'Enduring the Whirlwind' by Gregory Liedtke review is up on AWNT blog

[sullafelix]

http://www.awargamersneedfulthings.co.u ... edtke.html

The book is about the actual ability of Germany to replace it's losses in the first two years of the war in Russia.

Thanks

[Blond_Knight]

Hmmm I'll have to see if its available in Kindle.

[warspite1]

This book is potentially interesting but I don’t really understand, what is being proven here:

Having bluffed and been able to conquer on the cheap until June 1941, you can see that in no way was Germany ready for a war on the scale it fought in Russia.

Okay so this is well known and detailed by Cooper amongst others. The German Army on the Eastern Front was tasked with way more than it was capable of handling – as they massively under-estimated the material and manpower strength of the Red Army. Hitler invaded the USSR with barely more tanks than he had for France, though in true Hitler style he created more panzer divisions, so the worst of both worlds - more non-combat troops and staffs and a drop in individual panzer division strength..…. but I digress.

He challenges the etched in stone belief that the Germans were swamped by the Russians and could not keep up with the material and manpower losses. The author has shown that between June of 1941 and July of 1943, the Germans were able to mostly make up for their losses on the eastern front.

But even if they were able to replace the losses of both men and material, they were simply replacing what was insufficient in the first place.

The book not only shows the toll taken on the German Army, but also shows the terrible losses of men and materials that the Russians had to try to replace in that span of time.

As you say yourself, replacing battle-hardened, trained infantry and tankmen, with raw recruits is a problem – as is making good losses through the employment of the 2nd Hungarian, 8th Italian and 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies.

Re the Soviets, again, a given. The horrendous numbers lost in the early encirclements and in the too-hastily ordered counter-attacks – particularly that pre-Blue – are all well known. But if one looks at the numbers engaged in individual battles, the Soviets were able to field more men. That they could bleed the 6th Army white, while building up massive reserves on either flank to enable Uranus is an obvious example.

The surplus of armaments on hand were usually greater than their losses at most points.

Okay, but if they are not getting those armaments to the front then that is all part of the problem. If the equipment cannot be got to where it needs to be then it could be on the moon for all the good it does stuck at railheads. Moreover, is that, in addition to not being able to move the equipment to where it needs to go, they are not able to man those weapons anyway. If they suddenly had all this excess of quality material, why not give it to the Romanians and Hungarians – not to mention the Italians? – all of whom were crying out for better anti-tank weapons, not to mention armour. Not that they would have been able to deliver this equipment to them anymore easily…

One thing the book brings out is even when the equipment was available in Germany, it was usually sitting by the rail heads unable to be shipped to where it was needed. The shortage of railways and of trains was felt from the beginning of the War in Russia until the end.

The problems of rail capacity, the different gauge railways – not to mention using valuable and desperately needed rail stock for the Final Solution, again is well known.

The details of the book show that contrary to other histories, women were used in the work place at a higher level than the Allies at times.

Interesting. I would like to know more about this.

"In short, the German Army was able to generate forces of prodigious strength three times in the space of two and one-half years. If these efforts were ultimately insufficient to produce victory between June 1941 and July 1943, the root cause of Germany's failure during the Russo-German War reside elsewhere." He is able to show that the German Army was sufficiently staffed and equipped by the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Prodigious strength? Well everything is relative isn’t it? The fact is that for the war they were fighting the strength was insufficient:
a) The Wehrmacht units were insufficient for Barbarossa
b) After the Winter of 1941-42 the Germans could no longer consider offensives along the entire front and the two subsequent offensives were of increasingly smaller size.
c) For Blau, the southern army group was able to be reinforced and re-equipped only by removing almost all armour and much of the air force from the other army groups.
d) By the time of Kursk, the size and scope of the offensive was limited to the area of the bulge created either side of the city. Yes the Germans, relatively, brought together armies of great strength, but in no way were they keeping up with losses on a like for like basis.

Sufficiently staffed and equipped for Kursk? By what measure? If its against success or failure, well obviously not as the enemy was so much stronger and the Germans were beaten and had to abandon the offensive.

So not really sure what this book is adding to what is already known. The Germans were swamped by the Russians. They started Barbarossa in no fit shape to win it and soon suffered crippling manpower losses. So even if they kept up with losses in manpower (numbers not quality) and material (quality was improving, as was the enemy's as pre-war material was replaced with newer models) they were doing so in an environment where the enemy was getting relatively stronger.

[sullafelix]

The author wants to show that contrary to what others have stated the Germans were not swamped by the Russians.
His argument is mostly that you cannot blame the German losses for them not being able to win in Russia.
As I stated in the review from what I have read the Germans 'getting swamped' happened after Kursk.
I agree with your statements.
I believe the author is aiming at the 'Germans would have one if they had gone into a war economy earler' crowd.
A few books have also said they lost at Kursk because of not having enough infantry replacements.
The other point you could raise is it is possible that the Germans were able to keep up with making older equipment.What use would a 'door knocker' be in 1942?
There have been many histories written in the west that just take for granted all of the excuses that the German generals voiced after the war. Not enough replacements, and not enough equipment.

[Blond_Knight]

ORIGINAL: sulla05


His argument is mostly that you cannot blame the German losses for them not being able to win in Russia.

Haha what?
There is no way Germany could have won after they failed to capture Moscow. Maybe they could have won without Hitler, but the irony is without him they'd never attacked the Soviets in the first place.

[sullafelix]

I think people forget how one sided the Russian front histories were before the last twenty years and the opening up of the Russian archives.
We had to unlearn everything we had read for the thirty yeasrs before then.
Tons of books in libraries, and still in print are all based on the German generals and their attempt to explain away their defeat.

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The German Army on the Eastern Front was tasked with way more than it was capable of handling – as they massively under-estimated the material and manpower strength of the Red Army.

True, but IMHO the key here was the infamous Hitlerite "all you have to do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will crumble to the ground".

After all, the Werhmacht did all they could and more (inflicting astronomical losses) and yet the rotten structure did not crumble. But who really thought -summer, autumn 1941 - they would not be knocked out?

The amazing thing is that they kept fighting.

A fatal strategic mistake. The Japanese did exactly the same: "the decadent and soft Americans will give up after our blows".

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The German Army on the Eastern Front was tasked with way more than it was capable of handling – as they massively under-estimated the material and manpower strength of the Red Army.

True, but IMHO the key here was the infamous Hitlerite "all you have to do is kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will crumble to the ground".

After all, the Werhmacht did all they could and more (inflicting astronomical losses) and yet the rotten structure did not crumble. But who really thought -summer, autumn 1941 - they would not be knocked out?

The amazing thing is that they kept fighting.

warspite1

Well quite. And why was that? A very interesting subject. What was it about the Soviet soldier in WWII that meant, even when the situation was hopeless, he kept fighting and extracting maximum casualties on the Germans - casualties, regardless of the book above, they simply could not afford?

Was it, like with the US, the anger that they had been attacked without warning - and in this case from a supposed ally? (to the common soldier that may have appeared so).

Was it that they knew what would happen if they surrendered to the Germans? (not so much the case I would have thought in the early battles).

Was it simply fear of the consequences from their own side - political officers - if they retreated or didn't advance? (again maybe not so much in the early stages?).

Was it love of the Motherland? (maybe but there cannot have been much love of Russia for many of the non-Russian soldiers given their treatment in the 20's and 30's.

Who knows - but its a good job they did.

[TulliusDetritus]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Well quite. And why was that? [...] even when the situation was hopeless, he kept fighting and extracting maximum casualties on the Germans

You summarise the reasons pretty well. Psychiatrists and sociologists could perhaps add something.

[Capt. Harlock]

Was it, like with the US, the anger that they had been attacked without warning - and in this case from a supposed ally? (to the common soldier that may have appeared so).

Was it that they knew what would happen if they surrendered to the Germans? (not so much the case I would have thought in the early battles).

Was it simply fear of the consequences from their own side - political officers - if they retreated or didn't advance? (again maybe not so much in the early stages?).

Was it love of the Motherland? (maybe but there cannot have been much love of Russia for many of the non-Russian soldiers given their treatment in the 20's and 30's.

It's worth considering that Russian Empire soldiery was also willing to sustain massive casualties during WWI. Perhaps eastern Europeans simply didn't consider their lives as worthwhile as did Britons or Frenchmen.

[demyansk]

I wonder what would happen if we were invaded? Our snowflakes would worry about losing their social media. "No safe zones".

[Blond_Knight]

ORIGINAL: demjansk

I wonder what would happen if we were invaded?

Ive often wondered about that. An elastic defense sure makes sense when you have no connection to the land, but defending our homes?
I think that would quickly take on the character of the Eastern front in WW2 with hard desperate fighting and savage partisan actions.
And as for the snowflakes...there'd be a lot of women with shaved heads, and men shot for collaboration afterwards.