. In the CV vs CV engagements, the F4F *defeated the Zero* several times.

And if it hadn't been for the robustness of the Wildcat and the fragility of the Zero, the loss rate would have been considerably higher.

Agreed.

When all was said and done, it was the dedication of the pilots and the evolution of their tactical doctrine that allowed US pilots to survive the early battles and begin dealing crippling losses to the enemy as the year wore on.

They inflicted crippling losses on the Japanese in every engagement other than Wake Island on 12 Dec 1941. If yours is supposed to be an argument in favor of a Zero bonus, the most favorable evidence for the Japanese only warrants a 1-day bonus.

Your use of mid-late 1942 statistics to justify the removal of the ZB is flawed.

Your claim to Japanese superiority against the F4F is flawed because there are no data of any kind at all to support your claim. It is true that the only stats I have offered are derived from April 1942 onward. On the other hand, there are no stats from any time during the war that logically support your claims or any argument for a Zero bonus.

I really don't care so long as the total WitP OOB is also adjusted to reflect the true historical picture.

I agree. The true historical picture would, all othe rthings being equal, have Wildcates defeating Zeroes at a consistent and slightly favorable (to the Wildcat) loss ratio of somewhere from 1.0:1.0 or 1.2:1.0.

And that would certainly have a far greater negative impact on the allied forces than the Japanese.

Beyond mere faith in the mystical cult of the Zero there is no basis for that allegation.

For instance, VF-6 Wildcats should have their armor rating removed and durability dropped due to no self-sealing tanks.

The armor was in the pilot seat. The self sealing tanks were indeed more easily combusted, but then you'd also consider that the F4F-3 (which was the early variant) was substantially faster and more maneuverable than the F4F4. It had an even greater roll rate. As I understand it in WitP abstracts self sealing tanks and armor as "armor." So VF6's planes should have more armor than any A6M2.

I can go on and on. How nit-picky do you want to get?

Go into as much detail as you like. If you can divine the way that the game designers indexed these things in such a way as to come up with an "MVR" rating or a "durability" or "armor" rating your observations might become important. And while we're nitpicking the F4F we can do the same for the Zero, because the A6M2 also had various improvements installed by August 1942 that were not otherwise present in December 1941.

You state that the USN carriers should be able to go one on one against a Japanese fleet CV in 1941 and early 42 yet you have no data to justify your opinion.

Actually there is plenty of data. On the face of it the US CVs were slightly more robust (excepting possibly Shokaku and Zuikaku), had faster arming and loading and turn around times for conducting strikes, had radar (albeit early forms), IFF, and more planes. Since there is no operational evidence to indicate that the Japanese CVs otherwise were likely to turn in a better performance than the USN ones, I can't see why anyone would object to my claim.

All I see is a consistent pattern of faith in the cult of Japanese fanhood. Yours (and others) arguments simply reduces to this syllogism. (1) The stats I (mdiehl) quote fall outside of the scope of the ZB in the game. (2) Therefore you must be correct even though you have no data to support your claim.

It is a very strange, base, and non-Cartesian form of pseudo reasoning that assumes that NO DATA is a superior platform for drawing your conclusions than SOME data from the tail end of the time frame in question that I use to draw my conclusions.

This is the Marshall Islands raid on 1 February 1942, specifically the attack on Taroa. Wildcats managed to surprise 2 Claudes who were not aware of the attack but succeeded in only shooting down only 1 and damaging the other.

That'd be a divide by Zero error (hehehe) if you tried to calculate a kill ratio, depending on what you use for the numerator. Expressed as Japanese lost vs USN lost that would be a kill ratio with an asymptotic limit approaching infinity. Expressed as USN lost vs Japanese it would be 0:1. Either way, that combat stands in favor of the USN.

They were not intercepted before or after releasing their bombs. No hits were obtained but one bomb fell close enough to kill one sailor, injure 7 others and start a gasoline fire. One Nell, after releasing its bombs, pulled up sharply and attempted to dive into the deck of the Enterprise. It just missed but its wing cut a SBD in half on the flight deck.

Which has nothing whatsoever to do with the F4F as a plane or its pilots so much as size and position of CAP. In the February (IIRC, maybe March) Rabaul Raid 17 of 18 Betties were destroyed. No one has said that the Japanese lost every day, but lose they did, consistently, vs the USN.

Halsey's After Action Report specifically states "The inability of the 5" AA battery to knock down the formation of enemy twin-engine bombers ... is a matter of grave concern. ... AA Gunnery Practices [should] be scheduled when opportunity offers, with ship steaming at not less than 25 knots. If adequate safeguards can be introduced, ship should be required to make radical changes of course."

Which of course has nothing to do with the subject to hand. At the time, IJN AAA was every bit as woeful. Unlike the USN, however, IJN AAA remained horrid throughout the war.

But let's look at the next day's action. Here you have 2 US CVs facing off against 2 IJN CVs. We know the result. Lexington sunk, Yorktown moderately damaged. Shokaku badly damaged but Zuikaku unscathed. Both airgroups were decimated, Yorktown having only 4 operational fighters left at the end of the battle.

Shokaku's and Zuikaku's airgroups decimated. Shokaku very badly damaged. Shoho sunk. Yorktown damaged but not so badly as to prevent her from being operatoinal three weeks later. Lexington lost to a damage control error. Hey stuff happens.

Only at Midway, do we see a decisive result and it can be argued that the result was as much due to Japanese poor tactical use of her air forces and lack of coordination as to the skill of the US airmen. There was also a large measure of "luck" involved, as there is in any battle.

Actually Coral Sea was fairly decisive. It thwarted immediate Japanese ambitions for Port Moresby, invalided two Japanese CVs prior to operaion AF, and drew the Japanese into a muckraking fistfight in the Guadalcanal campaign. As to Midway, most of the lucky breaks there greatly favored the Japanese. Were it not for bad luck at Midway, the USN would have had no luck at all.

Again, what is the basis for your opinion that the US would, more often than not, win a CV vs CV battle early in the war?

I said the F4F would consistently beat the A6M. I also said that any USN CV from the get go should have as good a chance 1 for 1 against a Japanese CV as the Japanese CV. Some of the elements of that opinion have been mentioned above.

Lundstrom and Frank certainly won't help you here.

Of course they do. Especially Lundstom. Fact remains that the USN won the first two engagements in which CVs faced CVs.

The fact remains that the historical record doesn't support the outcome of such an action. If anything, it presents the opposite potentiality.

Only if you fabricate a history to hang your argument on. The only data available suggest to the contrary.

[mdiehl]

http://www.cv6.org/1942/marshalls/marshalls_2.htm

Quick summary: No VF6 aircraft lost that day to enemy action. 1 F4F pilot, Ensn Criswell, lost operationally in a crash on take-off attributed to "disorientation."

No SBDs definitely lost to enemy fighters although it is possible the Claude's contributed to the loss of some of them. The unit history says the SBD pilots thought that the Claude pilots were not very capable.

In their first encounter with their Japanese counterparts, the Air Group came away less than impressed, noting the Japanese fighters seemed easily discouraged when faced with two or three SBDs working together defensively.

So, Chez, your description of the Tarawa/Marshalls raid is riddled with errors.

[Ron Saueracker]

I'm just wondering how these different performance characteristics and tactical doctrines could actually have been modelled in the game. I know we all bitch about how the model sucks but I'm at a loss how this could have been done sufficiently. I was thinking the same about land combat as well. (I still have the odd smoke and this is what I was thinking of while having a rare puff outside![8|] I think I have a morbid fascination with this darn game,)

[Berkut]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The problem is that later in the war, when both sides started committing relatively poorly trained pilots to the campaign, is that one of the problems was not just lack of combat experience, it was lack of even flight time!

That is incorrect though. Late in the war the Allies were not committing poorly trained pilots to the engagement. Indeed, while pre-war Allied training was very good (in the USN/USMC) and adequate (USAAF), training programs intensified as the war progress, producing both greater numbers of pilots and those with more intensive and realistic combat training. These included flying combat exercises against friendly a.c. of type, flying combat exercises against other branch services, and in the USN case, an advanced fighter school (similar to modern Top Gun). During the interval from 1942-1944, flying time in training increased. By 1944 the US had so many very well trained pilots that pilot training programs were being scaled back.

As to whether or not "any combat experience is better than none at all." Gee it sure sounds appealing to "common sense." But whether it is universally true is open to debate. Many dicta of common sense turn out to be baseless when explored in detail.

For example I note that the most intensely trained units in the USAAF (Tuskeegee airmen) were immediately successful and superior to the veteran German pilots that they faced. As with many of the ?? aspects of this game, where and how the EXP index is derived is a black box. It does not seem closely tied to anything in particular in the real world.

Uhh, I said "later in the war", not "late in the war". A rather big difference.

Read Fire in the Sky, for a great discussion about the inadequacies of the USAAF training program in 1942 and early 43.

Yes, by the end of 43 and into 44 this had been worked out rather nicely.

[mogami]

Hi, Well the lazy designers should have just coded Aces of the Pacific (with expanded data base of every single aircraft on the planet during the war) And then during air combat you and as many friends as needed flew each and every aircraft. So simple I don't understand why it wasn't done. Whats so hard about coding it so the player flies every aircraft of WWII?

[bradfordkay]

"Hi, I think all the pilots are over rated. I think a 70 should be a really great pilot with 40-50 your normal pre combat but trained pilot. "

I am in complete agreement here. On Dec 7, 1941, we have many pilots with experience ratings in the 90s. This means that these guys can game substantially no experience the rest of the war!!!

"Even USN had problems with A6M2 as late as Coral Sea they were still thinking IJN was flying ME-109"

In Lundstrom's "First Team", this was discussed. One pilot mentioned the fact that when viewed from above and behind, the sleek fuselage made the plane look like one equipped with an inline engine. When combined with the oversized spinner on the Zero's prop, it was a simple mistake (those two aircraft shared the oversized spinner).

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Lexington lost to a damage control error. Hey stuff happens.

Yes, and especially when Fletcher was around.

[mdiehl]

To be fair, Tristanjohn, was any class of fighting ships named after *that* Fletcher (FJ?). Certainly not the ww2 vintage DDs.

Read Fire in the Sky, for a great discussion about the inadequacies of the USAAF training program in 1942 and early 43.

I've read it. To reiterate I think it is not very detailed, not particularly analytical, presents little in the way of compelling empirical evidence, and relies far too heavily on anecdotes. As a history of Allied air operations in the SOPac I give it a C-. Were I teaching a course on WW2 in the PTO in 1942-1943, FitS would not be recommended reading except perhaps as the object of a critical book review.

Touched with Fire seemed better to me. FitS almost seemed like it was written from the gleanings not used in Touched with Fire. On the other hand I have found other texts on the ground campaign (Frank's Guadalcanal, Eric Hammel's Munda Trail) to be more informative.

[mdiehl]

Uhh, I said "later in the war", not "late in the war". A rather big difference.

Well, unless you want to be specific as to when the comment has little value. I could in theory pick any particular time as a rebuttal and be told that is not the interval you had in mind. For what it is worth, the abridged USAAF history indicates that USAAF pilot training programs produced pilots with 400 hours of advanced flight training, aerial gunnery training, and advanced combat training.

That stands in contrast to late war German pilot total training air time averages of about 150 hours and Japanese pilot air time <100 hours.

I doubt that at any time during the war USAAF pilots were deployed with fewer than 200 hours of total training air time. So at no point would any rookie USAAF pilot be as inadequately trained as a later war Japanese or German pilot.

No breakdown given though on how that 400 hours worked. I can get you the reference if you are interested. IIRC that claim at least for the USAAF covers the period from some time in 1943 onward. USAAF pre-war pilots also had substantial amounts of air time. So if there was a period of desperation for USAAF pilots it was likely in late 1942. At least that's my best guess.

[Berkut]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Uhh, I said "later in the war", not "late in the war". A rather big difference.

Well, unless you want to be specific as to when the comment has little value. I could in theory pick any particular time as a rebuttal and be told that is not the interval you had in mind.

No, you could pick any time frame in question OTHER THAN the one I had in mind, and be told that wasn't the interval I was talking about.

If you think I am going to lie about what I meant just to score a meaningless point...why bother discussing anything?

My point was...hell, I don't even remember what my original point was trying to support. In any case, "later in the war", later than the early portion, the USAAF put out some pretty poorly trained pilots.

For what it is worth, the abridged USAAF history indicates that USAAF pilot training programs produced pilots with 400 hours of advanced flight training, aerial gunnery training, and advanced combat training.

eventually...

That stands in contrast to late war German pilot total training air time averages of about 150 hours and Japanese pilot air time <100 hours.

I doubt that at any time during the war USAAF pilots were deployed with fewer than 200 hours of total training air time. So at no point would any rookie USAAF pilot be as inadequately trained as a later war Japanese or German pilot.

No argument from me, I've never said otherwise.

No breakdown given though on how that 400 hours worked. I can get you the reference if you are interested. IIRC that claim at least for the USAAF covers the period from some time in 1943 onward. USAAF pre-war pilots also had substantial amounts of air time. So if there was a period of desperation for USAAF pilots it was likely in late 1942. At least that's my best guess.

Agreed. Late '42, early '43, when attrition had gotten going, but the training pipeline had not really caught up yet.

[mdiehl]

Well then I'd like to see the reasoning that suggests USAAF pilots were poorly trained at any time during the war. I agree that 200 hours, being less than 400 hours, was not as useful. The question is whether or not in late 1942 200 hours was the right kind of training to allow USAAF pilots to hold their own or outperform Japanese pilots?

[jwilkerson]

Hi Tris, Welcome back ! How did you rate 5 months off ?? Where do I sign up ???

... You seem to believe that the Zero Bonus was something real, when in fact it is nothing more than a kind of artifact imposed by a game designer on one of his system's mathematical models. The Zero Bonus is not something which needs to be proven invalid (difficult in any case--proving negatives is an endless chore) but rather something which needs to be proven to be valid--that is, evidence needs to be presented that the Zero Bonus has validity based on historical results. There has to be a reason (and very good reason at that) to implement this kind of a dynamic. If no such reason can be presented, then the dynamic must be judged invalid.

The duration of the Zero Bonus within the game's structure is an arbitrary factor as well. It could just as easily extend from the beginning of the war through the end of 1941, or for any other period arbitrarily chosen by the designer. Again, this is not something which needs to be shown to be invalid but shown to be valid in the first place by that designer.

Just thought I'd make a small non-aligned point regarding "proofs" ( being a mathematician by original training ). A computer wargame ( or a board wargame for that matter ) is not a mathematical proposition. The designer is perfectly free to make ANY decision he ( or she ) wishes when designing a game. The Zero bonus is certainly an abstraction - it certainly is not real ( there were no cups of ZB Exlicor for IJN pilots to pour over their aircraft prior to take off ) .. the ZB is not real !!! The designer decided to put this abstraction in the game rightly or wrongly - and in general "design decisions" do not need to be justified ( remember that old SPI qualification - "rules question" will be answered - but not "design questions" or words to that effect ) ... so for better or worse ... abstractions such as the ZB may be added by the designer with no justification whatsoever. It is up to us to accept or reject, by whether we buy and play the game, that is all .. that is how this "system" works. Unlike mathematical propositions which do need to be proven true or false unless they remain unproven in which case they are called conjectures.

[Lt. Calley]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

It is up to us to accept or reject, by whether we buy and play the game, that is all ..

No, that is not all, we can get rid of the zero bonus by using the editor and/or playing the CHS version if it gets rid of the bonus.

[Ron Saueracker]

I'm a big fan of FJ Fletcher. No idea why he get's crapped on.

[mdiehl]

No, that is not all, we can get rid of the zero bonus by using the editor and/or playing the CHS version if it gets rid of the bonus.

Problem is that using the editor to kill the ZB won't fix the problem. Who wants to buy a game knowing that it is so badly researched and designed that you have to use the editor to repair almost every underlying assumption in the data before you get something that works properly? Some do apparently.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

No, that is not all, we can get rid of the zero bonus by using the editor and/or playing the CHS version if it gets rid of the bonus.

Problem is that using the editor to kill the ZB won't fix the problem. Who wants to buy a game knowing that it is so badly researched and designed that you have to use the editor to repair almost every underlying assumption in the data before you get something that works properly? Some do apparently.

Too bad the editor can't fix what the devs refuse to.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

To be fair, Tristanjohn, was any class of fighting ships named after *that* Fletcher (FJ?). Certainly not the ww2 vintage DDs.

That WWII destroyer class was named after his uncle, Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher. This guy was awarded the Medal of Honor for his "action" at the trumped-up incident of Vera Cruz in 1914. He was a rear admiral then. His widow, Susan Hunt Stetson, dedicated USS Fletcher (DD-445) in 1942.

Years later, the Navy, always glad to salute a Fletcher, then named a Spruance-class (DD-992) for Frank Jack Fletcher. The younger Fletcher was a lieutenant serving under his uncle at Vera Cruz, and I believe, like old Uncle Friday, he actually did on one occasion or two actually step ashore. If memory serves, his citation mentioned "helping refugees to safety" or some such nonsense. (That could be easily looked up.)

Hell, I'll do it for you. Frank Jack's citation reads:

For distinguished conduct in battle, engagements of Vera Cruz, 21 and 22 April 1914. Under fire, Lt. Fletcher was eminent and conspicuous in performance of his duties. He was in charge of the Esperanze and succeeded in getting on board over 350 refugees, many of them after the conflict had commenced. Although the ship was under fire, being struck more than 30 times, he succeeded in getting all the refugees placed in safety. Lt. Fletcher was later placed in charge of the train conveying refugees under a flag of truce. This was hazardous duty, as it was believed that the track was mined, and a small error in dealing with the Mexican guard of soldiers might readily have caused a conflict, such a conflict at one time being narrowly averted. It was greatly due to his efforts in establishing friendly relations with the Mexican soldiers that so many refugees succeeded in reaching Vera Cruz from the interior.

Frank Friday's citation reads sillier still:

For distinguished conduct in battle, engagements of Vera Cruz, 21 and 22 April 1914. Under fire, Rear Adm. Fletcher was eminent and conspicuous in the performance of his duties; was senior officer present at Vera Cruz, and the landing and the operations of the landing force were carried out under his orders and directions. In connection with these operations, he was at times on shore and under fire.

Anyway, the latter Fletcher was launched 16 June 1979, about six years after Frank Jack died.

Here is a portrait of Frank Friday Fletcher.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

I'm a big fan of FJ Fletcher. No idea why he get's crapped on.

Well, I guess if you were a big fan of his then you wouldn't, would you? [8D]

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Hi Tris, Welcome back ! How did you rate 5 months off ?? Where do I sign up ???

... You seem to believe that the Zero Bonus was something real, when in fact it is nothing more than a kind of artifact imposed by a game designer on one of his system's mathematical models. The Zero Bonus is not something which needs to be proven invalid (difficult in any case--proving negatives is an endless chore) but rather something which needs to be proven to be valid--that is, evidence needs to be presented that the Zero Bonus has validity based on historical results. There has to be a reason (and very good reason at that) to implement this kind of a dynamic. If no such reason can be presented, then the dynamic must be judged invalid.

The duration of the Zero Bonus within the game's structure is an arbitrary factor as well. It could just as easily extend from the beginning of the war through the end of 1941, or for any other period arbitrarily chosen by the designer. Again, this is not something which needs to be shown to be invalid but shown to be valid in the first place by that designer.

Just thought I'd make a small non-aligned point regarding "proofs" ( being a mathematician by original training ). A computer wargame ( or a board wargame for that matter ) is not a mathematical proposition. The designer is perfectly free to make ANY decision he ( or she ) wishes when designing a game. The Zero bonus is certainly an abstraction - it certainly is not real ( there were no cups of ZB Exlicor for IJN pilots to pour over their aircraft prior to take off ) .. the ZB is not real !!! The designer decided to put this abstraction in the game rightly or wrongly - and in general "design decisions" do not need to be justified ( remember that old SPI qualification - "rules question" will be answered - but not "design questions" or words to that effect ) ... so for better or worse ... abstractions such as the ZB may be added by the designer with no justification whatsoever. It is up to us to accept or reject, by whether we buy and play the game, that is all .. that is how this "system" works. Unlike mathematical propositions which do need to be proven true or false unless they remain unproven in which case they are called conjectures.

Joe, I speak to the "debate" here, not a designer's rights as defined under our Constitution. It is the bad argument I'm after, not Gary or his Zero Bonus or anything else. We're basically stuck gamewise with much of what Gary provided--that, and a House Rules list as long as your arm. I just can't stand idly by while one flimsy argument after another is presented on these boards defending Gary's work. That's too much for me.

Perhaps I should start a new thread and discuss what constitutes good argument vis-a-vis bad argument, good logic verus bad logic, point out what fallacious reasoning is, why an ad hominem plea doesn't fly in educated circles, and all that. In fact I think I just might. Because this board, with the exception of a precious few who post here, hasn't got a clue.